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ABstract 
ABSTRACT 
The Constitution of India provides: for a system of 
government which can be described as federal - parliamentary. 
That 'Federalism' and 'Parliamentary government' are, to a 
certain extent, mutually inconsistent is a well - known 
proposition. The imperatives of national unity and co-operative 
federalism, which received a conspicuously articulate recognition 
from the founding fathers, further complicate the situation. 
Given this frame work, it is not difficult to appreciate that the 
Governor of a State in India has to play a somewhat complex 
role. Before the fourth general elections in 1967, the Congress 
was having a clear majority at the Centre and in most of the 
States. Ministries in the States enjoyed great stability because 
the governments, namely at the Centre and in the States, were 
run by the same party. Hence the Governor's role was not a 
matter of public controversy and least attention was paid to it. 
Sarojini Naidu, one time Governor of Uttar Pradesh, said that 
she considered herself "a bird in a golden cage". B. Pattabhi 
Sitaranayya a former Governor of Madhya Pradesh, also 
observed that he had no public function to perform except 
making the fortnightly report to the President. 
The 1967 general elections witnessed a drastic change in 
the political States of affairs. Although Congress retained power 
at the Centre, it lost its base in eight States that is West Bengal, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala, Punjab, Haryana and 
Madhya Pradesh where non-Congress and coalition 
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governments came to power. The reason for the unity among 
allies of the coeilition ministries was their bitter opposition to the 
Congress regime and a desire to achieve power but they could 
not maintain their unity for a long time. The period between 
1967 and 1970 saw the downfall more than two dozen ministries 
in different States giving birth to political defections and 
opportunistic tendencies aiid as a result, the Governors started 
facing complexities, prbssures and strains in exercising their 
powers and positioh. The office of the Governor suddenly become 
significattt and cohtrovetsial and the role of the Governor was 
questioned fot the fit-st time. As a result, many debates took 
place to restructure the constitutional framework concerning the 
office and rolfe of the Grovernor in a federal set-up. When the 
Chief Ministers belonged to the opposition, the Governor was 
considered as thfe Centre's agent and when there was a coalition 
government, the Chief Ministers position was rendered 
ineffectual. As a result the Governor started playing a stubborn 
role, which gave birth to debatable issues concerning the 
constitutional powers of the Governor. Form time to time, the 
role of Governor has made Indian citizen feel that they are living 
in a very fragile democratic realm which can be shaken 
effortlessly by the Governor. It is well known fact that the 
Governors have played a dictatorial role many time and 
transcended all the democratic limits. Different political parties 
have misused the role of the Governor at different times for their 
partisan interests, thus proving that Indian society has yet to 
achieve the State of political moderniation and political culture. 
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The present study is divided into 5 chapters. The first 
chapter which is the 'introduction'. As the nature of every such 
office is to some extent rootfed in the past it was thought 
indisputable essential to trace. Therefore, the very first chapter 
has been devoted to this problem. In connection with the office of 
the Governor, it seems important to analyse the in view of the 
fact that some provisions of the previous Acts such as 
Government of India Act 1909, 1919, and 1935. 
The second chapter is concerned with 'the Governor 
constitutional position and functions' in India. The Governor is 
the executive head of the State government. All executive 
authority of thfe State is vested in him which he can exercise 
directly or through officers subordinate to him. As the head of 
the State, the Governor appoint the Chief Minister, which in post 
1967 period claimed much attention of the authorities on the 
subject. The matter of appointment of the Chief Minister may 
appear to be simple under normal circumstances, but assumes 
great signific^ce at certain other times. Various political 
scenarios might present themselves before the Governor and 
depending upon the situation, he has either to act strictly 
according to the provisions of the Constitution or use his 
discretion. When a single party secures an absolute majority in 
the State Legislative Assembly after the electrtions, the task of 
the Governor in the appointment of the Chief Minister is simple. 
He has no other alternative but to call the leader of the majority 
party to form his ministry. The task of the Governor becomes 
somewhat complicated when no single party secures a majority 
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in the State Assembly. Hete the Governor has to appoint the 
Chief Minister at his discretion. The criteria that influences the 
decision of the Governor in such a situation is that the person to 
chosen should, in his opinion, be in a position to mobilize 
majority support in the Assembley. The Constitution has also 
assigned some judicial functions to Governor. The Governor 
decides matters relating to the appointments and transfers of the 
judges of the High Court and posting and promotion of district 
judges and other judicial officers. Besides, this the politics of 
granting pardon on account of pressures has also been a matter 
of concern in the role of the Governor. The Discretionary power 
of the Governor is much debated in the recent past. The 
Governor has exercised his discretion in the appointment of the 
Chief Minister, dismissal of the Chief Minister and the Council of 
Ministers, suspension of the Legislative Assembly, dissolution of 
the Legislature, i-ecomttiending to the President to issue a 
proclamation of emergency, and matters related to the Assent to 
the Bills. These Discretionary powers are misunderstood and 
misused by the Governor in the State. The Governor is the 
Chancellor of the State Universities. But the function of the 
Chancellor is a statutory function. The Governor as the head of 
the State is very limited role to play in the administration of the 
State but as a Chancellor he may play very significant role in the 
field of higher education. He is not the executive functionary of 
the University but being the head of the University he can issue 
guidance and instructions to the Universities for their proper 
functioning. 
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The third chapter expresses the relationship between 'the 
Governor and the Legislature'. In the very beginning the chapter 
dealt with the politics of nominating members to the Legislature. 
The Governor has the power to nominate some members of the 
Anglo-Indian Community to the Legislative Assembly in case he/ 
she finds that it does not have adequate representation in that 
House. He also nominates 1/6^^ of the member's to Legislative 
Council from among jiersons having special knowledge or 
experience in the fields of science, arts, social service, 
cooperative movement. Then comes the power to summon and 
prorogue the legislature and dissolution of the Legislative 
Assembly the popular chamber of the State. The summoning and 
prorogation of the Legislature do not seem controversial to a 
layman, the Governor may play a major role in saving and 
ousting a partifcular Council of Ministers, as our has show- In 
the pre-1967 period it is true that this power is not misused, but 
the development in the post-1967 period shows a groomy 
picture. So far as the prorogation of the Legislature is concerned 
in some of the States the Governor being a constitutional head, 
went to the extent of saving a particular Chief Minister by the 
misused of his power. On the advice of the Election Commission, 
he can decide a matter relating to disqualification of a member of 
the Legislature if the member's election is challenged. The 
Governor powers to Message to House and Special Address to 
the House also analyzed in this chapter. Hereafter comes the 
power of the Governor to Assent and Reservation of Bills. The 
Governor an integral part of the State Legislature. Therefore, all 
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Bills passed by the State Legislature are subject to his assent. 
Whenever a Bill passed by the State Legislature is received by 
him, the Governor has these options:{ a) he may straightaway 
give his assent; (b) withhold it; (c) reserve it for consideration of 
the President; (d) retune it (in case of only non - Money Bills) to 
the Legislature for recorisidieration. It is provided that he/she 
connote withhold his assent on a Bill in case it is re- adopted by 
the Legislature whfethfer arty of his recommendations has been 
accepted or not. Afccdrding to Article 200 of the Constitution, 
certain categories of riills connote be assented by the Governor 
and they have to be reserved for consideration by the President 
of India. Legislatioh for compulsory acquisition of private 
property; or Bills likely to adversely affect the powers of the High 
Courts; or Bills seeking to impose taxes on item declared 
'essential' by ah Act of Parliament; or Legislation likely to be in 
conflict with some law of the Parliament covering a subject in the 
concurrent list; or other Bill likely to create conflict with the 
Union government fall in this category. The Governor has the 
power of issuing Ordinance. Despite the fact that this provisions 
was adopted by the framers of the Constitution for certain 
unseen contingencies, it is misused in a State even to protect a 
legislator whose elections petition was pending in the High 
Court. 
The fourth chapter deals with *the Governor and Centre -
State Relations'. The proper working of the office of Governor in 
India is of crucial importance not only for the proper functioning 
of the federation but also for the success of the democratic 
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system of government in the country. The Centre -State relations 
which till 1967 were not put to test due to the Congress party 
monopoly at the Centre and most of the States, but after fourth 
general elections there was confusion in political set up of the 
country. This chapter analyses the Administrative relations 
between Centre and State governments. It is also necessary to 
set out the relevant provisions in the Constitution which operate 
in the field of Centre-State relationship which may have their 
impact on such relationship. There are two separate fields in 
which the Governor is to function, namely the State - field; and 
non-State field. In the State field the Governor is an executive 
head and functions on the advice of his Council of Ministers 
except in the exercise of his discretion. The Governor functions 
in the Non - State field are such as laid down in part XI of the 
Constitution under 'Administrative Relations' (Chapter II ). In 
matters covered by Articles 256, 257 arid 258 the Governor 
could not easily act on advice of his ministers, if that advice was 
contrary to the directions of the Central government, t h i s is an 
important exception to the doctrine of parliamentary government 
in the States. The most important Articles that make the 
Governor an agent of the Centre are Articles 155 and 156. Article 
155 vests the power of appointment of the Governor in the 
President of India and Article 156 requires the Governor to hold 
office during the pleasure of the President. The every Governor 
owes his office to the President and may lose it if the President 
so desires. The effect of this means that the Governor is 
dependent upon the Prime Minister and the Union Home 
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Minister for his removal. As such, the Governor for the fear of 
losing his office or of not getting any other government 
assignment after his present term he may heed the prompting of 
the Union more carefully than the advice of his own Council of 
Ministers. Recently in Jharkhand, Goa, and Bihar Governors 
acts established him as the agent of the Ceritral government. 
The fifth Chapter is concerned with 'the Governor and 
Al-ticle 356' of the Constitution of India. The careful analysis of 
the application of Article 356 brings to light the provision had 
not been used very much for the purpose for which it was 
itlcol-porated. Since the ihauguration of the Constitution in 1950 
President's rule was proclsiimed more than hundreds times. It is 
iti this background that chapter is tried to analyze the 
Constituent Assembly Debates and background, in which the 
provision wds included in the Constitution to dismiss a duly 
elected government. After the Genesis of the Article 356, Federsil 
sjsirit and Actibn of Article 356 of the Constitution is analyzed. 
India is a country having a federal system which in practice 
shows the dominance of the Union government over the State 
government. To establish this situation Governor a 
representative of Centre place a key role. Article 356 has 
empowered the Governor to shows its presence in the State. The 
use of Article 356 is conditioned by the Report from the Governor 
of the State., or 'otherwise" than the Governor's Report; the 
President must be satisfied; and the Breakdown of constitutional 
machinery in a State, analysis of each ingredient is essential. 
Hereafter, comes the Parliamentary control mechanism of Article 
JlBstrdct 
356 bf the Constitution of India. Then comes the Judicial 
Interpretation of Article 356 of the Constitution of India. The first 
case on the issue of President's rule in State was decided by the 
Kerala High Court. But the Bommai case is a landmark in the 
history of the India Constitution. After the Supreme Court's 
judgment in the S.R. Bommai case, it is well settled that the 
Article 356 is an extreme power and is to be used as a last resort 
in cases where it is manifest that there is an impass and the 
constitutional machinery in a State has collapsed. 
The last chapter contains 'Conclusion* has been highlights 
the problems in the totality in the cohtext of the role of Governor 
since 1971 and suggests ways and means to proper functioning 
of the office of the Governor. 
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PREFACE 
The office of the Governor has a long history, though none 
too pleasant. Its colonial origin ethos and bureaucratic 
background naturally occasioned animated discussions in the 
Constituent Assembly on such aspect as the appointment, 
powers and functions of the Governors. Eventually, the framers 
of the Constitution assigned to him a somewhat complex role -
he was made a component of the State apparatus as well as a 
link between the Union and the federating unit, the latter in 
particular investing him with " a significance for national 
integration and for the preservation of national standards." 
There was hardly any occasion for the Governor to exercise 
his seemingly irreconcilable dual role for the first two decades 
after independence in view of the existence of political harmony 
between the Union and the State governments resulting from the 
functioning of virtual one- party rule in the country. 
Consequently, the Constitution operated as a unitary one not 
even with subsidiary federal features. For the beginning, the 
Governor tended to be an "ornamental sinecure" concerned 
mostly with the discharge of formal functions like the swearing -
in of Ministers; addressing the Legislature at the commencement 
of sessions, and gracing official functions with his presence. It is 
also important to note that the first decade after the 
independence happened to be an era of dominating Chief 
Ministers, who wielded considerable political influence with the 
Centre leadership of the Congress party and exercised almost 
111 
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undisputed sway over their cabinets and the State units of the 
Congress party. This set a pattern of relationships between the 
Governors and the Chief Ministers in which the former tended to 
endure 'abnegation' of their role; they were frequently 
'outflanked' and were finally reduced to non - entities. Only in 
rare cases did their role attract some attention in Parliament and 
Media, with the result that the institution "languished from the 
incognizance" it has suffered. 
The 1967 general elections brought about radical 
transformation in the political spectrum of the country. The 
Congress party lost its monopoly in several States, where, 
coalition governments came into existence. The one common 
element which united minor parties against the Congress in 
these States was their desire to unseat the latter from power 
which it had wielded for two decades. Soon after the functioning 
of the coalition governments in the States, interesting 
constitutional problems arose which made the office of the 
Governor a real focus of an animated discussion. The Governor 
was no longer treated as an innocent figure. The opposition 
parties in the Centre and their governments in the States 
characterized the Governor as an instrument of Centre. 
Even after more than five decades of the working of Indian 
Constitution the controversies relating to the office of the 
Governor still remain in lime light.The period since 1971 to 
present day is very significant in the independence India. During 
this period new forces, figure in Indian politics leadings to 
tensions, turmoil misunderstandings and confusion in the States 
iv 
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consequently the role and position of the Governor has assumed 
new dimensions as a guardian of State administration. The split 
in the Congress party, the wave of political defections, the 
formation of coalition government in various States, regional 
tendencies and separatist movements also significant of the 
Governor's role. The period of my study is since 1971 but I have 
tried to incorporate the past developments also. As the study 
should have been started since 1971 but during the course of 
this study it was realized that for a proper, complete and 
comprehensive understanding of the subject, it is necessary to 
give a past development also. 
Aims and objectivfes:-
The purpose of my study is analyse the important provisions 
relating to the powers and functions of the Governor, how these 
powers have been exercised sittce the commencement of the 
Constitution, how to safeguard and ensure the smooth working 
of parliamentary demdcracy in States even in the most difficult 
situations. The main objectives of the study are:-
(i) To focus on the role of the Governor as a result of the 
provisions of the Constitution as well as the political 
usage of the office particularly since 1971. 
(ii) To ascertain whether the founding fathers of the 
Constitution were justified in incorporating Article 356 
in the Constitution of India, 
(iii) To analyse the real scope and ambit of the term "failure 
of the constitutional machinery in the State." 
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(iv) To examine whether the Parliament can rectify the 
defects, if any, in case excesses are committed by the 
Union Executive, 
(v) To discuss whether the Court can adjudicate on the 
validity of the Presidential proclamation. 
Research Design ds Methodology: 
The methodology used for the study is analj^ical, empirical 
and historical. Case study method is also widely used. The study 
is primary based on the primary documents, government reports 
of various Committee and Commission and Constituent 
Assembly Debates, The secondary sources as books, articles in 
journal, magazine and newspapers. In addition to these, the 
decisions of various High Courts and Supreme Court of India 
have been extensively used as primary data. 
The thesis has been divided into six chapters. The Introduction' 
is given in the first chapter. The role of the Governor under the 
Act of 1909, 1919 and 1935 are discussed in the first chapter. 
The second chapter contains t he Governor Constitutional 
position and functions' in India. This chapter examines the 
different views expressed by the framers of the Constitution in 
the Constituent Assembly, the Governor's role in the present 
Constitution as a constitutional head of the States. The third 
chapter expresses the relationship between the Governor and 
the Legislature'. As the component of the State Legislature 
Governor has coextensive powers. The Governor powers to 
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Nomination to House, Summoning of House, Message to House, 
Special Address to the House, Disqualification from House, 
Assent and Reservations of Bills and the Ordinance- Making 
power of Governor is discussed. The fourth chapter covers the 
Governor and the Centre-State relations. The fifth chapter 
throws light on t he Governor and Article 356'. In this chapter 
highlights the Genesis of the Article 356 of the Constitution, 
Parliamentary control mechanism of the Article 356 and then 
highlight the role the judiciary vis a vis Article 356 of the 
Constitution. The last chapter is the Conclusion of the thesis in 
totality and suggest ways and means to smooth functioning of 
the office of the Governor. 
Vll 

Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
The office of the Governor in India is a heritage of the 
British rule. The famous Elizabethan Charter of the 31^^ 
December 1600 ^ which granted to "the Company of Merchants of 
Lx)ndon'' the exclusive right of trading into the East Indies, 
invested the control of business of the Company in a Governor 
and twenty-four committees.2 The Charter provided for the office 
of the Governor elected by the Company. The Charter was 
granted for a period of fifteen years and Thomas Smith Alderman 
of London was appointed as the first Governor. 
Governor: the Genesis: 
The first phase in the evoluation of the office of the 
Governor is that of a manager of trading concern. The Charter 
Act of 1600,1 provided for the office of the Governor primarily to 
ensure an integrated coherent management, control and 
direction of the business of the Company. The Governor was 
intended to defend and promote the commercial interests of the 
Company and perform managerial functions. According to the 
provisions of the Charter, the Governor was to have the direction 
of the Company's voyages the provision shipping and 
merchandises, the sale of merchandises returned and the 
managing of all other things belonging to the Company. The 
Governor had also certain specified legislative, executive and 
judicial powers. The Charter allowed them^: -
• To use any trade route and have an exclusive right of 
trading with power to grant licenses to trade. 
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• To makes reasonable "laws, constitutions, orders and 
ordinances", not contrary or repugnant to the laws, 
statutes or customs of the English realm for good 
government of the Company and its affairs; 
• To impose, such fines or penalties as might be necessary 
for enforcing these laws. 
No doubt, these powers and privileges were formally 
granted to the Company, but in practice the Governor alone 
exercised them, as he held a key position in the executive body of 
the Company. He, however, functioned under the supervision of 
the General Court, which met on certain occasions from among 
the great merchants of England associated with the Company.'^ 
He was removable by the same body if he did not behave well. 
With the extension of powers and privileges of the Company 
through the Charter Acts of 1609, 1615, 1623, and 1657, the 
office of the Governor also gradually acquired importance. The 
Charter Act of 1661, in particular gave the Company 'power and 
command' over the fortress it possessed and authorised the 
Governor and his Council "to judge all persons belonging to the 
said Governor and Company or that shall live under them, and 
to execute judgment accordingly".s The replacement of the 
system of election of the Governor by that of appointment by the 
Company ailso came to affect the structure of his office in many 
ways. He was now endowed with powers to safeguard factories 
and other places of trade and even "to continue or make peace or 
war.6 Yet the power and authority vested in him were not 
adequate to enable him to discharge his onerous duties to 
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safeguard the commercial interests of the Company against the 
onslaught of Portugese trading concerns and the antipathy of the 
Mughal rule to any foreign trade. This called for ability of 
management, qualities of leadership and strength of character on 
the part of the Governor so that he could be equal to the 
occasion in foreign land. 
The second phase is marked by transition from commerce 
to statecraft when the Governor came to play significant political 
role in building up on the British Empire. With the gradual 
transition of the Company from a trading association to 
sovereign in the latter part of the 17th century, the Governor was 
invested with power of civil and military government. Besides 
looking after and promoting development of wealth and trade of 
the Company, the Governor now was to see that such a policy 
was followed as might constitute "the foundation of a large, well-
grounded , sure English dominion in India for all time to come''.^ 
The policy particularly highlighted under the stewardship of Sir 
Josiah Child. The Charter of 1669 had already authorised the 
Governor to use and exercise all those powers and authorities 
intend to a Captain General of a army by virtue of the office. 
Subsequent Acts also conferred several important powers on the 
Governor. Thus by 1698 the Governors, who in the first few years 
were begging for the right to exist, began to "live in a regal State 
with a navy, a standing army, a militia, judges and a minf .s 
The Charter Act of 1698, which regulated by and large the 
governance of the Company till the enactment of the Regulating 
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Acts of 1773, defined the powers of the Governor in still clearer 
terms. Each of the three Presidencies-Bombay, Madras and 
Calcutta-were placed under a Governor and a Council appointed 
by the Company.^ All powers were vested in the Governor and 
the Council Jointly, and every decision was to be taken by 
majority of votes. The number of members varied in each 
Presidency but it was normally between 12 and 16. All the 
Presidencies were made independent of the each other though 
they were enjoined to follow "the principle of mutual help and 
cooperation amongst them for the common benefit of the 
whole. "10 Since the Council was comprised of the senior civil 
servants of the Company, and since the decisions were taken by 
a majority of the members, the Governor was not more than 
"primus inter pares"!i. He could not overrule his colleagues nor 
was he expected to act on his own in any eventuality or to by 
pass the Council. When Warren Hastings became the Governor 
of Bengal, he complained in his letter to the Court of Directors 
that the powers of the Governor, although supposed to be great, 
are in reality little more than those any individual in his Council. 
However, there were some factors which put him in more 
advantageous jacket than his Councillors. He was the 
Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Company and had the 
exclusive privilege of corresponding with the secret committee of 
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the Court of Directors which gave confidential instructions only 
to him for managing the affairs of the Company. The personal 
influence of the incumbent also mattered much in determining 
his position. A man of strong character, determination and 
imagination would certainly dominate the Council. Above all, the 
relations between the Council and the Court of Directors were 
worse than that of a slave and master. The Court of Directors 
never hesitated in insulting the Council. It led the Council to 
criticise its behavior. 
The third phase is characterized by the formation of a 
central authority in the form of a supreme government and the 
consequent subordination of the Governor to it. The Regulating 
Act of 1773, which is regarded "as the basis of all subsequent 
legislations for determining the form of Indian government" 12 and 
as "beginning of Parliamentary intervention", ^^  introduced "a 
policy of centralisation "1"^  depriving the Governors of their 
independent and absolute positions with in their limits. It 
reduced them to the status of an agent expected to act according 
to the direction of the central authority. The Act provided for the 
post of a Governor-General of Bengal with a Council of four 
members who had the power of superintending and controlling 
the government and management of the Presidencies of Madras, 
Bombay and Bencoolen (a settlement in the island Sumatra ). 
The President (i.e., the Governor }and the Council of those 
Presidencies were not to make war or negotiate treaties without 
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the consent of said Governor- General and Council except in case 
of imminent necessity. 
The Governor-General was authorised to suspend the 
Governor and Councillors of the subordinate Presidencies for 
disobeying the Central government. The Presidencies were also 
required to send all needful information with regard to the affairs 
of the Company. All future appointments were vested in the 
Court of Directors. The Act of 1773 confined the above powers 
and the power of interference of the Governor-General and 
Council to matters of war and negotiations with native States, 
the Act of 1784 gave them the authority to control the war 
expenditure of other Presidencies. No doubt, as a result of this 
Act the position of the Governor improved, as he was granted the 
right of a casting vote, but the power of the Governor-General to 
suspend Governors and Councillors of other Presidencies gave 
him complete authority of control over them.^^ 
This centralising trend to some was only a matter of theoretical 
importance. In practice, the extent to which the Central 
government could "superintend, direct and control" the regional 
governments was limited by the two primary factors. i6 First, the 
distance between the Central government and the Presidencies in 
making communications were slow and uncertain at that time, 
provincial governments had to take steps to meet certain 
exigencies without awaiting the approval of the Central 
government. Secondly, the huge volume of business involved 
make it quite impossible for any central authority to control the 
day-to-day administration of all the territories placed under its 
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superintendence and control. There is no doubt that the Act was 
intended to establish the supremacy of the government but gave 
to the Governor- General 'so shadowy a control' over the 
subordinate Presidencies that he was little more than first gimong 
equals. Thus, the power of superintendence, direction and 
control were exercised in matter of policy rather than of current 
administration. According to Philip Woodruff, the provisions of 
the Act were equally to blame, as they gave the Governor-
General so shadowy a control over the Governors of Madras and 
Bombay that he was little more than first among equals. ^ ^ For 
example, the Governors were under the control of the Governor-
General with regard to the declaration of peace and war, but the 
exceptions laid down to this rule were so wide as to rendered it 
nugatory. Some subsequent Acts also enhanced the power of the 
Governors. On the recommendation of the Lord Cornwallis, the 
Governor-General, the Governor of a Presidency was authorized 
to overrule his Council, is The Charter Act of 1793 vested in the 
Governors "a discretionary power of action without the 
concurrence of their respective Councils." 
The same Act empowered the Governor and Council to 
send dispatches directly to the secret committee of the Court of 
Directors. It is true that Governor-General still continued to 
superintend and control other Presidencies, but the latter were to 
obey the orders only if they were not repugnant to instructions 
from England. 19 In 1807 the Governors of Madras and Bombay 
were empowered to issue regulations and Act of 1830 gave them 
power of taxations. But the centralising tendency continued to 
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grow, and in the Charter Act of 1833 the control of the Central 
government was asserted much more distinctly than in previous 
Acts. Under the Act the Governor-General of Bengal became the 
Governor-General of India and his government for the first time 
came to be known as Government of India. Its authority became 
coextensive with the area of British possessions in India.20 The 
Act took away from the provincial governments the power of 
making laws. They were given the right of only submitting drafts 
or reports of any laws or regulations, which they thought 
expedient. The Governor of a Presidency could act as an 
extraordinary member of the Council of Governor- General when 
it assembled there. Section 59 of the Act, prohibited the 
Governor of a Presidency to make or suspend any regulations, 
except in cases of urgent necessity, with the approval of the 
Governor-General-in-Council. It was also provided by the Act 
that he could not grant any salary, gratuity or allowance without 
the approval of the Governor-General-in Council. The Governors 
of the subordinate Presidencies were put entirely under the 
control of the Governor-General in the sense that he was to obey 
the instructions of the Governor- General in all points relating to 
the civil and military administrations. The Governors were also 
required to send true copies of their orders to the Governor-
General and other information which the Governor-General 
thought essential in the interests of the Company.21 Provision 
was also made that the Court of Directors could, after the 
passing of the Act, declare that the Governor-General of India 
would not be Governor of the Presidency of the Fort William in 
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Bengal and a separate Governor would be appointed for the said 
Presidency. But only a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed, who 
was though for the meantime only. The India's first war of 
Independence started in 1857, the Act of 1853 remained in 
operation with some minor changes introduced by the 
Government of India Act, 1854. Under Section 4 of the Act of 
1854 the Governor-General was empowered to limit the powers 
of the Govemor-in-Council, Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor of 
Bengal or Agra or the North-West Provinces, who was then or 
might be thereafter appointed. 
The fourth phase which provide the office of the Governor 
with a political setting which allowed it to acquire some of its 
modem characteristics. The Governor had the opportunity to 
function, at least in theory, with a legislature and also with some 
native elements. It is true that when the Government of India 
Act, 1858 was being enacted for transferring the government of 
India from the Company to Crown, Lord Palmerston, the Prime 
Minister, declared that the proposed Act would be confined 
entirely and solely to "a change in the administrative 
organization at Home" and would not bring "any alteration in the 
existing arrangement in India".22 Two executive Councillors were 
appointed by the Crown, to assist the Governor. Thus, the 
Governor hereafter became an appointee of the Crown. He 
continued to function with Executive Councillors appointed by 
the Crown and also retained the power to overrule them. He now 
came to possess the right of direct access to the Secretary of 
State of India, though he still had to work under the Governor -
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General. As matter of fact the disappearance of the East India 
Company marked a change rather in the form of government 
than in the substance of policy. After a period of nearly three 
years of the direct rule of the Crown, the British government 
introduced the Indian Councils Act of 1861, which is said to 
contain the first seeds of representative institutions in India. "It 
laid the foundation of the policy of legislative devolution" and 
thereby enhanced the powers and functions of the Governor. The 
power of making and amending laws, which was taken away 
from him by Charter Act of 1833, was restored to him by the Act 
of 1861. The importance of the Act remains in the fact that 
native of India secured seats in the Council. 
The Governor had the power to nominate these additional 
members who were to be "not less than four nor more than eight 
in number" and of whom not less than one half were required to 
be "non official" and who were invariably Indians. He was also 
empowered to summon any person as additional member if a 
vacancy occurred and to determine time and place of meeting of 
the legislative council, to adjourn it and to make for conduct of 
business at its meetings. He was to preside over its meetings and 
had a casting vote. No member could introduce "any measure 
affecting the public revenues"23 without the previous sanction of 
the Governor. The latter could give his assent to or withhold his 
assent from any bill. It is thus clear that the Indian Councils Act 
of 1861 attempted at mitigating the grievances of the Governors 
who held the doctrine that the interference of the government 
was indefensible in principle, as it militated against the practice 
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of local self-government. However, the Governors continued to 
function in subordination to Governor-General in Council. The 
laws passed by the Governor-General's legislative council could 
'control and supersede' laws passed by provincial governments. 
On the one hand, the powers of legislation were restored to the 
Governors and on the other, effective restrictions were imposed 
on them. The Governor had to look always to the Governor-
General for performing his legislative functions, because the 
latter had the authority to disallow any measure even after it had 
received the assent of the former. No measure could become valid 
until it received the assent of the Governor- General. 
Subsequent Acts could not bring about any substantial 
improvement in the position of the Governor. The Indian Council 
Act of 1870 empowered the Governor to propose to the Governor-
General in Council, drafts of any regulations together with the 
reasons for proposing the same, which are being approved by the 
Governor-General in Council, became laws. The Indian Councils 
Act of 1871 gave a new impetus to the local governments by 
empowering the Govemor-in-Council to propose to the Governor-
General in Council drafts of any regulations for the peace and 
good government of any part24, and by giving the local 
legislatures the power to amend and repel certain laws.^s It was 
the outcome of a decision of the Bombay High Court in R.V. 
Reay. As the Indian Council Acts of 1861, supplemented by the 
Act of 1871 could not meet the aspirations of the people, and as 
the national sentiments under the directions of the Indian 
National Congress began to take a new shape among the liberal 
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spokesmen, the demand for introducing new reforms assumed a 
fresh dimension. Therefore, the British Government enacted the 
Indian Council Act of 1892. George Curzon, the future Viceroy of 
India, as under Secretary of State of India while moving the 
measure in the House of Commons on March 1892 said; the 
object of this Bill is to widen the basis and to expand functions of 
the Government of India, to give further opportunity than at 
present exists to the non-official and native elements in Indian 
society to take part in the work of government. Thus, the Indian 
Council Act of 1892, though increased the number of members of 
the provincial legislative council, imposed restriction on the 
Governor by providing that the Governor-General might make 
regulations regarding nomination of the members to the 
legislative council by the Governor^^. 
After having sown the seeds of communalism, the British 
Government enacted the Indian Council Act of 1909, based on 
the underlying idea of Morley-Minto changes, aimed at making 
substantial advance over previous enactments. All the legislative 
councils were enlarged, and all were given substantial elected 
element.27 The councils were also given the right of discussing 
questions of public interest. This provided the members of the 
council with some opportunity of exercising influence on 
questions of administration and finance and of making the 
Governor feel responsive. But this Act also could not do away 
with the element of a high degree of centralisation. 
The relaxation of Parliamentary control had not been 
contemplated, the government of India could not relax their 
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control over local government. The government of India directly 
administered not less than two- thirds of the entire revenues of 
the State. The Central government exercised legislative and 
administrative control over the provinces. The Governor had to 
secure assent of the Governor- General on all the bills passed by 
his Council and had to act strictly according to instructions 
which were issued by the Central government regarding the vital 
matters of administrations. Thus before the introduction of the 
Montagu- Chelmsford Reforms, Governors functioned practically 
as the 'agent' of the government of India though they tended to 
be autocratic in their internal administration, which was 
tempered by the provision of the legislative councils. 
The main features of the Act of 1909 were as follows: 
• The official majority in the Provincial Legislative Council 
was abandoned, at least in theory. 
• The size of these bodies was enlarged up to a maximum to 
50 additional members in the large provinces and 30 in 
the smaller. The greater part of these additional members 
were non- official who were to be elected either by groups 
of local authorities, trade associations or Universities; and 
• A special representation was given the Muslim 
community. 
Undoubtedly, it was a distinct advance over the previous 
Acts, but, except in Bengal, the Governor could have a working 
majority in the Legislative Council at his beck and call in every 
Province. For example, there were forty-six members in the 
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Legislative Council of Bombay, out of which there were twenty-
one elected, seven nominated non-official and eighteen officials. 
In this way, the Governor had the support of twenty-five in a 
House of forty-six .In Bengal, the situation was some what 
different. In a House of fifty-two, the Governor had the support of 
twenty officials and four nominated non-officisds. As such, he 
could have been overridden by his Council, 
So far as the control of the Centre over the provinces was 
concerned, that remained unmitigated. The Governor-General, 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, had the power 
to make regulations as to the conditions under which and 
manner in which persons resident in India were to be nominated 
or elected as member of the Legislative Councils of Govemors28. 
The Central government still kept the power of scrutinizing and 
altering the provincial budget. Besides, the rules made by the 
Governor in regard to the discussion of the annual financial 
statement, matters of general public interest and the asking of 
questions, were subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State, 
and the Legislative Council could not alter or amend them.29 The 
Secretary of State was empowered to determine the number of 
ordinary members of Governor's Executive Councils.3o Since all 
the powers remained in the hands of the Governor subject to the 
authority of the Secretary of State, the non - official majority in 
the Legislative Councils proved quite "illusory." The Legislative 
Council, whether Supreme or Provincial, were nothing but 
advisory bodies without any power of effective control over the 
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Government, Imperial or Provincial.^iIt may be said that the Act 
of 1909: 
Envisaged a Presidential type of Government in which 
the President could be assured of perpetual majority in the 
Legislative Council and in case of necessity ignore the 
Legislative Council altogether. That is the Governor- General 
and the Governors were as independent of their Legislative 
Councils as they were of their Excusive Councils. 
As a matter of fact, the Minto-Morley Reforms were not 
intended to serve as a measure of self-govemment.32 Their only 
object was to associate Indians in a larger measure with 
everyday administration. Sir S.P Sinha, who was the first Indian 
member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, said that:-
The Morley-Minto Reforms though a distinct advance gave 
Indians in the Legislative Councils only influence and not power. 
Power is different from influence and what we need is a steady 
increase of power to determine and to control policy.^s Thus 
before the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 
Governors functioned practically as the 'agents' of the 
government of Indian though they to be autocratic in their 
internal administration, which has tempered by the provision of 
the legislative councils. 
The government of India interposed till more directly in the 
provinces under the Lieutenant-Governors than in those under 
the Governors-in-Council. The plan of having a Lieutenant-
Governor was adopted because it was cheaper and also because 
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it left "the Governor General a greater share of authority in such 
a province. While the Governor was an appointee of the Crown, 
the Lieutenants Governor was appointed by the Governor-
General in Council with the approval of the Crown in accordance 
with the Charter Act of 1853. The Governor-General was only to 
see person appointed as the Lieutenant Governor had been, at 
the time of appointment, at least ten years in the service of the 
Crown in India. Otherwise, with the approval of the Secretary of 
State in Council, he might declare and limit the extent of 
authority of any Lieutenant- Governor34.Besides being inferior in 
emolument and dignity to the Governor, the office of the 
Lieutenant-Governor different in yet another respect. He was not 
associated with an Executive Council till 1912 when a Council 
was constituted only for Bihar and Orissa, other Lieutenant -
Governors still being left without such a Council. This made the 
interference of the Central government in the affairs of a 
Lieutenant-Governorship look more plausible. 
But Chesney maintains that in reality there was no 
difference between a Lieutenant- Governor and a Governor, 
particularly when the latter ceased to be head (little more than 
nominal) of the administration of an army. Under the Charter 
Act of 1853, the Lieutenant Governor, like his counterpart in the 
Presidency, was to nominate one member for his province on the 
Council of the Governor - General .35 The Indian Councils Acts of 
1861 enable both the Governors and the Lieutenant-Governors 
to act as additional Councillors when Executive Council 
assembled within their jurisdiction .36 
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The Act further authorised the Governor-General-in 
Council to extend the provisions regarding the Constitution of 
legislative council, in the Presidencies to the Lieutenant-
Governorships of Bengal, North Western Provinces and the 
Punjab and empowered the Lieutenant-Governors to nominate 
the Councillors- The council Act of 1909 also treated both the 
offices on equal footing when it provided for the enlargement of 
their councils and the inclusion of elected members in them. 37 
The Lieutenant -Governors were now to have Executive Councils, 
if the Governor-General in Council deemed it necessary.^s The 
Government of India Act, 1915 required, in identical terms, every 
local government to obey the orders of the Governor-General in 
the Council and to keep him constantly and diligently informed 
of its proceeding and of all matters which should, in its opinion, 
be reported to him, or as to which he required information, and 
was declared to be under his super- intendance, direction and 
control in all the matters relating to the government of its 
province. With the passage of time the difference became, so 
nominal that the Government of India Act 1919 converted the 
post of the Lieutenant-Governor in many provinces into that of 
the Governor. 
The fifth phase, which began with the enactments of the 
Government of India Act, 1919, attempts were made to reorient 
the office of the Governor to meet the requirements of 
constitutional reforms. The cordial features of all the previous 
phases were: 
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• The concentration of authority at the Centre and its 
dominance over provinces; 
• The ultimate responsibility of the British Parliament for 
the whole of the Indian government; 
• The supremacy of the executive, i.e. the Governor in the 
field of administration as also that of legislation. 
Though the ultimate responsibility still rested with the 
British Parliament. This Act witnessed the introduction, of a 
modicum of responsibility into the working of the government 
made possible by the constitutional arrangement called 
"Dyarchy''39 .The Act of 1919 aimed at the gradual development 
of self-governing institutions in India "with a view to the 
progressive realisation of responsibilities government" and 
further the purposes of this Act is to enhance the responsibilities 
of the Governor. In addition, a major attempt was made to 
initiate a policy of devolution as a means of giving greater scope 
to the provincial governments and of forming half-way house 
between the old centralism and federalism. The Governor was, 
therefore, expected to play the role of a head of the State. The 
Governors of Bengal, Madras and Bombay continued to be 
appointed by the Crown, and were usually chosen from among 
persons of high rank and administrative experience in Great 
Britain, while those of other provinces were appointed by the 
Crown after consulting the Governor- General.'^o Under the new 
system of 'dyarchy', the Governor occupied a unique place in 
both parts of the executive "transferred" and "reserved". He and 
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his Executive Council were in charge of what were known as 
'reserved' subjects, whereas 'transferred' subjects were put 
under the Governor and his ministers. Though the Governor has 
no say in the appointment of the Executive Councillors, the 
latter were responsible to him. He presided over meetings of the 
Executive Council and had a casting vote. 
With regard to the administration of the 'transferred' 
subjects, the Governor was empowered to appoint, by 
notification, ministers who were or were to become within a 
period of six months members of the legislative Council. Such 
ministers hold ofRce during the pleasure of the Governor'* ^  
though ordinarily the latter was to dismiss them only when they 
lost the confidence of the legislative council.^2 Ministers who 
enjoyed the confidence of the majority in their legislative council 
were to be given fullest opportunity of managing that field of 
government, which was entrusted to their care. The Governor 
was instructed to be always "guided by the advice of his 
ministers", but when he saw sufficient cause he could "dissent 
from their opinion" and was required to taken action "otherwise 
than in accordance with that advice".43 The Governor, thus, was 
not expected to occupy the position of a purely constitutional 
head of the State, who was bound to accept the decisions of his 
ministers. As a matter of fact his position was "one of great 
responsibility and difficulty and also of great opportunity and 
honour".44 He was expected to hold the balance between 
divergent policies and different ideals "to encourage the 
deliberations" between himself, his Councillors and his 
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ministers."^s He was empowered to make rules and order for the 
more convenient transaction of business of the Presidencies. 
The Governor under the said Act was enjoined with 
important legislative powers. Although he was not to be a 
member of the legislative council, he appointed the time and 
place for holding its session and could prorogue it by notification 
or othenvise. He had the right to address the council and for that 
purpose be might require the attendance of its members. He 
nominated some members of legislative council who are 
associated with special knowledge and experience."^^NQ bill 
passed by the legislative Council could become law until it had 
received the assent of the Governor. He might withhold his 
assent from the bill, return the bill to the Council for 
reconsideration or reserve the bill for the consideration of the 
Governor- General. No motion for the appropriation of any 
provincial revenue could be made, except on the 
recommendation of the Governor communicated to the council. 
The Governor was further invested with an extraordinary power 
of legislation. If a Governor's legislative council refused leave to 
introduce, or failed to pass in the form recommended by the 
Governor, any bill relating to a reserved subject, the Governor 
might certify that the passage of the bill was essential. The bill 
then become an Act after it was signed by the Governor, though 
the latter had to send an authentic copy of every Act, made in 
that way to the Governor-General who secured the assent of His 
Majesty-in-Council to it.47 The Governor, thus, held almost an 
autocratic position, which in turn made the policy of "progressive 
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realisation of responsible government" a hoax. He was made in 
effect a constitutional dictator in the province and Dyarchy could 
be tempered only by frequent exercise of his powers. Since the 
Governor had important powers with regards, to the formation of 
the legislative council, he could manipulate minister's majority 
there and could make the minister behave according to his 
wishes. It is important to note that the Government of India Act, 
1919 did not materially affect the centralized nature of the polity. 
The Governor still continued to function under the 
"superintendence, direction and control" of the Governor-
General. He was responsible to the latter for the good governance 
of both the parts of dyarchy. There were a large number of 
enactments where powers were reserved to the Governor -
General in Council or were exercised by provincial governments 
subject to his sanction or control. Proposals of provincial 
governments required in many cases the sanction of the 
government of India, ^ s The Governor was obliged to reserve 
certain number of bills for the consideration of the Governor-
General who might withhold his assent and reserve them at his 
end for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon. 
The last phase in the evolution of the office of the Governor 
during pre-Independence India was the most crucial in as much 
as the dimensions acquired by it at this stage, constituted the 
base of the office of the Governor as constitutional 
head of the State. The Government of India, Act 1935 on the 
recommendation of India Statutory Commission (Simon 
Commission) of 1929.49 wanted to complete the process of 
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devolution and to make each province "as far as possible a 
mistress in her own house." It introduced certain new principles 
the federal principle with its corollary of provincial autonomy 
and the principle of popular responsible government in the 
provinces subject to certain "safeguards" as they were called in 
political parlance in India^o .The role of the Governor, therefore 
became twofold he was to act as a 'constitutional' head of an 
autonomous province providing the Premiers with a scope of 
becoming the "effective heads of "provincial administrations," 
and also as an agent of the Central government. He was to 
exercise the executive authority of the province on behalf of the 
Crown in his name on aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 
He was however, authorised to act in his discretion and also in 
his individual judgment. He was, thus, not bound to accept the 
advice of the Council of Ministers and the question whether any, 
and if so what advice was tendered by ministers to the Governor, 
was not to be enquired into in any court. On the question 
whether any matter was or was not a matter regarding which 
the Governor could act in his discretion or exercise his individual 
judgment, his decision was to be final and the validity of any 
thing done by him was not to be called in question. He might 
require the Council of Ministers to transmit to him any 
information with respect to the provincial government.si In the 
exercise of his functions, the Governor had certain 'special 
responsibilities' such as prevention of any grave menace to the 
peace or tranquillity of the province, protection of rights and 
legitimate interests of minorities, government servants and also 
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the rulers of the Indian States, prevention of unfair 
discrimination against British interests, securing of the peace 
and good government of 'partially excluded areas' and securing 
of the execution of orders or directions lawfully issued to him by 
the Governor-General. The Act armed the Governor with yet 
another special power. If it appeared to him that the peace and 
tranquillity of the province were being endangered by persons 
engaged in violent activities, he could act without consulting the 
Council of Ministers and direct that sources of information 
relating to such activities of violence should not be disclosed to 
others, not even to minister.52 The Governor, acting in his 
individual judgment, was to make amend or approve any rules, 
regulation or orders relating to police force. He had important 
legislative powers. He was empowered to summon and prorogue 
the provincial legislature. He could dissolve the lower House in 
his discretion could address both Houses and send massage to 
them. A bill passed by the provincial legislature was to be 
presented to the Governor who could either give or withhold his 
assent to the bill or reserve it for the consideration of the 
Governor-General. He could stop the discussion of any measure, 
if he considered such a course necessary for the proper 
discharge of his special responsibilities. Besides these ordinary 
legislative powers, the Governor was given some extraordinary 
powers of law making. During the recess of the legislature, if he 
was satisfied that circumstance existed which rendered it 
necessary to take immediate action; he might promulgate an 
ordinance which required subsequent approval of the legislature. 
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The Governor had the power to issue a second type ordinance, 
which did not need the approval of the legislature. Such an 
ordinance could be promulgated, when the Governor considered 
an immediate action necessary to discharge his functions in his 
discretion or to exercise his individual judgment.53 The Governor 
had yet another unususd power of passing permanent 
"Governor's Act" to facilitate the discharge of his discretionary 
functions or the exercise for his individual judgment. Every such 
Act be required to be communicated to the Secretary of State, 
through the Governor-General and was to be laid before both the 
Houses of Parliament. Each Governor had a power, similar to 
that of the Governor-General, to include in the schedule of 
authorised expenditure a sum necessary to secure the due 
discharge of his special responsibilities. This power was however, 
to be exercised after a demand had been made and the 
legislature had either refused it or had assented subject to 
reduction. No financial bill was introduced except on the 
recommendation of the Governor. He could also declare in his 
discretion, but with the concurrence of the Governor-General, 
the breakdown of the Constitution in the province, whenever he 
was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the 
government of the province could not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under such a 
situation, he might proclaim that his functions, to such an 
extent as might be specified in the proclamations, would be 
exercised in his discretion and that he would assume to himself 
all or any of the powers vested or exercisable by any provincial 
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body or authority except those exercisable by the High Court. 
That proclamation might even contain any such incidental and 
consequential provisions as would appear to him necessary for 
giving effect to the object of proclamation.^'^ 
The inclusion of the Instrument of Instructions^s in the 
Government of India Act, 1935 was however, intended to 
encourage the working of responsible governments in the 
provinces and thereby to put limitations on the enormous 
powers of the Governor. The Governor was instructed to appoint 
that man as the Chief Minister who was likely to command a 
stable majority in the legislature. Other ministers were to be 
appointed by him on the advice of the Chief Minister, though he 
was to ensure, as far as practicable, the representation of the 
members of important minority communities in the Council of 
Ministers He was required to be guided by the advice of his 
ministers. It is true that legally he could discharge his functions 
in exercise of his discretion or individual judgment even without 
consulting or accepting the advice of his ministers, but the legal 
disabilities were expected to be subordinated constitutional 
conventions. It was regarded to be the sacred duty of the 
Governor to support "frankly, honorably, and with all his might, 
the ministry of time, whatever it may be, so long as it commands 
majority and governs with integrity for welfare of the country". It, 
thus, freed the Governor from all responsibility for the acts of the 
executive and legislature and gave full play to the constitutional 
maxim that the "king can do no wrong". 
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The Governor continued to hold a dominant position under 
the Act of 1935. The Instrument of Instructions, which breathed 
a spirit of compromise to further ministerial responsibility and 
responsible government, was after all "dependent on a 
gentleman's understanding'^e, it could not be enforced in a 
Court of law. The special power conferred on the Governor and 
his power to act in his discretion and in his individual judgment 
placed him in a position so as to control the strings of provincial 
administration in all three spheres legislative, executive and 
financial. This was more so in non-Congress provinces where 
coalition ministries were formed, and the Governors actively 
intervened in the working of responsible government. Such 
ministries lacked the support of a workable majority in the 
legislatures and had therefore to depend on the help of the 
Governors and the civil service. The relationship between the 
Governors and ministers was seemingly smooth: but when the 
Governor of Sind terminated the services of Premier Allah Bux 
on October 10, 1942 and the Governor of Bengal literally forced 
Premier A.K. Fazlul Haq to submit his resignation in March 
1943, the cat was out of the bag. There were loud protests 
against the arbitrariness of the Governors and Shyama Prasad 
Mukherjee, Minister of Finance in Bengal, had to observe that 
the Governors had "interfered with the work of the ministry and 
had rendered so called provincial autonomy into meaningless 
farce".^ "^ The coalition cabinets acted as a democratic facade 
which the Governor ruled through the bureaucracy. The very 
first act of the Governors in the provinces where the Congress 
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party was in majority in the legislatures was in, the words of B.P. 
Singh Roy (President Bengal Legislative Council), 
"unconstitutional when they obtained minority ministries and 
allowed them to function nearly five months''^^ 
In the Congress provinces, responsible government 
functioned more or less smoothly for some time and the 
Governors had hardly any occasion to interfere in their working. 
Four factors accounted for the non- interference by the 
Governors in the functioning of Congress ministries: 
• The Congress peirty in provincial legislatures was highly 
disciplined and subject to the unified control of the 
Central Parliamentary Board; 
• The party was in absolute majority in the provincial 
legislatures, and, therefore, the Governor was bound to 
summon the leader of the Congress party to form the 
ministry; he had no occasion to withdraw his pleasure 
whenever he wished; 
• The Congress party formed homogeneous cabinets to 
foster the principle of Joint responsibility and refused to 
form coalition cabinets with the Muslim League and other 
parties; and 
• The Congress High Command has made it a condition of 
office-acceptance that the Governor must assure and 
publicly state that he "would not use his special powers of 
interference or set a side the advice of ministers in regard 
to their constitutional activities."soThe party had been 
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assured by Lord Linlithgow, the Governor- General, that 
there was no foundation for any suggestion that a 
Governor would have power to interfere with the day -to -
day administration of a province.so Therefore, so long as 
the Congress party remained in power, the Governors 
wisely refrained from exercising their special powers of 
interference. The Congress party in its fifty- first session 
gladly admitted that "a measure of cooperation was 
extended by the Governors to the ministers".^i 
But the Governors never tended to become mere 
ceremonial heads, and there is a grain of truth in the complaint 
of N.B. Khare, the Congress Premier of the Central Provinces, 
made at a public meeting in Poona on 22nd of December 1937, 
that the old Dyarchy was still in existence and the Governor of 
the provinces, armed with powers of the special responsibilities 
individual judgment and discretion, sat as the agent of British 
Imperialism to hamper the progress of Congress ministries. 
As a matter of fact, a covert tension between the Governor and 
the ministry was going on in every Congress province, and 
clashes and constitutional crises were avoided only with great 
caution and tact. For example, in 1938 the Premiers of Bihar 
and United Provinces, Sir Krishna Sinha and Govind Ballabh 
pant respectively, insisted on the release of political prisoners, 
but their Governors disagreed. Left with no option, the two 
ministries resigned on February 1938 alleging the Governors of 
interfering in the provincial administration against the letter and 
the spirit of the Constitution. Few days later, however, the 
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Governors and the Chief Ministers arrived at 'agreed conclusion' 
and the ministries withdrew their resignations. Similarly, in 
Orissa the threatened constitutional crisis created by the 
declaration of intention of the ministry to resign if J.R. Dain, 
Revenue Commissioner of Orissa, was appointed as acting 
Governors during the absence the Governor, Sir John Hubback, 
was averted by cancelling the leave of the latter. When the 
Congress ministries resigned on account of the differences 
between the Congress party and the British government over the 
issue of India's participation in the Second World War, the 
Constitution was suspended and the administration was taken 
over by the Governors. 
The concentration of authority in the hands of the 
Governor-General and his domination over the provincial 
governments through the Governors also detracted a good deal 
from the functioning of provincial autonomy. The Act provided 
that whenever a Governor would act in his discretion or exercise 
his individual judgment, he would be "under the general control 
of, and comply with such particular directions of the Governor -
General in his discretion''62 The Governor while promulgating-
ordinances and enacting Governor's Act was to communicate 
each one of them to the Secretary of State through the Governor-
General, providing the latter a wide scope for interference. Under 
section 123 of the Act, the Governor-General was at liberty to 
require Governors "to discharge certain functions as his agent." 
It was also expressly laid down that the executive authority of 
every province was to be so exercised as not to impede or 
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prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the 
federations and the latter was to extend to the giving of such 
directions as might appear to it to be necessary for the 
purpose63. It was also necessary to have the previous sanction of 
the Governor - General for introducing certain legislative 
proposals and the Governor were also to reserve certain number 
of bills for the assent of the Governor-General. It was expected, 
however that working of the federal scheme would act as a check 
on the exercise of overriding powers by the Governor-General. 
But since the scheme itself could not come in operation owing to 
the antipathy of the Princes toward the formation of a federation, 
the nature of the Constitution remained unitary, and the 
provincial governments operated under the direction and control 
of the Governor- General as strictly as before. 
Commencing his career as the manager of trading 
corporation, the Governor soon took on the role of territorial 
ruler concerned primarily with consolidation of the military 
conquests of the East India Company which was moved by 
political ambitions to expand and safeguard its trade and 
commerce. The Governor throughout the administration of the 
British in India remained the most trusted autocratic provincial 
agent and representative of the centralised British polity, though 
the gradual introductions of self- governing institutions a 
concession in Indian nationalist aspirations tended to modify 
the structure of his office to meet new situations. The building 
upon the provincial administration which came to enjoy 
considerable area of powers devolved from the Central 
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government was effected around the office of the Governor. But 
the ethos of the office remained throughout bureaucratic and the 
Governor continued to embody the attitudes and notions, which 
had become closely identified with his office. With the passage of 
the time the Indian independence Act, 1947, the British rule in 
India came to an end and India became an independent and 
sovereign country, it also resulted in some sort of changes in the 
office of the Governor. Though India continued to be governed by 
provisions of Act of 1935, the Governor-General was empowered 
to make amendment in the provisions up to 31st March 1948. 
Thereafter, the Constituent Assembly, which was not subject to 
any limitations whatsoever, could modify the same. By the time 
of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, became effective, the 
Governor in various States tendered their resignations to the 
Governor-General to be effective from 15th August 1947. Except 
Madras, Bombay and Assam fresh appointments were made in 
every province. The appointments of these Governors were 
approved by the king- Emperor. Infact appointments were made 
by the Congress High Command in consultation with the 
Premiers of Provinces. The special responsibilities of the 
Governor that existed under the Government of India Act, 1935, 
began to disappear from the Indian political system speedily. As 
a matter of fact as stated by an official spokesman, the full 
responsibilities devolved on the Premier of the Province, being 
the administrative head. By the time the new Constitution came 
into existence on 26th January 1950, no significant change was 
introduced in the office of the Governor. 
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THE GOVERNOR CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION 
AND FUNCTIONS 
The Constitution is a bond of national unity and reflects 
the ultimate needs, aims and aspiration of its people. When 
India become independent the immediate need was to achieve 
unity in its inherent diversity, therefore, the founding fathers 
responded through a federal structurization of the government in 
the country, which because of the compulsions of history and 
tradition to be centre-oriented and Governor to play a key role in 
the establishing the relations between Centre and State. This led 
some constitutional writers to remark that India is a unitary 
State with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal State 
with subsidiary unitary feature. Whatever be its orientation, the 
fact remains that the existence in any federal system of two 
levels of government makes conflict of some kind at some time 
inevitable. Even if each government is unmotivated by a desire to 
extend its authority, instances arise where the action of one may 
impinge upon the competence of the other. Indian political scene 
amply bears witness to this fact. The first twenty years of the 
working of the federal apparatus did not throw up very many 
problems because of the cementing commonality represented by 
the supremacy of the Congress party at the Centre and the 
States. However, with the disappearing commonality, in the later 
years problems began to surface. This led to the expression of 
extreme views from those favouring Centre's supremacy, on the 
one hand, to complete State autonomy, on the other. The 
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problem is not only alive today but has assumed serious 
proportions, occasionally threatening the strength of the national 
fibre. In such a situation judiciary can play a role in resolving 
occasional legal conflicts, but is not expected to run the federal 
process in day to day functioning. Consequently, the Governor 
remains to be the only functionary, who can play a definite role 
in the best management of the federal process, as he only 
occupies the position of a keystone in the arch of federal 
structure. He occupies a position, which, if properly exercised in 
right constitutional perspective, may transform confrontation 
between the Union and State governments into cooperation. The 
Constitution of India under Article 153 lay down that there 
should be a Governor for each States. The Constitution of India 
adopted in 1950 accepted most of the provisions relating to 
government mentioned in the Government of India Act, 1935 
except the special responsibilities provided to the Governor. The 
controversy arose as to the mode of appointment of the Governor 
of States. The Constitution provides for a nominated Governor, 
appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal.i 
During the framing of the Constitution the debate on the 
powers and position of the Governor was first initiated in the 
Provincial Constitution Committee and in the Union Committee 
as it was closely linked up with the question of the form of 
government the country should have, whether it should be 
Presidential or Parliamentary. After deciding in favours of 
Parliamentary executive type, the two bodies decided in favours 
of an elected Governor, because, they thought that an elected 
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Governor would give stability to the government. The Drafting 
Committee gave one more alternative to the above Committees 
that the Governor would be appointed by the President from a 
panel of names chosen by the State Legislative Assembly, and 
this suggestion was justified on the ground of the Governors 
power in comparison with vast power enjoyed by the pre-
independent Governor. The Committee of the viewed that the 
present Governor will have very restricted power in comparison 
with his predices. The Chairman of the Drafting Committee Dr. 
Ambedkar was of the view that as the present Governor will have 
very limited powers so it is not desirable to impose upon the 
electorate the obligation to enter upon the electoral process 
which would cause a lot of time, a lot of trouble and a lot of 
money as welP. Sir Alladi Krishna Swamy Ayyar advanced three 
arguments against the provision of an elected Governor. Firstly, 
the Governor is merely a constitutional head of the province and 
that the real executive power has been vested in the ministry 
responsible to the Lower House in different State. If the Governor 
is properly functioning as the constitutional head, the expenses 
involved in going through the process of election is out of all 
proportion to the powers vested in the Governor under the 
Constitution. Secondly, there is also the danger of the Governor 
who has been elected by the people at large getting into a clash 
with the Premier and cabinet responsible to the Legislature 
which itself has been elected on the basis of the universal 
suffrage. Thirdly, it is said that the Governor may occasionally 
have to use his extraordinary powers. This point is more in 
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favour of nomination then in favours of election. A person who is 
nominated or appointed by the President with the concurrence of 
the provincial cabinet is likely to take for greater care than a 
person who is elected by people. Jawaharlal Nehru felt that if we 
have an elected Governor that would to some extent encourage 
that separatist political tendency more than otherwise.^ He 
maintained that minority groups will have better chance in the 
process of nomination than in election. He also argued that 
nomination is really a more democratic procedure than the other 
procedure (i.e. election) in the sense that the latter would not 
make the democratic machine work smoothly. ^ 
Under the Indian Constitution the Governor holds more or 
less the same position in the State as the President in the Union. 
In the Constituent Assembly there was long discussion about the 
powers, position and functions of the Governor and different 
views are expressed. Member of the Constituent Assembly 
B.G.kher speaking in the Constituent Assembly had said, "so for 
as the Governor is concerned we have given him very few powers. 
But I do not agree with the comment that he is mere-figurehead, 
a figure-head, is capable neither of good nor of bad and he 
continued that a Governor can do a great deal of good, if he is a 
good Governor and he do a great deal of mischief if he is a bad 
Governor, in spite of the very little power given to him under the 
Constitution's. Pandit T.D Bhargava told the Assembly that it 
was wrong to preserve that Governor was a dummy, a figure-
head. To him he was to exercise very wide powers. Dr. Ambedkar 
pointed out, that the Governor has certain duties to perform. 
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These duties are of two types. First, he has to retain the ministry 
in the office during his pleasure; he has to see "whether and 
when he should exercise his pleasure against the ministry". 
Secondly, it is also the Governor's duty to advise the ministry, to 
warn them, to suggest to the ministry an alternative and to ask 
for reconsideration,6 In the absence of the rights or duties of a 
constitutional head, the Governors of a State would have been 
an absolutely unnecessary functionary. And the constitutional 
makers have certainly visualized the Governor not only as a 
necessary, but also as useful functionary. AUadi Krishna Swamy 
Ayyar member of the Constituent Assembly visualized the 
Governor to be a constitutional head, a councillor and adviser of 
the ministry, one who can throw oil over troubled waters. The 
position was best summarized up by the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee Dr. Ambedkar, in the following words: He is 
the representative not of a party. He is the representative of the 
people as a whole of the State. It is in the name of the people 
thdt he carries on the administration. He must see that the 
administration is carried on a level which may be regarded as 
good, efficient, honest administration." ^ As a constitutional head 
of the State, the Governor is expected to play a very useful role. 
He is supposed to ensure stability, purity and impartiality in the 
administration, but also to see that the government is carried on 
the interest of the people and not of a party. 
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Grovemor as the Executive Head: 
Constitutionally speaking the executive power of State vests 
with the Governor and all executive action will be taken in his 
name.8 But in actual practice he is only the constitutional head 
of the State and in this capacity he is bound by the advice of the 
Council of Ministers except where he is required by the 
Constitution to exercise his discretion.^ In normal times the 
Governor is aided and advised by the Council of Ministers and 
the real power lies in the hands of the cabinet which is the 
essence of a parliamentary system of government. In his capacity 
as the constitutional head of the State he is to appoint Chief 
Ministerio and the other ministers have to be appointed by the 
Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. It has also been 
laid down that the ministers 'shall hold office' during the 
pleasure of the Governor. Let us understand these provisions 
correctly. The Governor cannot appoint a Chief Minister in any 
arbitrary or whimsical manner. He has to be fully conscious of 
the contents of Article 164 (2) of the Constitution that the 
Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the 
Legislative Assembly of the State. This important provision has 
to guide the Governor in the choice of a Chief Minister. 
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The Governor occupies a pivotal position in the federal 
system of India. In the wake of the formation of coalition 
governments in different States since 1967, the office of the 
Governor has come in for criticism, particularly with the regards 
of the powers of the Governor related with the dissolving of the 
Legislative Assemblies. The manner in which Governors have 
hitherto used the power of appointing the Chief Minister is no 
less controversial. The matter of appointment of the Chief 
Minister may appear to be simple under normal circumstances, 
but assumes great significance at certain other time. Various 
political scenarios might emerge themselves before the Governor 
and depending upon the situation, he has either to act strictly 
according to the provisions of the Constitution or use his 
discretion. When a single party secures an absolute majority in 
the State Legislative Assembly after the elections, the task of the 
Governor in the appointment of the Chief Minister is simple. He 
has no other alternative but to call the leader of the majority 
party to form his ministry. 
The task of the Governor becomes somewhat complicated 
when no single party secures a majority in the State Assembly. 
Here, the Governor has to appoint the Chief Minister at his 
discretion, and the exercise of his discretion cannot be called in 
question in writ proceedings. The criterion that influences the 
decision of the Governor in such a situation is that the person so 
chosen should, in his opinion, be in a position to mobilise 
majority support in the Assembly. The power to appoint the 
Chief Minister is vested in the Governor but there is an 
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important qualification attached to this power i.e. he must select 
a person who commands majority support in the House. This 
shows that the Governor has no discretion in the matter of 
appointment of the Chief Minister. But there is a situation where 
the real impart of Governor's discretionary power comes into 
light. When at the end of a general elections, no single party 
obtains a clear majority and when loyalties of the legislators 
undergo frequent changes making the political picture in the 
State fluid and confused, or where the sitting government is 
reduced to minority due to defections, etc. the Govettlor's role 
becomes crucial and he has to take a decision after making such 
enquiries, as he thinks fit, as to the persoh who will be in a 
position to obtain a majority support of the House, and invite 
him to form the government, ii This is an area where the 
Constitution does not provide much guidelines to the Governor 
regarding thfe method of ascertaining the majority support a 
party enjoys, though the convention is that the parties or a 
combination of parties who command the majority are normally 
invited to form the government. It is here that he has to use his 
discretion. Since the 1971 Governor used their discretionary 
powers in appointment of Chief Minister, several times but the 
most important and significant cases are discussed below as 
briefly: 
West Bengal (1971): 
In West Bengal after the midterm election in 1971, the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M) dominated United 
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Leftist Front (ULF) has secured 123 seats in a House of 280 and 
emerged as the single largest party in West Bengal Legislature. 
The leader of the ULF Jyoti Basu requested the Governor to 
invite him to form the government on the ground of being single 
largest party in the State Assembly but the Governor did not 
heed to his request and invited the Ajay Kumar Mukherjee, the 
leader of the newly organized Democratic coalition to form the 
government in West Bengal. Similarly, the Governor of Orissa 
invited Bishwanath Das the leader of Orissa United Front 
Assembly party to form government while ignoring the Congress 
(R) which was the largest single party in the State. Like Kerala 
and West Bengal in 1978 in Mdharastra the Governor invited the 
leader of the Congress-Congress (I) coalition to form the 
government and rejected the claim of the Jana ta party, which 
was the single largest party in the Legislative Assembly. 
Kerala (l^Bi): 
When K. Karuna, Karan, a Congress (I) leader was 
appointed Chief Minister of a minority government of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) in Kerala on December 28, 1981. There 
were widespread demonstrations in the State against the 
Governor's action in appointing the minority government of 
Karunakaran. The people of Kerala had to witness the sad 
spectacle of the ministry try to survive by the casting vote of the 
speaker before it finally decided to quit. Therefore, the Governor 
did not give the opposition a chance to form the government 
when karunakaran lost his majority. 12 Thus, a parliamentary 
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history was created in Kerala Assembly on February 4, 1982 
when the speaker exercised his casting vote to defeat a no-
confidence motion against the government. The leaders of the 
opposition parties urged the then Governor, Jyoti 
Vencatachellum, to immediately dismiss the minority 
government of Karunakaran, the sole prop of which is the 
unconstitutional and unprincipled exercise of the casting vote of 
the speaker. 
Assam (1982): 
In the Assam, when the Governor in early 1982 installed 
Gogoi as Chief Minister without a clear majority to back him. 
The Assam Governor, Prakash Mehrotra has refused to accept 
the claim of opposition of 64 members in its ranks, but asked 
Gogoi to form the government, though he had the support of only 
48 members. The Left and Democratic Front (LDF) alliance 
denounced the Governor for acting as a party agent and 
demanded his resignation. Eventually, the Gogoi ministry had to 
quit office without facing the Assembly. i3 
Haryana (1982): 
After the Assembly election in Haiyana in 1982, the 
Congress (I) had 35 members and Lok Dai-Bharatiya Janata 
Party (LD-BJP) alliance had 36 members in a House of 90 
members. The Governor invited Devilal the leader of Lok Dal-BJP 
alliance, to parade his supporters. But suddenly he changed his 
mind and invited Bhajan Lai, the leader of the single largest 
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party, to form the new ministry on the ground that the Congress 
was the single largest party in the Assembly. 
Uttar Pradesh (1993): 
In November 1993 the Assembly elections of Uttar Pradesh 
(U.P) was held. The Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) had forged a pre-poU alliance and contested the 
elections together. The party positions were: SP (109), BSP (67), 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (177), Congress (28), Janata Dal 
(JD) (27), Communist Party India (CPl) (3), Communist Party of 
India (Maxist) CPI (M) (1), Uttara Khand Kranti Dal (UKD) (1), 
and Independents (8). The BJP emerged as a single largest party 
with 177 seats and SP and BSP-combine with 176 stood second 
largest party. Mulayam Singh, leader of SP and BSP, staked his 
claim to form the government with the support of Janata Dal 
(27), Congress (28), CPI (3), CPI (M) (1), UKD (1) and 
Independents (4). The then Governor Moti Lai Vora first asked 
the leader of the BJP Kalyan Singh whether he was able and 
wilUng to form a viable government. The Governor Vora also 
asked Kalyan Singh to submit a list of Member of Legislative 
Assemblies (MLAs) who were supporting his party and gave one 
day time for submission of the list. Kalyan Singh did not submit 
the list and sought one more day to which Vora agreed. But BJP 
failed to submit any list of its supporters. Thereupon Vora 
invited Mulayam Singh, leader of the single largest party, to form 
the government. Though BJP criticized the decision of Moti Lai 
Vora for not inviting BJP to form the government but it was for 
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the sake of criticism and completely devoid of merit as BJP has 
no prima facie evidence to show that it was in a position to prove 
the majority in the House. As against this, Mulayam Singh 
Yadav has submitted a list of 240 MLAs and letters from various 
parties for extending support to his government. 
The Uttar Pradesh (U.P) (1998): 
In U.P. the Bhartiya Jana ta Party (BJP) and the Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP) decided to share power for six months each. 
As a result, Mayawati was sworn in as Chief Minister on 21 
March, 1997. After six months Mayawati tendered her 
t-esignation to the Governor, Romesh Bhandari, and at the same 
time extended her support to kalyan Singh for forming his 
government. Thereafter Kalyan Singh claim to form the 
government with the support of BSP. The Governor Ramesh 
Bhandari appointed Kalyan Singh as Chief Minister who was 
sworn in on September 1997. On October 18, 1997 BSP 
withdrew its support to Kalyan Singh government. Since Kalyan 
Singh government was reduced to minority, the Governor asked 
him to prove his majority, on the floor of the House on October 
21, 1997. On October 20, 1997 a split in Congress party took 
place. Twenty-two Congress Members of Legislative Assemblies 
(MLAs) formed a separate group, which was recognized by the 
speaker Kesri Nath Tripathi on the same day in the name of Lok 
Tantrik Congress. Split also took place in Jana ta Dal and a 
group of 2 MLAs were recognized as Jan ta Dal (Raja Ram). In the 
midst of unprecented violence Kalyan Singh government proved 
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confidence in his government with the support of Lok Tantrik 
Congress (LTC), Jan ta Dal (Raja Ram) and an unrecognized 
group of 12 MLAs known as Jan Tantrik Bahujan Samaj Party 
(JTBSP) spUt from BSP. 
On February 21, 1998 Lok Tantrik Congress (LTC) and 
Jana ta Dal (Raja Ram) withdrew their support to the Kalyan 
Singh government. Jagdambika Pal of the LTC claimed to form a 
government supported by 240 non-BJP parties MLAs, which 
included the SP-BSP and Congress. Party position as on 
February 21, 1998 was as follows:-
Parties Seats 
BJP 178 
SP 110 
BSP 66 (12 disputed) 
LTC 22 
Congress 15 
Bharatiya Kisan Kamagar Party (BKKP) 08 
JD 04 
JD (Raja Ram) 03 
CPM 04 
Samta 02 
Communist Party of India. (CPI) 01 
Samajwadi Jan ta Party (R) SJP (R) 01 
Independents 13 
Strength 426, vacant 1, nominated 1. 
Soon after the withdrawal of support Kalyan Singh called 
on the Governor claiming absolute majority. Ruling out his 
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resignation Kalyan Singh in his letter to the Governor said, "I am 
prepared to prove my majority on the floor of the House, if it is so 
required. The Vidhan Sabha riot the Raj Bhavan is the place for 
trail of strength". He sought tiirife to prove majority in the House 
and added that it will be unconstitutional on the part of the 
Governor if he did not grant time. Having satisfied that 
Jagdambika Pal had the support of 226 MLAs the Governor 
Ramesh Bhandari rejected the plea of Kalyan Singh to prove 
majority in the House and dismissed his government under 
Article 164. He appointed Jagdambika Pal as the Chief Minister 
Who was sworn in as the Chief Minister on the same night. 
The decision of the Governor dismissing the Kalyan Singh 
government and installing Jagdambika Pal as Chief Minister was 
challenged in the Allahabad High Court by Dr. N.K.S. Gaur, the 
Higher Education Minister in the Kalyan Singh ministry. The 
petitioner sought for an interim relief setting a side the order of 
dismissal passed by the Governot on the ground that in Bommai 
case the court is empowered to pass such order. 
The Governor's order was defended on the ground that the 
ruling in Bommai case is applicable in case where majority or 
minority of the ruling party is required to be tested to make a 
recommendation to the President under Article 356 for the 
imposition of the President's rule in a State. Since the U.P 
Governor has exercised his independent power under Articles 
163 and 164 of the Constitution to take a decision in an 
emerging political situation and appointed a Chief Minster to run 
the State, the Bommai case inapplicable. However, on behalf of 
50 
iJie governor Constitutionaf Position and functions 
petitioner it was contended that in the Bommai case the 
Supreme Court had given place to a general constitutional 
practice about testing the majority or minority status of a ruling 
party. The principle had its applicabiUty invgiriably in all 
situations where the Governor came to the conclusion that a 
ruling parly had been reduced to minority. 
Bihar (2000): 
In the Bihar 2000 Assembly elections were held. No party 
had absolute majority in the House. The Rashtriya Janata Dal 
(RJD) was the single largest party and pre-poU alliance group in 
Bihar Assembly had large number of members then National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA). Therefore, it should have been called 
to form the government. But the Governor Vinod Pandey, call the 
Nitish Kumar to form the government. And the Vinod Pandey 
swore in Jana ta Dal (united) leader Nitish Kumar in Bihar as 
Chief Minister, after the election, when he did not have the 
necessary numbers to prove his majority in the Assembly. Nitish 
Kumar was given time to prove his majority, which he failed in 
the Assembly and had quit.The opposition parties in nationwide 
protests to the Bihar Governor to discharge his constitutional 
responsibility by inviting NDA to form the government in 
violation of democratic norms. 
Jharkhand (2005): 
The Jharkhand Assembly elections were held in 2005. No 
party obtained absolute majority in the 81 members State 
Assemblies. The Bharatiya Jana ta Party (BJP) led National 
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Democratic Alliance (NDA) formally staked its claim to form the 
government in Jharkhand, submitting a list of 41 Member of 
Legislative Assemblies (MLAs), 36 elected on alliance ticket and 5 
independents to Governor Syed Sibtey Razi. But the Governor 
decision to Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)-Congress combines 
to form the government in the Jharkhand Assembly. The 
decision to install a JMM-led government snowballed into a 
major controversy. The President Abdul Kalam summoned Razi 
to get a first hand account of developments in Ranchi that led to 
the swearing in of Shibu Soren as Chief Minister, hours after five 
independent MLAs had met the Governor and expressed their 
support to formation of a BJP-led NDA government. The BJP 
attacked Razi's decision as a "constitutional outrage. 
Meghalaya (2008): 
The North-Eastern Hill State of Meghalaya Assembly 
elections were held on March 2008. No political parties secured 
absolute majority. The Congress won 25 seats in 60 members 
House (currently its effective strength is 59) in the recent 
Assembly polls. It managed to rope in three independents. 
Against, it the Meghalaya Progressive Alliance (MPA) led by the 
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) comprising others regional 
party and independents. The MPA claims the strength of 31 
Member of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) including the NCP-14, 
11 of the regional United Democratic Party (UDP), two of the Hill 
State People's Democratic Party, one each of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party, and the Khun Hsynniewtrep National Awakening 
Movement and two independents. Both the Congress and new 
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formed combined the UDP-NCP staking claim to form 
government. The Governor invited Congress to form government 
and D.D. Lapang was sworn as the Chief Minister of the State. 
The Governor also gives him nine days time to prove his majority 
on the floor of the House. But the Congress led D.D. Lapang 
ministry was resigned a head of the trust vote after failing to 
muster majority^'*. The Meghalaya Progressive Alliance (MPA) 
leader Donkupar Roy was appointed the new Chief Minister on 
19 March 2008. Thus, the whole study reveals the facts that 
different standards have been used in different States almost in 
the same situation by the Governor of different States in 
appointment of the Chief Minister of the States. 
Judicial Powers of Governor: 
The Constitution lays down that every judge of the High 
Court shall be appointed by the President under his hand and 
seal after consulting duly with the Chief Justice of India, the 
Governor of the State, and iti cases of appointment of a Judge 
other than the Chief Justice of the High Court, i^  it seems that 
the Governor of the State is to consulted whenever the President 
is to appoint any Judge of the High Court of that State. The 
provision of consultation with the Governor does not mean 
consultation with the Governor in his discretionary capacity, but 
that the power of the Governor will be exercised on the advice of 
the Council of Ministers. The normal procedure followed in the 
appointment of a Judge of the High Court is that the Chief 
Justice forwards his recommendation to the Chief Minister who 
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in his turn forwards his recommendation, in consultation with 
the Governor to the Minister of Home Affairs in the Central 
government. Even though the Chief Minister consults with the 
Governor in regard to the appointment, the final say on that 
effect rests with the Chief Minister of the State concerned, if the 
Chief Minister is unrelenting to the name, the Governor is 
helpless in the matter. And in the case the Governor does not 
like a nominee of the Chief Minister to be appointed a Judge of 
the High Court, here also, the Governors become ineffective. 
Every person appointed to be a Judge of a High Court shall, 
before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the 
Governor of the State, or some person appointed in that behalf 
by him, as oath or affirmation according to the form set out for 
the purpose in the Third Schedule. ^ ^ According to the normal 
practice the Governor administers oath to the Chief Justice of 
the High Court and in case of other Judges he appoints the Chief 
Justice of the High Court to administer oath to such Judge on 
his behalf. The Governor may appoint someone else in his place 
in whose presence the oath is to be made for good reasons, but a 
general authorization made by the Governor appointing the Chief 
Justice is not proper. Appointment of acting Chief Justice results 
only in an arrangement for performance of duties of the vacant 
office, hence the appointee cannot make oath in the prescribed 
forms. A Judge transferred from one High Court to other High 
Court is required to make an oath before he enters upon his 
office of the transferee High Court. 
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Granting Pardons: 
Under the Constitution of India, like the President, the 
Governor of a State has also the power to grant pardons, 
reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend or 
remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any 
offence against any law relating to a matter to which the 
executive power of State extends, i^  The executive power of the 
State extends to matters with respect to which J^X^^^ti^^, of 
the State has power to make laws. ^ ^ 
The Governor can grant the following: ^ \ \ 
• Reprieves, i.e. a temporary sus^>^j^^^^;;-;^C^itke 
punishment fixed by law; 
• Respites i.e. postponement to the future the 
execution of a sentence; 
• Commutation, i.e. changing a punishment to one of a 
different sort than that originally proposed; and 
• Remission, i.e. reduce the amount of punishment 
without changing the character of punishment. 
For the first time, the Governor power in this respect 
became the subject of judicial controversy in the case of 
Commander Nanavati who was sentenced to life imprisonment 
by the Bombay High Court. In the case of Nanawati the Governor 
of Maharashtra granted remission and ordered his release, four 
years after he was awarded life imprisonment. This order was 
issued by the Governor in consultation with the Chief Minister 
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because of exceptionally good conduct of Nanawati in jail and a 
distinguished record of service in the Indian Navy. 
Recently in 2006, the Supreme Court has rightly ruled that 
the President or the Governor's power of pardon, reprieve or 
remission of a convict's sentence is in a subject to judicial 
review. Clearly, judicial review will act as an essentially 
constitutional safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power by 
the executive. Significantly, Justice Arijit Pasayat and Justice 
S.H. Kapadia quashed the remission of sentence granted to a 
convict by Mr. Sushil Kumar Shinde, the then Andhra Pradesh 
Governor and now Union Power Minister. The manner in which 
the convict, a Congress worker was given remission of sentenced 
was proved that Mr. Shinde was guided by political 
considerations while exercising his power under Article 161. If 
executive clemency is so brazenly abused by a constitutional 
authority like the Governor, judicial review is the only remedy to 
rectify the illegal action ahd restore the rule of law.The Court 
ruled that the power of the pardon may be considered as 
discretion. However, it is not privillage act of grace and is subject 
to certain standards. The directive that the power of pardon 
should not be compromised on considerations of religion, caste 
or political expediency assume significance in the context of the 
mercy petition filed before President by M. Afzal Guru's family. 
The Supreme Court has upheld death sentence of Afzal Guru, 
accused in the Parliament attack case. The Supreme Court 
judgment also hold important lessons for both Punjab and 
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Haryana where the Governor's on the advice of the respective 
governments, have misused their power of pardon for political 
considerations. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has issued 
a notice to the Punjab government for granting pardon to 
Bathinda based Sandeep Singh, son of former minister Teja 
Singh, convicted in a double murder case. In Haryana, the Om 
Praksh Chautala government indiscriminately granted pardon to 
hardcore criminals, apparently to harass political opponent. The 
grant of clemency to several convicted criminals in Haryana 
raises questions about the Om Prakash Chautala government's 
political motive. Thus, in the present constitutional scheme of 
things the President and the Governors act on the aid and advice 
of the Council of Ministers even with regard to the grant of 
pardon. Thereof they ought intferpection, lest the Court declares 
it as null and void as it did with what Mr. Shinde's exercise of 
power of political reasons. In addition to the above judicial 
powers of the Governor, the Governor has also the power to 
sanction prosecution of a ministers or a member of Legislative 
Assemblies (MLAs) under the Prevention of Corruption Act. There 
has been considerable debate whether this power is to be 
exercised by the Governor on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers or in his discretion. After Antulay's case where 
Governor P.C. Alexander has accorded his permission to 
prosecute the former, a new controversy has arisen in the fodder 
scam case involving Bihar then the Chief Minister Laloo Prasad 
Yadav. Bihar Governor A.R. Kidwai was accorded sanction to the 
Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I) to prosecute the Chief 
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Minister. 19 In Tamil Nadu, Jayalalitha has challenged in the 
Supreme Court of India the power of the Governor M. Channa 
Reddy to sanction her prostecution. The Supreme Court said, if 
the Governor cannot act in his own discretion, there would be a 
complete breakdown of the rule of law as much as it would be 
open for governments to refuse sanction inspite of overwhelming 
material showing that prima facie a case was made out. 
Discretionary Powers of Governor: 
The Constitution also envisages situations in which the 
Governor has certain discretionary powers. The Constitution 
provide that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and 
advise the Governor in thfe exercise of his function except is so 
far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his 
functions or any of them in his discretions.sojf any question 
arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which 
the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in 
his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by 
the Governor shall be called in question on the ground that he 
ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion.21 The 
question whether any , and if so what, advice was tendered by 
ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into by any 
court.22 Unless a particular Article expressly so provides, an 
obligations of the Governor to act 'in his discretion' he is to act 
on the advice of Council of Ministers. The only function in which 
the State Governor is required to exercise his discretion under 
the Constitution are para 9(2) of the sixth schedule to the 
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Constitution regarding the administration of tribal areas in 
Assam. Article 239 (AB) ^ s o authorises the Governor to act 
independently of his Council of Ministers i.e. when he is 
appointed by the President to be the administrator of an 
adjoining Union Territory. The Governor of Naggiland is given 
discretion in respect of some matters under Article 371-A (1) (b) 
(d), 2(b) and (F). Implied discretionary power with the Governor 
can be read in the second proviso to Article 200 under which the 
Governor may reserve a Bill for the consideration of the 
President and in Article 356 (1) under which he may report to 
the President that the government of the State cannot be run in 
accordance with the Constitution. It may, however, be noted that 
under all these provisions the Governor is supposed to be acting 
as the representative of the President and not independently. 
The Governor can exercise his discretionary powers in some 
matters such as: 
• In the appointment of the Chief Minister the Governor 
can exercise his discretionary powers only when there 
is no single pafty securing the majority. He cannot 
exercise his discretion in the event of a clear decisive 
majority of a party or a coalition.23 
• The Governor can also use his discretionary power in 
dismissing the ministry because they hold office 
during the pleasure of the Governor. At the same 
time they are collectively responsible to the Lower 
House of the State Legislature. As long as they 
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command a majority in the Lower House of the State 
Legislature and performs their duties according to the 
oath which thisy have taken in such conditions there 
is no scope for the Governor to use his discretion. He 
can only use his discretion against the ministry when 
they lose the majority and indulge themselves into 
corrupt practices.24 
• The Governor can use his discretionary power in 
dissolving the Lower House of the Legislature i.e. 
Legislative Assembly.25 
• The Governor can also reserve a Bill for the 
consideration of the President in his discretion which 
has already been passed by the State Legislature.26 
• The Governor can make a report to the President 
when the government of the State cannot be carried 
on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution.27 
• Finally, he can ask the Chief Minister in his 
discretion to submit for the consideration of the 
Council of Ministers any matter on which a decision 
has been taken by an individual minister and not by 
the whole Council of Ministers. 
Thus, the Governor can exercise his discretion in a 
particular situation. It was the intention of framers of 
Constitution that the situational discretion would be exercised 
not an ordinary circumstance, but under the pressing needs of 
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the political situation existing at a particular time in the State. In 
normal times, in the exercise of his functions, the Governor is 
aided and advised by the Council of Ministers, but in an 
abnormal situation he would apply his discretion as an agent of 
the President and inform him about the happenings in the State. 
Thus, the intention of constitutional makers is that the Governor 
in exercise of discretion in abnormal situations should preserve 
and protect the constitutional provisions and prevent any 
misuse of those provisions. 
Governor as a Chancellor of the University: 
There is at the head of every University as Chancellor. In 
most instances, he is the State Govfemor. His powers are defined 
in the respective University Act. The Chancellor is the permanent 
head of the University signifying continuity of control, the mark 
of evenness and constancy of authority.^s He is the President of 
the University court and presides over convocation of the 
University. An honorary degtee can be conferred only if the 
proposal is confirmed by the Chancellor. The Chancellor has 
been empowered to call for any information from the University 
relating to the administration of the affairs of the University. A 
duty has been further cast upon the Vice- Chancellor to furnish 
such information or records as desired by the Chancellor. Affairs 
of the University have a very large concept and each and every 
matter, which relates to the University, can be subject-matter of 
inquiry by the Chancellor. The Chancellor is one of the officers of 
the University. But it does not mean that he is the employee of 
61 
lUe governor ConstitutionaC Position and functions 
the University or government of India or State government. The 
order of the Chancellor was challenged in the Rajasthan High 
Court on the ground that the order was without jurisdiction as 
the incumbent had been a member of the Public Service 
Commission and under Article 319 (d) he could not accept 
employment either under the government of India or the 
government of the State. The full bench of the Rajasthan High 
Court held that the Governor cannot be called an employee of 
the government of India or the State governments^. The decision 
of Rajasthan High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
India. 30 
The Governor is ex- officio Chancellor of the University. But 
he functions in two different capacities. As a Governor Article 
154 of the Constitution of India lays down that the executive 
power of the States shall be vested in the Governor and shall be 
exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinates 
to him in accordance with the Constitution. When the Governor 
exercises the executive power of the State, he may be equated 
with the State government, but not when he exercises other 
powers. While exercising the powers as Chancellor he cannot be 
deemed to be the exercising of the executive power of the State 
whether as Governor or the State government.^iThe Chancellor 
is empowered to appoint Vice-Chancellor. The process of 
appointment is varies. One method through the syndicate or the 
senate. The other method is recommendation of names by the 
Committee constituted by the Chancellor. Amongst persons 
recommended, the Chancellor finally chooses one person to be 
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appointed as Vice-Chancellor. Chancellor is also empowered to 
appoint an interim Vice-Chancellor for six month. The term may 
be extfended from time to time but cannot exceed one year. The 
power to appoint Vice-Chancellor vests in Chancellor in practice 
the Chancellor consults the Chief Minister in making such 
appointment. The appointment of Vice-Chancellor is not rtiadfe 
on basis of merit only but other consideration viz, caste, religion, 
affiliation with ruling political party major role. It is now less 
academic, more political appointments. The politicalisation of 
Vice-Chancellor's appointment has badly affected the 
atmosphere of cartipus and deterioted the academic standards of 
the Universities. Recently in July, 2008 by amending vital 
clauses of Rajasthan University Law Act in the State Assembly, 
the Vasundhara Raje government it seems has taken a step 
towards clipping the Governors authority to appoint and remove 
Vice - Chancellors to the 10 Universities in the State. The tussle 
for appointments and removal dates back to October 1, 2005 
when the then Rajasthan Governor and now President Pratibha 
Patil had reportedly appointed N.K Jain as Vice-Chancellor of 
Ranjasthan University (RU) despite reservations by the State 
government. A similar situation had arisen in Uttar Pradesh in 
2006 when the than Mulayam Singh Yadev government passed a 
Bill inducting a secretary-level official in the sub-committee for 
appointment of Vice-Chancellors. Mulaym Singh government 
took this step after Uttar Pradesh Governor T.V. Rajeswar had 
appointed four Vice-Chancellors without consulting the 
government. 
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The Governor as the head of the State has very limited role 
to play in the administration of the State but as a Chancellor he 
may play very significant role in the field of higher education of 
the State. Although he is not the executive functionary of the 
University but being the head and officer of the University he can 
issue guidance and instruction to the University for their proper 
functioning. University functions through different authorities, 
e.g. Court, Executive Council, Academic Council etc. As the head 
of the University the Chancellor should keep a vigilant eye over 
the overall working of such authorities. The Moti Lai Vora 
Governor of Uttar Pradesh (1993-96) appointed a two man 
committee whicB included hh. Legal Adviser ^ d Secretdty to 
visit each University. The team visited all the Universities and 
submitted it reports. On the basis of such reports Mr. Vora in 
cohsultation with the Chief Minister and officers of the State 
government introduced many programmers and also helped in 
itnproving the financial condition of the Universities. 
Thus, the example of Mr. Vora is illustrated to show that in 
the matter of higher education in the State Governor should not 
sit as a silent spectator and wait for the State government's 
actions. As the head of the Universities he should himself take 
initiative. Since he is the Head of the State also, his initiative will 
bring results. 
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THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 
The State Governor is an integral part of the Legislature in 
the Indian States under the Article 168 of the Constitution, 
which consists of the Governor, the Assembly and the Legislative 
Council if it is a bicameral Legislature. The king in England also 
becomes an integrsd part of the Parliament of that country which 
consists of House of Lords and the House of Commons. The 
Indian Constitution closely based on British Parliamentary 
democracy, the Constituent Assembly has conveniently adopted 
the same system for the Union government too, where the 
President of India becomes the integral part of the Indian 
Parliament. The Constitution of India thus makes the executive 
authority of the State coextensive with the legislative authority of 
the State. As an integral part of the State Legislature the 
Governor of a State enjoys extensive legislative powers. 
Nomination to Council: 
According to the Constitution of India, the Governor of 
State is to nominate one sixth of the members of Legislative 
Council and the members so nominated shall consist of 
personality of proven talents having special knowledge in respect 
of such matters as art, literature science, cooperative movement 
and social service. This power of nomination to the Upper House 
was intended to give representation to unrepresented elite class 
whose unequivocal service can be use to the government and its 
functions. The categories mentioned in Article 171 (5) are not 
exhaustive. Each of the subjects is not required to be 
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represented in evfery case. Even the practical experience in the 
spheres enumerated in the clause makes a person eligible for 
nomination to the Council even though he has no special 
knowledge in thfem. A person who has taken active part in 
politics and the governance of the State for several years is 
presumed to have practical experience in matters of social 
service and therefore, qualified to be nominated as a member of 
the Council. The nomination of members of the Legislative 
Council of the State made by the Governor under Article 171 (3) 
(e) read with Article 171 (5) is an act done by him in his official 
capacity. The Governor not being answerable to the Court by 
reason of Article 361, no legal proceeding will lie in a court of law 
challenging the nomination of the members on the ground that 
the persons nominated are not duly qualified. Whether the 
members nominated to the State Legislative Council under 
Article 171 (3) possess the required qualifications is a question of 
fact and the High Court cannot decide it under Article 226. 
When it is not sho^ Am that a person nominated to the Legislative 
Council was disqualified or that the Governor had no power to 
nominate him, the mere showing that the nomination was made 
for political reasons will not be sufficient to issue a writ of que-
warranto. 
Where selection of person for nomination to the Legislative 
Council was made by the Chief Minister with the approval of the 
Council of Ministers and a subsequent publication of a 
notification of names was made stating that the Governor had 
nominated those members, the nomination will be deemed to 
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have been made by the Governor and the Court cannot enquire 
into the advice, if any, given by the Council of Ministers to the 
Governor. 
Article 171, clause (3) (e) and (5) makes an inroad into the 
principle of election which is the foundation of the system of 
Parliamentary government established by the Constitution. 
Clause (5) was not intended to make membership available in 
the public interest to persons having special knowledge or 
practical experience in the sphere mentioned so that they may 
not contest election. 
The nomination under Clause 171 (3) (e) is made by the 
Governor on the advice of the Council of Ministers. In Uttar 
Pradesh (U.P.) a piquant situation arose. After the Assembly 
elections in 1993 no political party has acquired adequate 
membership to claim itiajority in the House. The first 
government undet Mulayam Singh Yadav was formed in coalition 
with Bahujan Sato^j Pariy (BSP) with outside support of other 
political parties and independent members except the Bhartiya 
Janata Party (BJP) . There was split in June 1995 between 
Samajwadi Party led by the Mulayam Singh Yadav and BSP. As 
a result BSP members of the House elected Ms Mayawati as their 
leader and laid claim to form the government with assured 
support of BJP in the House. Mulayam Singh Yadav despite 
having lost majority support in the House persisted to continue. 
The Governor Moti Lai Vora, therefore , dismissed the Council of 
Ministers headed by Mulayam Singh Yadav and appointed Ms 
Mayawati, leader of BSP as Chief Minister and directed to prove 
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majority on the floor of the House within specified period. Ms 
Mayawati succeeded in showing massive support in the House 
with the aid of BJP and also of others. After 4 months there was 
apparent split between BSP and BJP and each leveled 
incriminating charges against the other. There was a threat of 
withdrawal of support of EIJP or BSP refusing support of BJP in 
running the government. The likely prospects were that the Chief 
Minister may advise the Governor to dissolve the House and 
tender her resignation .Mayawati was not a member of the 
Legislature of the State arid therefore she was to cease to be 
Chief Minister after the expiry of six months from June 3, 1995 
under Article 164 (4) of the Constitution. In this background Ms 
Mayawati, Chief Minister of U.P., sent to the Governor the 
nomination of nine persons to the Legislative Council including 
herself under Article 171 (3) of the Constitution. While the 
matter was pending before the Governor she resigned on October 
17, 1995 and President's rule was imposed in the State. The 
following questions were redsed: 
(a) Whether it would be correct in law or in propriety to make 
nomination in Legislative Council on the advice of the Chief 
Minister or Council of Ministers, which has lost confidence 
of the Legislative Assembly? 
(b) Whether it would be correct in law or in propriety to allow 
the Chief Minister to seek her own nomination when this 
power of nomination is to be exercised by the Governor on 
proposal of Chief Minister herself under item 15 of Second 
Schedule of Rules of Business 1975. 
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S.S. Bhatnagar, then Advocate-General of U.P. held the 
view that the Governor is not bound by the advice of the Council 
of Ministers in the above particular circumstances. A paramount 
requirement laid under Article 164 is that a Chief Minister or 
Council of Ministers is responsible to the Legislative Council. It 
is this democratic trust by elected representatives of the people 
of the State which gives authority to the Chief Minister to advise 
the Governor in discharge of executive power vested in the latter 
under Article 154 of the Constitution. The executive power is in 
fact exercised by the Council of Ministers under Article 163 
though it expressed to be taken in the name of Governor under 
Article 166 of the Constitution. 
The function to nominate a member to the Legislative 
Council under Article 171 (3) (e) of the Constitution is preserved 
to the Governor with the aid of Chief Minister alone. (See item 
15 of Second Schedule under Rule 8 of U.P. Rules of Business , 
1975, framed under Article 166 (2) and 3 of Constitution). The 
said rule shows that the nomination to the Legislative Council is 
not matter which goes to Council of Ministers under Rules (7) of 
Rules of Business, 1975. On reading the provisions of Article 
154, Article 162 and Article 166 of the Constitution it is clear 
that the power to nominate to the Legislative Council under 
Article 171 (3) (e) of the Constitution is a constitutional power of 
the Governor as it does not fall in the definition and extent of 
executive power provided in Article 162 of the Constitution. In 
the Rules Business, this power to nominate to Legislative 
Council is preserved by the Governor in the Second Schedule. 
71 
iHe governor aiuf t&e Legislature 
Item 15 under Rule 8 is to be exercised by him with the aid of 
Chief Minister alone. It is not a matter, which can go to Council 
of Ministers under Rule 7 enumerated in First Schedule to Rules 
of Business. Thus this being the power of Governor to nominate 
to the Legislative Council under Rules of Business, 1975, shared 
with the Chief Minister, it cannot be read as a power of the Chief 
Minister to nominate herself. A division bench of Allahabad High 
Court! has taken the view that the 'power to nominate' means a 
power to nominate some other person and not to nominate on 
self. This view of the High Court was accepted by the State 
Legislature when it amended the University Act to empower the 
Chief Justice to nominate himself or other judge. Thus the power 
to nominate to the Legislative Council under Article 173 (3) (e) of 
the Constitution is a constitutional power of the Governor and is 
distinct from executive power of the State which vests in the 
Governor under Article 154 to be exercised through officer 
subordinate. The power to nominate to the Legislative Council of 
the Governor being distinct from the executive power of the 
State. It falls outside Article 166 (1) also. Thus, conclusion is 
that Governors power to nominate a person to Legislative 
Council is a constitutional power, who is himself a part of the 
Legislature. Therefore, this power is to be exercised in his own 
discretion. 
In January 1996 a writ petition was filed in the Allahabad 
High Court (Lucknow Bench) for directing the Governor to accept 
the advice of the Council of Ministers for nominating the 
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members to the U.P Legislative CounciP on the ground inter alia 
as follows: 
• Under Article 163 of Constitution, the Governor is 
bound by the advice of ministers tendered by the 
Council under Article 171 of the Constitution. 
• Except the discretionary powers of the Governor which 
are constitutionally recoginised there is no other power 
which is exercisable in his discretion. Therefore the 
power under 171 (3) (e) has to exercised by the Governor 
on the advice of the Council of Ministers. 
The nomination of a member by the Governor under sub-
clause (5) does not infringe the personal right of any elected 
members of Legislative Assembly even in an indirect manner so 
as to entitle him to sustain an application for the issue of writ of 
certiorari to quash the nomination made by the Governor. 
Summoning of House: 
The Constitution of India Article 174(1) enables the 
Governor to summon the House of the Legislature of the State to 
meet at such time and place as he thinks fit but six months 
shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and 
the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session and 
Article 174(2), the Governor from time to time -
a- Prorogue the House or either House. 
b- Dissolve the Legislative Assembly. 
According to established Parliamentary convention, the 
Governor should act on the advice of the Chief Minister of the 
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State, as is the British practice. In Britain, the sovereign always 
exercises his/her prerogatives of summoning the Parliament on 
the advice of Prime Minister being in line with well-formed 
conventions. The Governor usually exercises this power on the 
advice of the Council of Ministers. But in situation of defection or 
one of the support withdrawals by £iny coalition segment may 
make the task of the Governor difficult. His act of summoning or 
non-summoning the Assembly may prove decisive, because he 
can extend critical support to one party or the other and hence 
there is differential of opinions regarding the exercise of this 
power. The Governors have used different standards in various 
States in summon of the Legislative Assembly. As Bihar was 
gripped by a political crisis in 1967. B.P Mandal group of 
Legislators withdrew their support from M.P Sinha ministry and 
formed a new political party called Soshit Dal. B.P. Mandal urged 
the Governor to convene an early emergency session of the 
Legislative Assembly to assess the strength of the government. 
Chief Minister M.P. Sinha insisted that he alone was to decide when 
to summon the Assembly. He also said that the smooth passage 
of the Appropriation of Bill indicated that he enjoyed majority 
support in the House. The State Governor concurred with the 
assessment of the Chief Minister and did not call an earlier 
session of the Assembly and convened it to meet on the day 
suggested by the Chief Minster. M.A. Ayyangar did the same in 
1970, when Ramanand Tewari, the leader of Bihar Praja 
Socialist Party, informed the Governor that with the withdrawal 
of the support by the Communist Party of India and a section of 
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the Praja Socialist Party, the Bhola Paswan Sashtri government 
was reduced to minority. The Governor refused to oblige him and 
maintained that, "while the majority of the ruling coalition 
headed by Bhola Paswan Shastri could be tested only in the 
Assembly it had not shown signs of political instability following 
the withdrawal of support by the Communist Party of India". The 
State of West Bengal was plunged into a serious crisis as a result 
of the defection of P.C. Ghose, the then Food Minister of the 
State, who along with 16 members withdrew his support to the 
United Front government headed by Ajay Mukherjee of Bangla 
Congress in 1967. It reduced the government to a minority and 
the Governor asked the Chief Minister to convene and early 
session of the Assembly. He wrote, "in view of the fact that 17 
supporters of United Front government have withdrawn their 
support and 16 of them and the leader of Congress Legislature 
Party have signified their willingness to support an alternative 
government a reasonable doubt has arisen in the West Bangal 
Assembly". The Chief Minister, Ajay Mukherjee demurred at this 
suggestion and advised him to convene the Assembly on 
December, 18, and 1967. The Governor dismissed the United 
Front government and invited P.C. Ghosh to form an alternative 
government which the latter promptly did. 
The one of the significant example in the Karnataka Devraj 
Urs, government was, dismissed in 1977 on the mere suspicious, 
entertained by the Governor, that he had ceased to command a 
majority supports as a result of defections inspite of the fact 
that the Assembly was under summons and was going to meet 
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within three days, was it not the duty of Governor to put his 
doubt to test in the appropriate forum? Was it competent on the 
part of the Governor, acting from the position of a constitutional 
head, to take such a drastic action as dismissal without an 
adverse verdict given by the Assembly? If the Governor's conduct 
in the whole exercise is examined from the norms of 
Parliamentary system it is not difficult to appreciate the fact 
that throughout he had been playing politics and in the process 
the Constitution was violated in most blatant manner. 
In the analogous circumstance in the same State in 1989 
the Janata Dal government headed by S.R.Bommai was sacked. 
The fact at the case are that K.P. Mulakery, a Janata Dal 
member had defected from the party and wrote to the Governor 
that he had withdrawn support from the government, the next 
day he presented to the Governor 19 letters, alleged to have 
been signed by them, signifying their withdrawal of support 
from the government. Mr. Verkatsubahiah sent those letters to 
the Secretary of the Legislature for verification of signatures and 
after the authenticity of them was established, he reported to the 
President, that in view of the letters indicating the withdrawal of 
support, Bommai had lost his majority support and therefore 
constitutionally the government could not continue any further. 
He also informed the President that no other party was in a 
position to from an alternative government. It is also reported 
that 7 out of 19 who had defected earlier had returned to Janata 
Dal the very next day and had informed the Governor that their 
signatures were obtained fraudulently on misrepresentation of 
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facts and they fully supported the government. The State cabinet 
met the same day, and with a view to dispel the clouds of 
suspicion which had gathered, because of the politics of 
defection, decided to convene the Assembly session within a 
week and the Governor was advised accordingly. The Chief 
Minister informed the Governor that he was prepared to face the 
Assembly, any time he chooses to summon, to prove his 
majority. The Governor instead of summoning the Assembly as 
advised by the Chief Minister, which was the only appropriate 
constitutional forum to take a decision on the issue which had 
cropped up, added taint to the facts that 7 members who had 
returned back to Janata Dal had done it under pressure and the 
whole atmosphere had become vitiated by defection and the 
Bommai government which had lost the majority support, 
should be dismissed. The President however accepted^ the 
recommendation make by the Governor an^^^lb^wt^fBf^ 4ffe?^  
imposition of the President's rule in the State, /s . ^ * ^ ^ i ^ ^ 
Prorogation of the Assembly: V^^^ ^ 
Under Article 174 (2) (a) the power to p^ei^^^^er^fe^ 
Assembly of the State is vested in the Governor.There is a little 
difference between the terms adjournment, prorogation and 
dissolution of the Assembly. As the prorogation terminates the 
session of the Assembly and it operates until a fixed date, and 
the adjournment does not terminate the session but it is an 
interruption in the course of one and the same session. It 
postpones the further business for specific time, i.e. hours, days 
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or weeks. Dissolution means the end of the life of the Legislative 
Assembly and calls for a fresh election. According to 
Parliamentary practice, the Governor exercises the power of 
prorogation on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and it has 
become a well-established convention that the Governor 
prorogues the State Assembly on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers. The Punjab Governor D.C Pavete, prorogue the 
Legislative Assembly on April 10, 1970 while the resolution of 
removal of speaker was sdready there. On the other hand the 
Governor of Tamil Nadu K.K. Shah prorogued the Assembly on 
November 1972 in exercise of the power conferred upon him by 
Article 174 (2) (a) in order to resummon the session on 5th 
December 1972, when the spieaker of the Assembly adjourned 
the sitting of the Assembly to 5* December 1972. The Govfernot 
exercised this power similarly when 35 out of 62 Members of 
Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) of Congress Party withdrfew 
support from C.M.Sidique in favour of M.R. Kasim in Jammu 
and Kashmir. Siddique get the House prorogued on March 3, 
1970 during the budget session. The Governor cannot exercise 
the function of proroguing the Assembly in his discretion. He is 
bound by the advice of the Council of Minister. However, the 
Governor is always not bound to act according to the advice of 
the Council of Ministers, particularly when the prorogation is 
sought at the time when either his Chief Minister and his 
Council of Ministers has been threatened or reduced to minority 
or a vote of no-confidence motion is under consideration or the 
resolution for the removal of the speaker is pending.Through the 
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Parliamentary practices say that the Governor should act 
according to the advice of the Council of Ministers, it is he in fact 
who takes an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and 
therefore he must ensure that the Assembly should get its fair 
chance to measure its strength.3 
The Governor's Committfee (1971) is of the view that the 
Governor should normally act on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers. But if a Chief Minster advices the prorogation of the 
Legislative Assembly when a notice of a no confidence motion is 
pending the Governor should not prorogue the House. Sarkaria 
Commission report also holds the same views. Article 174 (2) 
which enables the Governor to prorogue the Legislature does not 
indicate any restriction on the power. When the Governor 
exercises the power while the Legislature is in sessions and in 
the midst of Legislative work the motive of the Governor may 
conceivably be questioned on the ground of on alleged want of 
good faith and about of constitutionals power. But when an 
Emergency arises, it exercise is perfectly understandable and it 
is not an abuse of power. On the speaker adjourning the 
Legislature of two months beyond March 31 making it 
impossible for the Finance Bill being passed before March 31, 
the Governor con prorogue the Legislative Assembly and get rid 
of the adjournment. Article 174 (2) does not put any restriction 
on the Governor's power and his action cannot be questioned as 
malafide when the Legislature is not in session. Courts are 
bound to take judicial notice of prorogation and presume the 
regularity of these actions which must be interpreted as far as 
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possible so that the thing alone may valid rather than invalid. 
Thus, the right to prorogue the House should be with the 
Governor but it does not mean that he will use it as an 
instrument to interfere in the normal working of the State 
Legislature. 
Dissolution of the Assembly: 
The Article 174 (2) (b) of the Constitution reveals that the 
power of dissolution of the Legislative Assembly is the 
discretionary powers of the Governor. There in no explicit 
provision in the Constitution which regulates this power of 
Governor nor has any convention developed in this regard. Thus 
the power to dissolve the Assembly by the Governor has been a 
subject of great controversy. In normal circumstances the 
Governor is bound to dissolve the Assembly if such on advice is 
tendered to him by a Chief Minister having a majority support, 
f'or instance, in many States the Chief Ministers got the 
Assembly dissolved, on the ground that he or she wanted that 
thfe Assembly and Parliamentary elections to take place 
simultaneously i.e. in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the 
Chief Minister of respective States N.T.Rama Rao and Ram 
Krishna Hedge got the Assembly dissolved as they wanted that 
the Assembly election be held simultaneously with the 
Parliamentary elections in January 1984.1n Kashmir in 1984, 
12 members of the Assembly defeated from National Conference 
in the leadership of G,M.Shah and withdraw their support from 
the government headed by Dr. Farooq Abdullah .Dr Abdullah 
80 
iHe governor and the Legislature 
advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly but the Governor 
did not accept the advice because having lost support of the 
majority members. Dr Abdullah Ministry had no constitutional 
right to recommend the dissolution of the House. Thus, the 
Constitution of India contains no specific provision defining 
under which circumstances the Governor can grant or refuse 
dissolution or any constitutional provisions requiring him to act 
always in conformity with ministerial advice on every matter. It is 
open to the Governor to refuse dissolution when asked for by a 
defeated party leader in case the Governor can form an 
alternative Council of Ministers to run a State administfation. If 
the Chief Minister enjoys the majority support then the advice of 
the dissolution should be accepted. The power of dissolution is 
most valuable and most powerful instrument, which ought to be 
used in extreme cases. The Governor should take the steps very 
cautiously and judiciously before allowing a Assembly to be 
dissolved and going frequently for mid-term election, which will 
incur an additional burden to the national exchequer. The Article 
174 (2) (b) expressly vests the Governor the power to dissolve the 
Legislative Assembly over if it is to be on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers. The power to given such an advice is 
automatically taken over by the Union government for the 
purpose of dissolution on the President assuming governmental 
powers by a proclamation under Article 356 (1).A dissolution by 
the President after the proclamation would be as good as a 
dissolution by the Governor. 
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Right to Address the Legislature: 
According to Constitution, the Governor may address the 
Legislative Assembly or in the case of a State having a Legislative 
Council, either House of the Legislature of State or both Houses 
assembled together and may for that purpose require the 
attendance of members^. The Governor may also send messages 
to the House or Houses of the Legislature of the State, whether 
with respect to a Bill then pending in Legislature or otherwise, 
and a House to which any message is so sent shall with all 
convenient dispatch consider any matter required by the 
message to be taken into consideration^. The address of the 
Governor under Article 175 to Legislative Assembly or to both 
Houses of Legislature is not obligatory and it is within his 
discretion. The power of the Governor under this Article will not 
be exercised on the advice df the Council of Ministers. The very 
fact that a Governor can send messages with respect to a Bill 
shows that it is a power given to him to influence the 
deliberations of the Assembly on some occasions at least. When 
a party in power has majority in the Lower House but not in the 
Upper House, they may persuade the President to send message 
to the Upper House to persuade the opposition to agree to a 
particular legislation. The power of sending messages may 
sometimes also be used for influencing the House when no 
political party has a clear cut majority in the House. 
According to Article 176(1) makes it obligatory on the part 
of the Governor to address the Legislative Assembly or in the 
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case of a State having Legislative Council assembled together at 
the commencement of the first session after each general 
election to the Legislative Assembly and commencement of the 
first session of each year and inform the Legislature of the 
causes of its summons. The Syed Abdul Mansur HabibuUah Vs 
the Speaker of West Bengal Legislative Assembly,^ the Calcutta 
High Court held that Article 176 should not be interpreted as 
merely a directory. In Saradhakar Vs Speaker, Orissa Legislative 
Assembly^ it was laid down that the Legislature in India cannot 
ordinarily be said to have met until the mandatory preliminaries 
under Article 176 have been gone through. It clearly means that 
the Governor is bound to address under Article 176.The 
addresses of the Governor are prepared by their respective 
governments. This raises some pertinent questions which are: 
• Should a Governor read the address in person? 
• Will the address be taken as read if the Governor utters 
just a word ftotn it? 
• Can the Governor refuse to read some part of the 
address if, according to him, it is self-condemnatory and 
impinges upon the dignity of his person and office both? 
The first question is, whether it is necessary for the 
Governor to be present in person to read the address or can 
someone deputise for him. Unlike the Centre where the Vice-
President deputises for the President in the letter's absence, in 
the State there is no post analogous to that of the Vice President. 
Here, the Governor addresses the members in person. Even in a 
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State of physical indisposition he will have to address in person 
unless he proceeds on leave and somebody officiates or takes 
charge of the Governor. In such a contingency such a Governor 
will address the Legislature in person. The only concession that 
can be made in the case of an ailing Governor not proceeding on 
leave is to permit him to address the Legislature outside the 
precincts of the Legislature. Such a situation cropped up in the 
State of Rajasthan. On February 22, 1961 the Governor 
Gurumukh Nihal Singh of Rajasthan addressed the members of 
the Legislative Assembly in the Raj Bhawan on account of 
illness. 
The second issue is, will the address be taken as read if the 
Governor reads only a part of it and not the whole of it? Such a 
situation may arise if some members create disturbances at the 
time of the addfess and do not allow the Governor to proceed 
with it. Instances are on record when several Governors were 
compelled to leave the Houses without reading the complete 
address. In West Bengal in 1965 Padmaja Naidu, the Governor 
of West Bengal, left the Assembly without completing her 
address because of the frequent noisy interruptions made by the 
Opposition. She laid her address on the table of the House and 
declared that it be taken as read. Commenting upon the 
incident, the Calcutta High Court opined.^ "When the Governor 
makes due attempt to perform the duty under Article 176, but 
fails and walks out of the House and make up the failure by 
publication of the address to the members of the Legislature by a 
well known method, namely, by laying the address on the table 
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of the House, the duty is merely irregularly performed and such 
an irregularity cannot be called in question under Article 212 (1). 
Unless there grows a constitutional convention that the 
Governor's addresses shall be heard with attention, respect and 
ceremony due to the constitutional head of the State, there may 
be occasions when members of the Legislature may indulge in 
loud shouting and unruly behaviour when the Governor comes 
to address. To hold that a Legislature must not be deemed to 
have met when a Governor is unable to begin or to finish the 
address under Article 176 and is compelled otherwise to publish 
the address is to put a value on such disturbances when they do 
not deserve. "The Governor's reading of portion of his speech from 
beginning and a portion from the concluding part followed by the 
House adopting a resolution taking the Governor's speech as 
read could be taken as the speech having been delivered. 
The third issue centres round the power of the Governor to 
skip over such portion from his address prepared by his Council 
of Ministers, which he considers derogatory to the dignity or his 
exalted office. This happened in West Bengal in 1969. Dharma 
Vira, was the Governor of West Bengal when the United Front 
government headed by the Chief Minister Ajay Mukherjee 
assumed office in 1967. Subsequently the then Food Minister, 
P.C. Ghose along with 16 others, from the United Front, reduced 
the government to a minority. The Governor asked the Chief 
Minister to demonstrate his majority on the floor of the House 
but he was unwilling to face the Assembly on the date suggested 
by the Governor. Hence the Governor dismissed the State 
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ministry and installed P.C. Ghose in office as the Chief Minister. 
When the Assembly met, the speaker Bijoy Banaijee refused to 
recognize the new government and created a constitutional 
deadlock. To overcome it the Governor was untimely compelled 
to dissolve the State Legislature and order a fresh poll. In the 
mid-term election in 1969, the erstwhile United Front emerged 
victorious with added majority and the opposition was badly 
routed. The new United Front ministry headed by Ajay 
Mukherjee, again decided to settle its score with Governor 
Dharma Vira whom it blamed for its earlier ouster. Hence in the 
address of the Governor, which it prepared, it inserted two 
paragraphs, which the Governor refused to read. The Governor 
Dharma Vira argued that the paragraphs were self-
condemnatory for him. According to him "Parliamentary 
government, with all its practices and conventions, has been in 
existence for centuries. But never in its history has any head of 
the government been faced with the problem of having to read 
self-condemnatory material neither according to the Constitution 
nor according to Parliamentary practices. The Governor of 
Punjab D.C.Pavate underwent a similar experience in 1969. His 
address too contained an objectionable paragraph concerning 
the toppling of the previous government of Gumam Singh in 
Punjab in 1968. D.C. Pavate requested the Chief Minister 
Gurnam Singh to drop that reference and the latter readily 
agreed to drop it and the matter ended there and then. Had 
Gurunam Singh insisted on the Governor reading that 
paragraph, it would have created a piquant situation. D.C Pavate 
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observers, "speech is, according to democratic tradition, 
ordinarily prepared by the Chief Minister and my duty is simply 
to read it as approval by the government". The question is if the 
address is an expression of the views of the government and not 
the Governor, the former should not transgress its authority and 
condemn the Governor and Central government. Thus, the 
Governor address under Article 175 as different from his address 
under Article 176 in a number of respects: 
• The address under Article 175 is entirely at the option of 
the Governor; that under Article 176 it is mandatory. 
• Under Article 175 in the case of a bicameral Legislature, 
the Governor may address the Houses in a joint session 
or separately; under Article 176, he has to address the 
House jointly only. 
• The subject-matter of the Governor's address is not 
specified under Article 175 whereas under Article 176 
he has to inform the Legislature of the causes of it's 
summon. 
• Article 175 does not provide for the allotment of time for 
the discussion of the matter adverted to in the 
Governor's address. Under Article 176 (2) provision shall 
be made by the rules regulating the procedure of the 
House or either House for the allotment of time for 
discussion of the matter referred to in the address. 
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It may be pointed t ha t the procedure prescribed in the 
rules made u n d e r Article 176 is directory. Their non- observsince 
would not vitiate the Assembly proceedings. 
D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f M e m b e r s : 
According to the Constitution, under Article 192(1) if any question 
arises as to whether a member of a House of Legislature of a State 
has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in 
clause(l) of Article 191,the question shall be referred for the decision 
of the Governor and his decision shall be final. Before giving any 
decision on such question, the Governor shall obtain the opinion of 
the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion 
under Article 192(2). 
The conditions for the application of this clause are: 
• That a quest ion as to disqualification h a s arisen. The 
clause, however, does not lay down where, by whom and 
in what m a n n e r the question should arise. It is not 
necessary t ha t it should arise in the Legislature itself. 
• That quest ion m u s t be referred for the decision of the 
Governor. It does not however, say tha t some other 
authori ty m u s t receive the compliant, hold an inquiry 
and then refer it for the decision of the Governor. If any 
such quest ion arises in any m a n n e r it h a s to be decided 
by the Governor alone and the cour ts shall have no 
jurisdiction to determine it. 
Article 191 of the Consti tution enumera tes certain 
disqualifications for being chosen as a member of the Legislature 
of State. The words "has become" indicate tha t disqualification 
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which can be referred to the Governor, under this Article is 
a disqualification arising subsequent to the election and not 
existing at the time of election.^ The words "shall be final" 
indicate that the Governor's decision Ccinnot be questioned in 
any court as to its propriety or correctness. There is authority of 
the Supreme Court^o to the effect that an appropriate writ may 
lie to set aside the order if it is established that the order was 
passed, 
• on collateral consideration or 
• in contravention of the rules of natural justice or 
• on no evidence or 
• on the advice of the executive or other authority who 
was not entitled to advise the Governor in the matter of 
exercise of such quasi-judicial function. 
Full bench of the Madras High Court held that a writ 
petition under Article 226 against a decision under Article 192 
(1) is maintainable. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that 
no writ petition under Article 226 to adjudiciable the question 
of disqualification of a member of Legislature is competent, the 
jurisdiction vests in the Governor under Article 192 (l).The 
decision or the question raised under Article 192 (1) has to be 
pronounced by the Governor, but that must be in accordance 
with the opinion of the Election Commission. When the 
Governor receives the complaint and he forwards the same to 
the Election Commission, it can assume that the Election 
Commission should proceed to try the complaint before giving 
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its opinion. It would not, therefore, be correct to say that it is 
the Governor who should hold the enquiry and then forward to 
the Election Commission all the material collected in such an 
enquiry to enable it to form its opinion and communicate the 
same to the Governor. The Election Commission rfeceiving 
complaint and order of reference by Governor acts within the 
jurisdiction in sending notice to the other party. A sitting 
member gets the opportunity to put forward his objection to an 
allegation to an alleged disqualification at an enquiry which is 
to be held by the Election Commission before the latter 
forwards its opinion under Article 192 (1) to the Governor. 
The question is whether the Governor is bound by the 
opinion of the Election Commission rendered about 
disqualification of a member of State Legislature. Can the 
Election Commission take decision if one of its members is 
disqualified from participating in the decision making? Answers 
to these vital issues have been given by the Supreme Court while 
disposing of an appeal of the Election Commission against a 
judgment of the Madras High Court which had allowed the plea 
of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Ms Jayalalitha alleging bias against 
the Chief Election Commissioner, T.N. Seshan. 
A three judge bench comprising the Chief Justice, Justice 
A.M. Ahmadi, Justice N.P. Singh and Justice B.N. Kirpal citing 
earlier judgment of the Supreme Court on this issue held that 
the President or the Governor, as the case may be, was bound by 
the opinion of the Election Commission on the question of 
disquadification of a member and in such case the decision of the 
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President or the Governor must depend on the opinion of the 
Election Commission and none else, not even the Council of 
Ministers. Referring the Article 192 (2) of the Constitution, the 
judges say it is clear from the use of the words "shall obtain the 
opinion of the Election Commission", that it is obligatory to 
obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and the further 
stipulation that the Governor "shall act" according to such 
opinion on leaves no room for doubt that the Governor is bound 
to act according to that opinion. The next question raised before 
the Court was: can the Election Commission take a decision if 
one of its members is disqualified from participating in the 
decision making. It may be referred to Jayalalitha's alleged bias 
against the Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan. The Court 
held that under the provisions of the Constitution and relevant 
law it was not imperative for the Chief Election Commissioner to 
participate in each and every decision that the Election 
Commission was required to make under the Constitution. 
Assent and Reservation of Bills: 
The Governor is a component of the State Legislature 
under Article 168; every Bill passed by the State Legislature has 
to be reserved for the Governor's assent under, Article 200 before 
it becomes on Act.^i The Article prescribes the procedure to be 
followed when a Bill has been passed by Legislative Assembly or 
Legislative Council of a State. It is by its very term inapplicable 
when there is no House of Legislature. According to this Article 
a Bill passed by the State Legislature are presented to the 
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Governor for his assent. He may take one of the following 
measures as under: 
• Assent a Bill which would become effective after his 
assent or 
• Withhold his assent to a Bill. 
• Return a Bill (except the Money Bill) to the Legislature 
for reconsideration. 
• Reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President. 
So far as assenting to a Bill is concerned the Governor 
may declare his assent to the Bill and thereby complfetes the 
legislative process. The Bill then becomes a law (Act) and is put 
on the statute book. As regards to withholding the assent to the 
Bill, the pertinent question here is how far a Governor is logically 
competent to withhold an assent to a Bill presented to him. The 
Governors of different States acted different in giving their assent 
to the Bills approved by the States Assemblies respectively. The 
Gbvemor of Madhya Pradesh H.V. Pataskar withheld his assent 
to "Land Revenue Rationalisation Bill" on the ground that it was 
likely to cause harm to the smooth working of the 
administration. In Kerala, the Governor B. Rama Krishna Rao 
withheld his assent to the Kerala Education Bill passed on 
September 2, 1957 by the State Assembly. He reserved the Bill 
for consideration of the President on the ground that some of the 
provisions of the Bill were contrary to the principles of the Indian 
Constitution. The Governor, therefore, being head of the State 
and as the Centre's agent to the State is competent to withhold 
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his assent there from on the ground that the Bill would soon 
aftjer becoming a law affect the fundamental interests of the 
people. But by following this course he has to show the reason 
for withholding his assent there from to the Bill and convene the 
ministry about the rationality of withholding his assent. 
The Governor of the Uttar Pradesh (U.P) Romesh Bhandari 
and Suraj Bhan withheld their assent to the U.P State University 
(Amendment) Bill 1998 on the ground that it hampers the 
autonomy of the State Universities. Contrary to this, the 
Governor of Assam Vishnu Sahai did not act, when the Bill for 
the Assamese official langi^^ge approved by the State Assfembly 
was present for the assent of the Governor in 1960. The 
Governor being aware of the implications and likely 
consequences and the Bengalis and tribal minority's opposing to 
the particular Bill, had assented it and consequently this 
controversy led to serious language riots in the State. 
Another question which is relevant related to withholding 
of assent thereupon is whether the Governor has a right to 
without a Bill indefinitely, and thus by implications veto it 
because the Constitution does not provide any time limit for the 
Governor to take any course for a Bill pending for his assent. 
The Constitution does not impose any time limit within which 
the Governor should make any of these declarations if he simply 
keeps a Bill pending before him indefinitely. 12 According to 
Parliamentary convention the head of a State acts on the advice 
of the Council of Ministers. In this respect, the Governor has no 
right to veto a Bill passed by the Legislature. Legislature is sole 
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law making body pertaining to the subjects specified within its 
parameters of the State. The Bill undergoes all the Legislative 
processes and the business before being finally presented to the 
Governor for his assent. The Governor, therefore, under no 
circumstances, can veto a Bill independently. He can, of course, 
exercise his veto at the pleasure of the ministry. But no ministry 
can be that acquiescent to advice a Governor to veto a Bill after 
it has faced all the hurdles for the passing of a Bill in the 
Legislative Assembly. 
It is provided in this Article that the Governor may return a 
Bill (except Money Bills) for the consideration to the House or 
Houses as the case may be with a message that the Bill be 
considered or modified in the light of his suggestion. The proviso 
further adds that when a Bill is returned "the House shall 
reconsider the Bill accordingly". The use of words "shall and 
accordingly" means that it shall be the duty of the Legislature to 
reconsider the Bill in the light of suggestions or amendments 
proposed by the Governor of the State. But the Legislature is not 
bound to accept these suggestions. They may or may not accept 
such proposal, and when passed again and submitted to him, 
the Governor shall not withhold his assent therefrom. Thus, it 
becomes obligatory on the part of the Governor to affix his 
signature to the Bill. However, it will not be obligatory on the 
part of the Governor to affix his signature on the Bill in which 
Legislative Assembly of the State, in addition to his amendment 
incorporated new changes, and in that case he can treat it as a 
new Bill and as such the Governor may exercise his options in 
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giving assent to the Bill. Now the question is whether the 
Governor while returning the Bill for consideration will do it in 
his discretion or on the advice of the ministry. 
The Governor has no discretion expressly stated in the 
Constitution in this regard, it seems quite, in keeping with the 
traditions with the Parliamentary government that when he can 
ask for reconsideration of any matter of the ministry, he can also 
ask for reconsideration of the Bill by thie Legislature. As far as 
the time limit is concerned in which a Governor should take time 
in either giving his assent or withholding or returning a Bill for 
reconsideration the Constitution provides that he would take 
steps as soon as possible and therefore it does not prescribe any 
time limit. It may be further asked whether the Governor is 
entitled to send a Bill back for its reconsideration to the 
successor House. The dissolution of the Legislative Assembly 
does not prevent the exercise of the powers of the Governor 
under Articles 200 and 201 with respect to a Bill, which has 
been presented for his assent prior to the dissolution.i3 Thus 
there is nothing in the Constitution to direct that the assent of 
the Governor or the President must be given during the life time 
of the Assembly which passed the Bill.i^ 
The Governor may reserve a Bill for reconsideration of the 
President. It is in the Governor's discretion as to what Bill he will 
reserve for the President's consideration .Now the pertinent 
question is what are the norms and criteria that a Governor 
should follow in reserving the Bill for consideration of the 
President. If a Governor started reserving for Presidential 
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consideration every Bill that he thought was unconstitutional 
there would be serious difficulty in conducting legislative process 
in the State. Besides the question whether the Bill is 
constitutional or otherwise is for the courts to determine, and 
issues of constitutionality of statutes are not as easy as they 
appear at the first blush, and it is the sobering experience of 
many constitutional lawyers that the statutes which appeared to 
be unconstitutional for more than one reason have been upheld 
by the Supreme Court after full discussion and argument. The 
last proviso of the Articles 200 provides that the Governor "shall" 
not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the 
President any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if 
it become law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as 
to endanger the position which that court is by this Constitution 
designed to fill. The words 'in the opinion of the Governor' 
indicate that the Governor may use his right to reserve a Bill for 
the consideration of t h e President'. The Governor by exercising 
his power to reserve a Bill for the President's pleasure may act in 
his discretion to preserve the independence, dignity and status 
of the State judiciary. 
The words, 'derogate from the powers of the High' Court are 
qualified by the words Svhich endangers the position of that 
court which by the Constitution, it is designed to fill'. Hence if a 
Bill merely seeks to affect the rights of the parties in a case 
pending before the High Court without endangering the 
constitutional position of the High Court, it need not to be 
reserved under this proviso. ^ ^ The Constitution lists certain 
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special circumstances under which a State Bill should receive 
the assent of the President in order to become a law, which 
makes mandatory of the Governor to reserve a bill for the 
consideration of the President. These cases are: 
• Under Article 31 (a) certain types of legislation providing 
for acquisition of property have to obtain the assent of 
the President to become a law. 
• Under Article 254 a State law in respect of a matter in 
the concurrent list which is repugnant to an existing 
Central law on the same mattfer is validated by the 
assent of the President. 
• Under clause (2) of the Article 288, the laws made by the 
State government relating to the taxation in respect of 
water and electricity shall be reserved by the Governor 
for President's sanction. 
• The Governor will also reserve all the Bills for the 
President's assent including the Money Bills to which 
the provisions of the Article 207 will apply in case these 
Bills affect the operation of Article 360 of the 
Constitution. It is also to be noted that the President 
also gives discretion to the State Governors to reserve all 
the financial Bills for his consideration. 
• Article 304 (b), the Governor may reserve such Bills 
passed by the State Legislature without the previous 
sanction of the President, in which the State government 
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has imposed some reasonable restrictions on the 
freedom of trade and commerce with or within the State. 
It is only a Bill by the Legislature of a State whether is 
single or bicameral, which cdn be reserved for the consideration 
of the President and for assent of the President. There is no 
provision in either of the Articles 200 and 201 or any Article of 
the Constitution which permits the Governor of a State to assent 
to a Bill passed by the Legislq.ture of a State and thereafter 
reserves it for the consideration of the President to obtain a 
further assent, i^  
Where the Governor reserves a Bill for consideration of the 
President under this Article and the President gives the assent, 
the Act is valid and cannot be challenged on the ground that it 
did not receive the assent of the Governor. Reservation is a 
function to be exercised by the Governor in his discretion and 
neither the propriety of the Governor's reservation in a particular 
case nor that of the assent by the President is justifiablei^, A Bill 
assented to by the President would not be rendered ineffective as 
an Act on the ground that there was no compelling necessity for 
the Governor to reserve it for the President's assent^^. There is 
no constitutional requirement that if principal Act has once 
received the President's assent every amending Bill thereafter 
should be reserved for the President's consideration and 
assent^^. When the President assents to an amending Act, he 
may be deemed to have assented the parent Act while assenting 
to the amending Act.20 When an Act is published in the official 
Gazette showing that the assent of the head of State was given 
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on a particular date, the factum of assent cannot be challenged 
in any court2i. The mere fact that the head of State was not 
present in the capital on a particular date is not enough to prove 
that his assent could not be given on that date, as there sire 
other methods of obtaining his assent e.g. by telegram, telephone 
or the like.22 The High Court has no jurisdiction to declare a Bill 
which has not received the Governor's assents as ultra vires. 
When the Bill has been reserved by the Governor for 
consideration of the President, the President may take one of the 
three courses. 
1. He may assent to the Bill 
2. He may withhold assent, 
3. He may, where the Bill is not a Money Bill, direct the 
Governor to return the Bill to the House or Houses of the 
State Legislature, for reconsideration.23 When a Bill is so 
returned, the House must then consider the Bill within a 
period of six months from the date of receipt. If it is again 
passed by the Houses with or without amendment, it shall be 
presented again to the President for his re-consideration. And 
when a Bill is presented for the second time, after 
reconsideration the President may assent to the Bill or reject 
it. 
The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act cannot be 
impugned on the ground of violation of Article 201 of the 
Constitution. Under Article 201, the High Court is concerned 
with the question whether in fact assent has been given by the 
President and, if assent has been given, it is not for the High 
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Court to consider whether recommendation to amend the Bill 
were made by the government of India and those 
recommendations were ignored by the government of Bombay. 
The alleged failure of the government of the Bombay to submit 
the Bill for considering the recommendation made by the 
Government of India does not affect the validity of the Bill, which 
by the assent of the President became an Act of the Bombay 
Legislature24. The Karnataka Land Reform Act 1974, assented to 
by the President, is not invalid on the ground of the President 
having earlier withheld his assent, when the material before the 
court was not sufficient to prove the ground.25 
Ordinance Making Power of Governot: 
According to Constitution of India under Article the 
Governor has to perform another important legislative function 
also, when the State Legislature is not in session the Governor 
can promulgate Ordinance. If he feels that conditions are 
abnormal in his States. Such Ordinance will have the same force 
as an act of the State Legislature, and it will be valid up to the 
six weeks from the reassembly of the State Legislature unless 
disapproved by it earlier. The Governor is also empowered to 
withdraw such ordinance at anytime he deems proper. 
Under Article 213 of the Indian Constitution, the Governor 
of a State can issue Ordinances under the following conditions: 
• The Governor can issue Ordinances only when the 
Legislative Assembly of a State is not in session or where 
there £ire two Houses, both Houses are not in session. 
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• The Governor must be satisfied that circumstance exists 
which render it necessary for him to take immediate 
action. In other words, the Governor of a State has a 
power to promulgate an Ordinance when there are some 
extraordinary circumstances which have existed in the 
State at a time when hone of the Houses is in session 
and there is an urgent need to meet the situation. 
• The Governor cannot issue Ordinance on the proposal 
on which he fails to obtain the previous sanction from 
the President. 
• The Ordinances must be laid down before the both 
Houses of the State Legislature when they assemble and 
the validity of such Ordinances shall cease to operate at 
the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the 
Legislature, unless it is approved earlier by the 
Legislature. 
• The Governor may withdraw the Ordinances at any 
time. 
• The Ordinance- making power of the Governor is 
coextensive with the legislative power of the State 
Legislature, i.e., he can only issue Ordinance on the 
subjects on which the State Legislature is empowered to 
make laws. 
• The Governor cannot issue an Ordinance without the 
instruction of the President in the following cases: 
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> Bill containing the same provision would have 
required the previous sanction of the President for 
its introduction in the Legislature. 
> He would have deemed it necessary to reserve a 
Bill for the consideration of the President. 
> An Act of the Legislature of the State containing 
the same provisions would have been invalid 
unless having been reserved for the consideration 
of the President and had received the assent of 
President. 
As required, the Governor can promulgate Ordinances only 
during the recess of the Legislature. It is an absolute condition 
for the exercise of the power that the Legislature or either House 
thereof must not be in session at that time.26 When the State 
Legislature consists of one House, viz., the Assembly no 
Ordinance can be promulgated at a time when the Assembly is 
in session.27 But where there are two Houses the Governor may 
jjromulgate an Ordinance if either of two Houses, has been 
prorogued. In an Allahabad case28 validity of an Ordinance was 
upheld even though the Assembly was in session and the 
Council has been prorogued, just a few days before promulgation 
of the Ordinance. The Governor may prorogue the Legislature of 
either House thereof for the purpose of making an Ordinance. If, 
however, the Ordinance is promulgated before the order of 
promulgation is notified, the Ordinance would be in valid. 29 A 
House is said to be in session from the date of its first meeting 
till its prorogation or dissolution. Promulgation of Ordinance is 
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not a discretionary power of the Governor but must be exercised 
with the aid and advice of the ministers.^o 
The Article lays down that the Governor will promulgate an 
Ordinance only when he is satisfied. It does not however mean 
the personal satisfaction of the Governor but that of his Council 
of Ministers on whose advice he is to act as a constitutional 
head.3i The satisfaction of the Governor is subjective satisfaction 
and the court is therefore not entitled to inquire into the reasons 
for that satisfaction or into the sufficiency of those reasons. The 
Ordinance need not in terms recite that the Governor was 
satisfied about the circumstances necessary for his taMng an 
immediate action. The statement in an Ordinance Vhereas the 
Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist' is presumptive 
proof of the factum of satisfaction. Though the court may inquire 
into the fact of the Governor's satisfaction, it cannot inquire into 
the reasons for that satisfaction or into the sufficiency of thosfe 
reasons. In some cases32 the Supreme Court held that the 
Governor's satisfaction under Article 213(1) cannot be 
challenged in a court of law on the ground that it was prompted 
by the malice but the observations made by the majority of the 
constitutional bench in the judgment in A.K. Roy Vs Union of 
Indiana have not been wiped off by two 1985 decisions-34 which 
lay down that the validity of an Ordinance can be challenged on 
the ground of malafides. However the Supreme Court has held^s 
that since Ordinance making is a Legislative and not an 
executive act, an Ordinance cannot be invalidated on the ground 
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of (a) no application of mind or (b) ulterior motive or ulterior 
purpose. 
A question arises, can successive Ordinance be issued? 
The Supreme Court in Wadhwa Vs State of Bihar^e has 
settled this issue by holding that the promulgation of Ordinances 
without placing them before the Legislature as required by 
Article 213 (2) (a), in a routine manner, would be fraud on the 
Constitution and as such repromulgated Ordinance would be 
struck down. Of course, a repromulgation may be justified in 
extretne cases when owing to the pressure of the Legislative 
business; the Legislature may be unable to enact a statute in 
place of the Ordinance. But to resort to it as a matter of usual 
practice would constitute usurpation by the executive of the law 
making function of the Legislature. 
The proviso to Article 213 (1) mentions the cases when the 
President's instructions are necessary for the promulgation of an 
Ordinance by the Governor. Article 213 (1) provides that the 
Governor shall not promulgate an Ordinance without the 
President's instruction if 
• It contained some provision requiring the President's 
previous sanction. 
• He deemed it necessary that some of the provisions needed 
reservations for the President's consent, and 
• Where it is an Act of the State Legislature containing some 
provisions which would have rendered it invalid unless it 
had been reserved for and received the President's assent. 
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Where a case is within the proviso, the promulgation of an 
Ordinance by the Governor without President's prior sanction 
will be void. If a State Legislature required the President's 
previous consent, no Ordinance on the same subject can be 
issued without the President's previous dssfent. The power of 
legislation by Ordinance is as wide as power of the Legislature of 
the State. Whatever could be achieved through regulation by the 
Legislature could be achieved by an Ordinance. Subject to the 
liinitation as to the duration of the Ordinances as laid down in 
clause 2(a) there is no other limitation upon the Ordinance-
mglking power of the Governor save those that are imposed upon 
the State Legislature under the Constitution. Hence an 
Ordinance may amend or repeal not only another Ordinance but 
also any law passed by the Legislature itself, subject to the 
liinitation as to its own duration.^7 Similarly where a law passed 
by the Legislature could be retrospective in operation, there is 
ndthihg to bar an Ordinance on the same subject from being 
retrdst>ective38. Though the duration of the Ordinance itself is 
limited to the period laid down in clause 2 (a) there is nothing to 
prevent an Ordinance from prescribing a sentence^^ or from 
making other provision such as the creation of an officC o^ which 
will endure even after the expiry of the Ordinance. On the other 
hand, an Ordinance would be invalid for contravention of the 
constitutional limitation to which the State Legislature is 
subject, i.e. Articles 14 and 254. In short, when the competence 
of the Governor is questioned, what the court has to determine is 
whether the State Legislature was competent to make the 
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impugned law and whether the conditions of Article 213 have 
been fulfilled. The important question in this regard is whether 
the Governor can enact the Appropriation Bill by means of an 
Ordinance after proroguing the House, when it has been 
rendered impossible owing to the speaker's ruling. The answer is 
that there is nothing in the Constitution which debars the 
Governor from issuing the Ordinance. "^^ 
As far the duration and approval of the Ordinance is 
concerned, it has to be placed before the Houses of the 
Legislature, within SLK weeks of its reassembly. When there are 
two Houses of the Legislature and the Houses are summoned to 
reassemble on different dates the period of six weeks shall be 
reckoned from the latter of those dates. The requirement of 
placing the Ordinance before the Legislature is directory. The 
only consequehce of non-compliance with this requirement is 
that the Ordinance will cease to operate at the expiration of six 
weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature. It does not affect 
the initial validity of the Ordinance.'^2 when the Ordinance 
lapses under Article 213(2) either because it is disapproved by 
the Legislature or because the Governor does not lay it before the 
Legislature or because it is not replaced by an Act of the 
Legislature, the Ordinance does not become void abinitio. 
Transactions which are already closed and completed in 
pursuance of such Ordinance or right created by it shall 
nevertheless remain valid, until the Legislatures make an Act 
operating retrospectively nullifying all acts done under the 
Ordinance. 3^ 
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THE GOVERNOR AND CENTRE STATE 
RELATIONS 
In a federal State like India the relations between the 
Central or the federal government and the governments of the 
States, constituting the federation, are of fundamental 
importance. As the entire governments powers of the State 
must necessarily be distributed between the Central 
government and the States governments in any federal 
structure. The smooth and efficient functioning of the 
governments at the Centre and in the States must depend upon 
a proper balance and harmony between the federal or the 
Central government on the one hand and the governments in 
the States on the other. To achieve this end the function of the 
Constitution and of constitutional law must therefore, be 
directed towards framing proper legal relations between the 
Central government and the governments in the States. Our 
Constitution embodies the Constitution both for the Union of 
India and also for the States. Unlike the American Constitution, 
which is concerned with the federal structure alone. Our 
Constitution has set up the Union Parliament and the 
Legislatures of the States between which the entire legislative 
powers of the State are distributed, i Part X I of the Constitution 
regulate the whole field of legislation, prescribing where 
Parliamentary legislation will prevail and where State legislation 
will supreme. The Constitution similarly sets up the executive 
government for the Union2 and the executive government for 
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the States.3 In the same manner the Constitution sets up the 
judicial organization in the country with the Union Judiciary 
consisting of the Supreme Court as the highest Court of the 
country and the High Courts and the subordinate courts for the 
dispensation of justice in the States'*. In relation to each of 
these organs of government namely, the Legislature, the 
Executive atid the Judiciary, the Constitution has prescribed 
the legal relations between the Central government and the 
States so as to maintain the balance in the functioning of these 
organs at the Centre and in the States. 
An institution of crucial importance on whose impartiality 
and integrity the autonomy of the State and soundness of 
Centre -State relations depend on the Governor of a State in the 
Indian Union. Since the fourth general elections there has been 
a radical change in the powfer balance in the Indian federal 
system. The Centre-Stdte relations which till 1967 were not put 
to test due to the Congress party monopoly of power at the 
Centre and in the States, haVfe atbused a measure of anxiety 
and confusion in the post-fourth general elections political set-
up of the country. 5 
Administrative Relations between Centre-State 
Governments: 
The constitutional heads of Centre and States are 
responsible for administrative relations between the Central 
government and the States. The Union government is 
represented by the President of India, who functions on the 
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advice of his Council of Ministers. The Constitution set up the 
office of the President as an elective office and vests the entire 
executive power of the Union in the President.^ The President 
has to function on the advice of his Council of Ministers who 
are collectively responsible to the House of the people. Our 
President is only the constitutional head of the Central 
government unlike the President of the United States of 
America. Though he acts in law in his own name in discharging 
the executive functions of the Union government, his functions 
are, in fact, distributed btetwfeen and discharged by his 
ministers according to the Rules of Business framed by the 
President. 7 
The executive powers of a State are vested in the Governor 
who has to function, like the President, on the advice of his 
Council of Ministers, who arb Collectively responsible to the 
State Legislature. The executivfe functions of the State are 
distributed between and dischdrgfed by the ministers according 
to the Rules of Business framed by the Governor.» In 
appreciating the role of the Governor of a State under our 
Constitution it is important to note that unlike the President he 
is not elected by the local Legislature or by the electorate in the 
State, but is appointed by the President of India and he holds 
office during the pleasure of the President.^ The controversy 
which has arisen in recent times concerning the Governor's role 
and the manner in which he should function is largely due to 
this fact that the Governor holds his office during the pleasure 
of the President and is appointed by the President, which 
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means that in terms of constitutional practice the Governor in a 
State is actually appointed by the ministers of the President 
and the Governor holds his office also during the pleasure of 
the ministers of the President. This imports into the structure 
of our Constitution a political element which gives rise to the 
very controversies, which have been thrown into bold relief 
during the period following upon the general elections of 1967. 
It is not difficult to appreciate that if the Governor is appointed 
by the ministers of the Central government and he continues 
during their pleasure, he may become suspect of acting under 
the pleasure of the ministers of the Central government in 
relation to his functions in the State. So long as the same party 
forming the government at the Centre and in the States, the 
matter does not assume much importance. But when the same 
party does not run the government at the Centre and in a 
particular State, any action taken by the Governor in that State 
either dismissing his ministers or choosing new ministers or 
recommending the imposition of President's rule in the State 
may become the subject of serious controversy. 
The first problem, in Centre-State relation under the 
Constitution is the problem of appointment of the Governor of a 
State and his removal. If the President is to act on the advice of 
his Council of Ministers so far as his executive authority is 
concerned, can he act in a manner in the matter of appointing 
and removing the Governor of a State, which will create a 
conflict between the Central government and the State 
government concerned? Like the President, the Governor must 
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act on advice of his Council of Ministers. If the President is 
advised by a Council of Ministers, which belongs to one party 
and the Governor is advised by a Council of Ministers which 
belongs to a party completely opposed to the party in power at 
the Centre, can or should the President appoint a Governor who 
is the out of tune with the party in power in the State? If he 
does so, it will create a most undesirable conflict. Is it not, 
therefore, proper that in appointing a Governor the Central 
government should consult the Chief Minister of the State 
concerned? It may be noted that such a consultation has infact 
became almost a convention since the Constitution. Similarly, 
can the President remove a Governor simply because he does 
not approve of the actions of his Council of Ministers, who 
belongs to a party different from the party in power at the 
Centre? Such a course would obviously be contrary to the spirit 
the Constitution, if not malafide and illegal. It must at the same 
time be realised that the Governor must function independently 
in discharging his functions as a channel of communication 
and contact between the Centre and the States. He bears 
certain responsibilities to the President. So far as he functions 
in the latter sphere, he definitely preserves in himself the old 
dual role of the Governor. The Governor is the executive head of 
the State; he is at the same time a link with the Centre, ^ o it is 
to allow the Governor to successfully and properly function as a 
link between the State government and the Central government 
that the Constitution does not allow to have elective Governor 
in the States. This is with the belief that if the Governor was 
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elected by the State Legislature, he could not function 
independently as a link between the State government and the 
Central government. 
State Field Functions of Governor: 
The State field, the Governor functions as the executive 
head and acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers. Under 
Article 163, he is to be advised by the Council of Ministers with 
the Chief Minister as the head in the exercise of his functions 
except in so far as he is to exercise his functions in his 
discretion. Under Article 164 the Chief Minister is appointed by 
the Governor and the other ministers are also appointed by the 
Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister and the Chief 
Ministers and other ministers hold their office during the 
pleasure of the Governor. The Council of Ministers is 
collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. 
The position of the Governor in the State field under the Indian 
Constitution offers hardly any par^lel in other CorLstitutions. 
As the constitutional head of the State, he resembles the 
President in relation to the Union government; but at the same 
time he also represents the President and the Union 
government in the discharge of various functions. His position 
in the State is governed by his paramount obligation to act on 
the advice of his Council of Ministers excepting in the 
performance of those functions which he is required to perform 
in his discretion by the Constitution. He is required by the 
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Constitution to exercise functions in his discretion only in 
regard to two specific cases, namely-
• The carrying on of the administration of tribal areas 
as the agent of the President^i; 
• Acting as the Administrator of Union Territory when 
so appointed by the President^2 
Besides these, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh has 
been given special responsibility by Article 371 of the 
Constitution in respect of Regional Committees of the 
Legislative Assembly of the State. The Governors of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat have been given special 
responsibilities in respect of Development Boards in Vidarbha 
Marathawada, Saurashtra and Kutch under Article 371(2) of 
the Constitution. Similarly, the Governor of Nagaland has 
special responsibility in respect of law and order in the State 
under Article 371-A of the Constitution. The Constitution does 
not expressly provide for any other discretionary powers there 
are certain other constitutional powers which, by necessary 
implication, require the Governor to exercise them in his 
discretion. 
The Constitution also provides discretionary powers to the 
Governor, not directly but by necessary implication. The 
Constitution envisages a greater scope of discretion for the 
Governor under Article 163 (1) and (2) which was considered 
necessary for keeping the Centre's eye on State functioning. ^ 3 
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Hence, situation may arise in which the Governor may actually 
have to exercise his discretion. These situations are:-
• regarding the appointment of the Chief Minister^^^, 
• regarding the dissolving of the State Legislative 
Assembly 15 
• regarding the dismissing of a ministry. ^ ^ 
• regarding the reservation of a Bill for the 
consideration of the President, "^^  and 
• regarding the Governor's report for President's rule 
in the State.is 
Thus these constitutional powers of the Governor are 
of significant use in the context of Centre-State relations. In the 
sphere in which he required by the Constitution to exercise his 
discretion, it is obvious that what is intended is his discretion 
and not that of any other authority, and therefore, his 
discretion cannot be controlled or interfered with, even by the 
Centre. This is why Governor's independence in the exercise of 
his discretionary powers is indispensable to a State's 
autonomy. An important question has been raised from time to 
time whether any guideline should be formulated for the 
manner in which the discretionary powers should be exercised 
by the Governor. The whole issue was carefully considered by 
the Constituent Assembly and in the initial stage of the drafting 
of the Constitution it was contemplated that a schedule by 
inserted in the Constitution providing for an Instrument of 
Instructions. Ultimately the Constituent Assembly in its wisdom 
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thought that if it was not necessary to have any Instrument of 
Instructions in this behalf, and the matter should be left to the 
Governor to be regulated by conventions^. In this way the idea 
regarding the Instrument of Instructions was dropped while 
enacting the Constitution.20 But, the Administrative Reforms 
Commission (ARC) recommended that "guidelines on the 
manner in which discretionary powers should be exercised by 
the Governor should be formulated by the Inter-State Council 
and, on acceptance by the Union, issued in the name of the 
President.2i Likewise, the Report of the Committee of Governor 
(1971) also came fairly close to suggesting a procedure for 
evolving a body of precedents. "A special wing may be set up in 
the President's Secretarial which would ascertain all the facts 
from time to time requiring action by the Governor in the 
exercise of his powers and reasons for the action taken by him 
in a particular situation". These would then be confidentially 
communicated to the Governors.22 
Governor's power to Appoint Chief Minister: 
A very controversial question regarding the Governor's 
discretion is his power to appoint the Chief Minister.23 Article 
164(1) of the Constitution of India reads: The Chief Minister 
shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers 
shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief 
Minister. Clearly, the words in clause (1) of Article 164 give full 
free hand to the Governor to appoint anyone as the Chief 
Minister and thus exercise of Governor's pleasure under Article 
164 (1) cannot be fettered by any condition or restriction.2^ 
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Formally it is the discretion of the Governor to exercise his 
personal judgment in appointing the Chief Minister, although 
not unconditioned by an essential feature of the parliamentary 
form of government, namely, the collective responsibility of the 
Council of Ministers to the State Assembly.^s This means, only 
such a person can be appointed a Chief Minister who carries or 
can carry with him majority of the Legislative Assembly. Hence 
it becomes clear that the Governor has no discretion in the 
appointment of the Chief Minister when there is one party 
having absolute majority in the House; he shall be bound to call 
upon the leader of the majority party to form the government.26 
But, in case a number of different parties are returned to 
the House and none of them has an absolute majority support 
in the House, what should the Governor do? Should he invite 
the largest single party to form the government? Or should he 
afford an opportunity to other smaller groups to form a 
coalition government? In answer to these questions the opinion 
is divided. Eminent jurists like A.K. Sarkar, P.B. 
Gajendragadkar and Mehar Chand Mahajan favours in view 
that a person who can ensure a stable government should be 
invited by the Governor to form the government.27 According to 
late M.C. Setalvad, if the party in power fails to obtain majority, 
the Governor should treat it as a popular rejection and call 
upon the leader of the opposition to form a ministry. In the 
event of his failure to do so the leader of the largest political 
party should be invited.28 The Governor's Committee has also 
recommend that "the relevant test (to appoint the Chief 
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Minister) is not the size of a party but its ability to command 
the support of the majority in the Legislature".29 These views of 
the Governor's Committee and eminent constitutional jurists 
deserve attention. But our past experience shows that most of 
the Governors had invited the leader of the single largest party 
to form the government during the last fifty plus years. 
Unfortunately, the practice of the leader of single largest party 
or the leader of the largest United Front formed before election 
has not been followed uniformity. This decision of the Governor 
based on political intention. Thus, looking at the past practices 
in the appointment of Chief Mihisters, It seems that it would 
much better for the parliamentary democracy in our country 
that immediately after the electiohs, when no party obtains 
absolute majority, the leader of the largest party or the leader of 
the largest Uhited Front formed before elections should be 
invited to form the government. So long as this principle is not 
accepted as the convention in apJ)ointing the Chief Minister, the 
possibility of the Governors exposing themselves to the charge 
of manoeuvring the appointment of the Chief Minister will 
remain.30 
Governor's Power to dissolve State Assemblies: 
Under Article 174(2) (b) the Governor has absolutely 
unrestricted power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly of the 
State. If the Governor has reason to believe that the Legislative 
Assembly is not representing the electorate, he has every 
constitutional right to dissolve it. The majority in the Legislative 
Assembly is creation of the electorate, and if the members by 
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their unilateral act of defection of change this majority into 
minority and a minority into majority, it clearly amounts to a 
breach of the electorate's confidence and betrayal of their trust 
and is clearly a violation of the fundamental principles of 
representative democracy. The Governor can therefore, dissolve 
a Legislative Assembly which has changed its character in this 
way. Unfortunately, the Governors have acted not as 
representatives of the Centre but virtually as functionary of the 
ruling party at the Centre in exercising their power to dissolve a 
State Assembly under Article 174 (2) (b).3i To prove this, two 
points deserve special mention here. First, whenever a Union 
government supported or a government supported by it from 
outside, or a government in which it was major partner, has 
fallen or has about to fall, the Assemblies instead of being 
suspended, have been dissolved undfer Article 174 (2) (b), Kerala 
(1970), West Bengal and Bihar (1971), or under Article 356 as 
in Andhra Pradesh (1954). Pondicherry (1968), West Bengal 
(1968 and 1971), Manipur (1969) and Orissa (1973) unless this 
collapse of government happened soon after elections as in 
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh (U.P) and Madhya Pradesh (1967) and 
Bihar (1969). In none of these cases were the opposition parties 
given an opportunity by the Governors to try and form 
government. 
Secondly, however a recommendation for dissolution 
under Article 174 (2) (b) or under Article 356 was made by a 
outgoing Chief Minister, it was rejected in all cases where the 
Union government was keen on forming the government. 
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Examples are of Rao Birendra Singh in Haryana and Sardar 
Gurman Singh in Punjab (1967), Mr. Charan Singh in Utteir 
Pradesh (1968), Bhola Paswan Shastri in Bihar (1968), Raja 
Naresh Singh in Madhya Pradesh (1969), Hitendra Desai in 
Gujarat and Karpoori Thakur in Bihar (1971). All these 
examples point to the disturbing trends in the role of Governor 
and make quite an impressive indictment.32 
Governor's Power to dismiss a Ministry: 
According to Article 164 (1) of the Constitution the 
Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. 
Thus the question arises: Does this constitutionally prescribed 
pleasure confer upon the Governor discretionary power to 
dismiss the ministers arbitrarily on subjective considerations.^a 
In answer to this question it may be said that in dismissing a 
minister (including the Chief Minister) the Governor cannot 
withdraw his pleasure with unfettered discretion, t h i s view of 
the Calcutta High Court^^ that the Governor can usfe his 
unfettered discretion to dismiss the Council of Ministers is not 
very sound because this view is not substantiated by the 
framers of the Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar speaking in the 
Constituent Assembly said that the position of the Governor is 
exactly the same as the position of the President.^s 
It may, however, be noted here that "the Governor cannot 
dismiss a ministry which enjoys the confidence of Lower House 
(though) he can get it dismissed by the President for violating 
the Constitution under Article 356''36. Articles 164(2) and 
Article 75 (3) which requires that the Council of Ministers shall 
122 
The governor and Center State ^Cations 
be collectively responsible to the Lower House are the backbone 
of the parliamentary form of government. This obviously means 
that though the Council of Ministers is appointed by the 
President or the Governor, as the case may be and holds office 
during their pleasure yet this pleasure is actually vested in the 
Lower House of the Parliament or the State Legislature.37 This 
is so because if the Governor is permitted to dismiss the 
popular government on his subjective satisfaction it would "cut 
at the root of parliamentary government to which our country is 
fortunately committed". However, the pleasure of the Governor 
to dismiss an individual minister means the pleasure of the 
Chief Minister because when the Chief Minister asks a 
particular minister to resign and if he does not resign, then he 
can advise the Governor to dismiss him.^^ But this practice has 
not always been followed in all cases and there are examples 
where the Governor has refused to dismiss the minister's 
inspite of the recommendations of the Chief Ministers. For 
example, in Uttar Pradesh in 1970 in case of Charan Singh 
when he was the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. He advised 
the Governor to dismiss a few minister but the Governor not 
only refused to dismiss them but even asked the Chief Minister 
to resign, and on refusal by the Chief Minister to do so, the 
Governor recommended the dismissal of ministry and 
imposition of President's rule under Article 356, which is a 
disturbing trend in the role of the Governor. Hence, it is 
submitted that so long as the Chief Minister is found capable of 
obtaining support of the majority of the House, the Governor 
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should continue to follow the advice of the Chief Minister to 
dismiss a minister. 
Governor's Power to reserve A Bill for President's 
Consideration: 
Every Bill passed by the State Legislature is presented to 
the Governor for his assent under Article 200 of the 
Constitution. The Governor has discretionary power to reserve 
the Bill for the consideration of the President.^9 In the 
exercising of this discretionary power the Governor has to play 
a constructive role in Centre-State relations. In the interest of 
amicable Centre State relations, the Governor should exercise 
his discretion only in exceptional and warranted cases. In 
addition to this, there are also certain circumstances under 
which the Constitution requires Presidential assent before a Bill 
passed by a State Legislature becomes law. Once a Bill is so 
reserved, the President may either give his assent or withhold it 
or he may direct the Governor that the Bill be placed before the 
State Legislature for reconsideration in accordance with his 
message to the House.'^o But there is no time limit provided for 
Presidential veto and the President can veto any Bills that is 
referred to him for assent and, he need not give any reasons for 
exercising his Veto. There have been instances when State Bill 
have sent back without Presidential assent.4i The fact also 
remains that some of the State Bills had continued to await the 
assent of the President for many years. 
Hence it is suggested that the Constitution should be 
amended whereby Bills sent by the Governor to the President 
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should be deemed to have been passed if the President neither 
rejects nor gives his assent to them within a period of three to 
six months. 
Governor's Report on the failure of constitutional 
machinery ih States: 
The President can act independently of the Governor's 
report42 in c^se of a situation in which the government of the 
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
constitutional provisions, yet the Governor's report generally 
forms the basis for President's action.43 Dr. Ambedkar justified 
the inclusion of the word "otherwise" in Article 356 on the 
ground that in emergent situations the President should come 
into the field from the beginning and not after the suppression 
of the Constitution by the Governor as envisaged under Article 
188 of the Draft Constitution.44 Thus Article 356 empowers the 
President evien to act on his own initiative. In State of Rajasthan 
Vs Union of Indians justice Bhagwati has also conceded that the 
inclusion of the world 'otherwise' in Article 356 gave the 
President very drastic powers which, if misused or abused, can 
destroy the constitutional equilibrium between the Union and 
the States. He says that, "indeed, the usual practice is that the 
President acts under Article 356 (1) of the Constitution only on 
Governor's report. But, the use of the word 'or otherwise' (in 
Article 356) shows that Presidential satisfaction could be based 
on other material as well. This feature of our Constitution 
indicates most strikingly the extent to which inroads have been 
made by it on the federal principle of government." It is 
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important to note that a few things which were thought 
inconceivable in constitutional terms have happened under the 
shelter of the world 'otherwise' in the Article 356. Mass 
dismissal of State governments without the report of the 
Governors, not for constitutional breakdown, but to suit the 
convenience of the party in power at the Centre, has happened 
in 1977 and 1980. Contrary to the expectations of Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar, (Chairman of Drafting Committee) Article 356 has 
neither remained a dead letter nor has it has been sparingly 
used. Since the inauguration of the Constitution in 1950 the 
Article 356 was invoked more than hundred times different 
States for various reasons. The landmark judgment on 
January 14, 2005, regarding the powers of Governor the 
Supreme Court held that the Governor does not enjoy any 
special discretionary powers under the sixth schedule of the 
Constitution which deals with the Centre-State relations. The 
five-judges constitutional bench headed by Chief Justice R.C. 
Lahoti said while performing his duty under the sixth schedule 
the Governor was bound to take the advice of the Council of 
Ministers and a contention that "the sixth schedule is a 
Constitution with the Constitution" could not be accepted for 
various reasons. "It is impossible to visualize complete 
segregation of the sixth schedule from the rest of the 
Constitution" said the bench having Mr. Justice Shivraj V. Patil, 
Mr. Justice K.G. Balkrishnan, Justice B.N. Shri Krishna and 
Justice G.P. Mathur as other Judges. The sixth schedule of the 
Constitution is a part of Constitution and cannot be interpreted 
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by forgetting its other provisions the Court said, adding the 
under para "20 BB" of the sixth schedule the Governor was 
bound by the advice of the cabinet. 
It would be understand from the above discussion that 
our Constitution never meant the office of the Governor to be 
merely ornamental. For the functioning of constitutional 
government in the State, the Governor forms the kingpin on 
which the entire machinery of the State must revolve. A 
Governor provides a stable link between the Central 
government and the State government and embodies in his 
office the machinery through which government in a State may 
function in accordance with the Constitution. Without him the 
Legislature cannot be called or prorogued or dissolved. Without 
him the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers cannot be 
chosen or removed. Even when the Council of Ministers is 
appointed, the Governor has to perform his legal, constitutional 
and conventional functions continuously in order to enable the 
government in the State to be conducted properly. He must see 
that the State government functions in accordance with the 
Constitution and in accordance with the directives in Part XI, 
Part XVIIl and other Parts of the Constitution. It is for the 
Governor to advice the ministry, to warn them, to suggest to the 
ministry alternative policies and actions and to ask for their 
consideration and reconsideration of accepted policies and 
programmes.46 These duties of the Governor are similar to the 
rights and duties of the British sovereign as a constitutional 
monarch under the British Constitution. The Governor of a 
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State can exercise considerable influence over the government 
of his State through a wise use of these rights. The Governor 
was visualised to be a constitutional head, a sagacious 
councillor and adviser to the ministry, one who can throw oil 
over troubled waters. Apart from being a symbol of the State, 
the Governor could if he were active, by means of getting into 
touch with opponents of the party in power, reconcile them to a 
good number of measures and generally by tours and other 
means make the administration run smoothly. In short, the 
Governor would act as a lubricator of the government in the 
State. 
The office of Governor was, therefore, never meant to be 
an ornament sinecure. He is not required to be an inert cypher 
and "his character, calibre and experience must be of an order 
that enables him to discharge with skill and detachment his 
dual responsibilities towards the Centre and toweirds the State 
executive of which he is the constitutional head".'*'^ Apart from 
his constant, watch and guidance of the State government with 
the possible intervention by him to preserve constitutional 
government either by removing one ministry or by appointing 
another or by invoking President's rule, under conditions which 
render constitutional government impossible, he is invested 
with special responsibility, s^ He has also to play an important 
role for national integration and for the preservation of national 
standard in public administration. The Governor of a State 
ruled by a party which also wields power at the Centre will 
always tend to be unimportant. As the Special Report of the 
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Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission has 
said, he would be out-flanked and reduce to non-entity.'•^ The 
prospect has now changed with the emergence of governments 
in some States being run by psirties different from the party 
ruling at the Centre and the institution of the Governor has 
now a chance to come into its own. In order to give true 
meaning to the office of the Governor, the first essential thing is 
to choose a proper person for filling the office. It should not be 
treated as the last refuge of a retit-ed politician or civil servant 
or as a place for distribution of patronage. Outstanding men in 
the political, social and educationad life of the country, who are 
not controversial figures, must obviously be the proper choice. 
In order to enable the Governor to successfully discharge 
his functions under the Constitution, an agreed code of conduct 
approved by the State goverhments, the Central government, 
the Parliament and the State Legislatures should be evolved. 
This code of conduct should first of all lay down norms and 
principles which should guide the exercise of the Governor's 
discretion and his powers which he is entitled to use and 
exercise on his personal judgment. The Governor's role being 
not merely formal or ornamental as discuss above, there are 
circumstances in which he might be called upon (and in fact 
recent experience in the States has shown that he may 
frequently be so called upon) to exercise his own judgment and 
in some situations the exercise of his judgment can be crucial 
particularly when his functions relate to matters in which the 
Central government may be vitally concerned. It is, therefore, 
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important that the Governor must be enabled to exercise his 
constitutional functions with a clear understanding and on the 
basis of principles which are accepted by the State government 
and the Central government and on the basis of agreed 
conventions. 
It is equally important that the Governor must act 
judiciously, impartially and efficiently while exercising his 
discretion and personal judgment. The report of the Study 
Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission raises four 
questions for the purpose of assuring that the Governor may 
properly exercise his functions: 
i. Questions relating to the appointment of Governor to 
ensure that persons of the requisite calibre are 
appointed; 
ii. Questions relating to the conditions, arrangements and 
procedures enabling the Governors to perform their 
duties; 
iii. Questions relating to the clarification and need for 
extension of areas involving the exercise of his own 
judgment by the Governor; 
iv. Question relating to the powers and procedures for 
keeping the Centre informed of happenings in the 
States. 
There can be no doubt that persons of high calibre and 
quality must be appointed to fill up the high office of the 
Governor. Everything that is necessary to find the best man for 
filling this high office should be done. In selecting the person to 
130 
THe governor and Center State ^Cations 
be appointed as the Governor the choice should not be confined 
to the party in power at the Centre and the field of selection 
should extend much beyond the political arena, so 
The procedure for appointment of Governors should be 
clearly laid down and once laid down it should never be 
deviated from like the appointment of the judges of the High 
Courts. The prescribed procedure must provide for consultation 
with the Chief Minister at the time of appointment of the 
Governor. The conditions of appointment must also be laid 
down and must assure fixity of tenure for the Governor so that 
the Governor is not under the constant threat of removal by the 
Central government. The Constitution prescribes the term of 
five years for the Governor but subject to his removal at any 
time by the President. The procedure must ensure that a 
Governor should normally be allowed to function for five years 
unless there are overwhelming reasons for transferring him or 
removing him. The Special Study Team of the Administrative 
Reforms Commission has examined several suggestions in 
regard to this sphere and these may be noted: 
• The first is that the appointment of Governors should be 
made subject to ratification by Parliament. The underlying 
object is to place a helpful curb on the discretion of the 
Central executive. We consider it unlikely that this 
suggestion will achieve the end in view, for with a majority 
in Parliament the party in power will find it easy to get 
approval for its nominee and ratification will thus become 
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a mere formality. The practice suggested also carries the 
danger that individual names may be discussed in 
Parliament. This may not only be unwholesome in itself 
but may also deter good men from accepting posts of 
Governor. 
• An alternative to the above suggestion is that the Central 
government should informally consult the leader of the 
opposition in the Lok Sabha on every selection of a 
Governor before making the appointment. The success of 
such an arrangement would depend on the healthy of the 
working relationship between the government and the 
opposition. Conventions and attitudes in this field are yet 
to develop fully. While the suggestion could be considered 
for adoption in due course, the Study Team felt that it is 
not likely to prove workable at the present stage. 
• The third suggestion is that the appointment of Governors 
should not be treated as the prerogative of the Union 
government. It is argued that these appointments do not 
fall within the scope of Article 74(1) according to which 
the President must act on the advice of his ministers. 
Since the Governor is not merely a Presidential agent but 
also the constitutional head of the State apparatus and in 
that capacity independent of the Union government, it has 
been suggested that appointment by the Union 
government acting through the President is not consistent 
with the federal character of the Constitution. The 
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implication is that the President can and should act in his 
discretion in the appointment of Governors. This 
suggestion poses a fundamental constitutional question 
which has implications going beyond the appointment of 
Governors only. The issue whether the President 
possesses discretionary powers under the Constitution or 
not and the further issue whether he should possess such 
powers or not, are serious questions which do not yield to 
an easy solution. The study Team considers that for the 
purpose of their study, the existing practice of the 
President acting on ministerial advice in appointing 
Governor should continue. 
Having regard to the pattern on which our Constitution is 
based, it would be hazardous to State that the President should 
perform important functions like the appointment of Governors 
of the States without the advice of his Council of Ministers. 
Constitutionally, legally, and otherwise the proper coutse is 
undoubtedly that the President must act on the advice of his 
Council of Ministers in appointing Governors in the States. The 
advice of the Council of Ministers is binding on the 
constitutional head on the principle that the Council of 
Ministers represents the majority view in Parliament and 
therefore such advice is binding on the constitutional head. 
Even from the point of view of constitutional propriety it is 
certain that, if the President acts on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers, he only acts in accordance with the majority view in 
Parliament. As a matter of constitutional convention it may 
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possibly be more healthy and more proper if the Prime Minister 
consults the leaders of the opposition parties before tendering 
advice to the President in making a particular appointment. 
The Centre-State relationship bears its greatest strain 
when controversies arise regarding the appointment and 
dismissal by a Governor of his Council of Ministers. The choice 
of the Chief Minister must necessarily be made by the 
Governor. That is not merely his legal and constitutional 
authority but also must rest on his individual judgment as to 
who, according to him, can command a majority in the State 
Legislature. So long as there was a single party in majority in 
the State Legislature the choice of a Chief Minister and the 
Council of Ministers was a matter of routine. Disputes arose 
only after the fourth general elections. The Congress Party lost 
its majority in West Bengal, Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, 
Orissa and Madras. The case of Madras was simple. The 
Dravida Munnetta Kazhagam (DMK) had a majority in the State 
Legislature and therefore, its leader was called by the Governor 
for appointment as Chief Minister. The case of Orissa was not 
very complicated. A coalition between the Swatantra Party and 
the Jana Congress had a clear majority in the State Legislature 
and the leader of the coalition parties, R.N, Singh Deo, ^as 
called upon to form the ministry. Bihar presented some 
difficulty but there also a coalition headed by Mahamaya 
Prasad Sinha obtained a majority in the State Legislature and 
Sinha was called upon to form the ministry. Soon afterwards 
there were defections in the coalition with the exit of B.P. 
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MandaJ and his party - as a result of which there was a vote of 
no confidence passed against the ministry. Then came the 
difficulty and the Governor on finding as to who commanded 
the majority support in the State Legislature, asked B.P. 
Mandal to form the ministry. B.P. Mandal soon lost the majority 
and there were conflicting claims made by different groups for 
majority support in the State Legislature. The Governor was not 
satisfied that any group had a majority and therefore, 
recommended the imposition of President's rule. After some 
time when the Governor found that Daroga Rai had a majority 
he appointed him as the Chief Minister and entrusted to him 
the formation of the ministry. 
The West Bengal also presetited serious complications. 
The United Front government which was formed after the 
general elections of 1967 under the Chief Ministership of Ajay 
Mukherjee faced difficulties after the defection of a large 
number of Member of Legislative Assemblies (MLA) under the 
leadership of P.C. Ghosh, who joined the Congress party in a 
coalition. This coalition clearly had a majority support in the 
State Legislature. The Governor requested Ajay Mukherjee to 
convene the Assembly for testing whether the United Front 
government enjoyed majority support any longer. On Mukherjee 
declining to do so, the Governor made his own assessment and 
dismissed Mukherjee as the Chief Minister and appointed Dr. 
P.C. Ghosh to be the Chief Minister. Dr. Ghosh's ministry 
continued for some time when there were defections in his 
ranks and also in the ranks of the Congress party as a result of 
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which the Governor found that nobody had a majority support 
in the State Legislature and no one could form a government. 
Thereupon President's rule was imposed on West Bengal. Mid 
term elections were held in February 1969. After the mid-term 
elections the United Front came in majority and Ajay Mukherjee 
was again appointed the Chief Minister. Very soon there were 
troubles within the United Front and Ajay Mukherjee resigned 
on March 16, 1970 as a result of serious differences between 
him and several constituent units of the United Front led by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPl (M). On Mukherjee 
resigning, the Governor tried to find out if anybody could form 
the ministry. Nobody came forward with the claim majority. As 
a result the Governor recommended the imposition of 
President's rule and President's rule was imposed on March 19, 
1970. 
Recently in 2005, Jharkhand Governor Syed Sibtey Razi's 
decision to install a Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) -led 
government snowballed into a major controversy. The President 
Kalam summoned Razi to get a first hand account of 
developments in Ranchi that led to the swearing in of Shibu 
Soren as Chief Minister, hours after 5 independent Member of 
Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) had met the Governor and 
expressed their support to formation of a Bhartiya Jan ta Party 
(BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments. The 
Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) attacked Razi's decision as a 
"constitutional outrage" and also it as "murder of democracy". 
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The opposition leader L.K. Advani charged Razi with 
"subverting" the people's verdict and "murdering democracy". 
The facts detailed above clearly indicate that in the choice 
of the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers, apart from 
the legal and constitutional position, the Governor must 
necessarily act on his own judgment and assess the relevant 
facts concerning, mainly, the problem of finding a leader 
commanding majority support in the State Legislature. The 
suspicion that the Governor may be influence in making his 
choice of dictation from the Central government should be 
completely eliminated. We do not accept the legal proposition 
that in the matter of choosing the Chief Minister, the Governor 
can be controlled by the President or the Central government 
simple because the latter is the appointing and dismissing 
authority for the Governor. As a matter of law it seems 
established that the Governor's discretion and judgment cannot 
be fettered by dictation from dny other authority. 
Regarding the dismissal of the ministry it may at once be 
stated that this matter has generated the most acute 
controversies and passions in the past. It was argued in the 
case of West Bengal when Ajay Mukherjee was dismissed by the 
then Governor, Dharma Vira, that the Governor should have 
acted like the British Crown and he could not dismiss the Chief 
Minister once he was appointed unless he himself tendered his 
resignation or unless there was an adverse vote against him in 
the Legislature. This may be a good principle to follow and an 
acceptable convention to adopt provided the Chief Minister, 
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who is appointed, continues to enjoy the same support of the 
same coalition or party on the basis of which he was appointed. 
The Uttar Pradesh (U.P) is a typical example of how difficult a 
position may be if the extreme proposition is accepted that the 
Governor can never dismiss the Council of Ministers or the 
Chief Minister before an adverse verdict is given in the 
Assembly. Both in West Bengal and (U.P) it became clear that 
the respective Chief Ministers, Ajay Mukherjee and Charan 
Singh, had lost the majority support. The coalitions on the 
basis of which they were appointed had ceased to exist. In the 
case of West Bengal Shri Ajay Mukherjee declined to call the 
Assembly immediately to have a vote of confidence. In the case 
Uttar Pradesh the majority of the ministers themselves were 
sought to be dismissed by Charan Singh and the coalition 
which had a majority represented by the Congress (R) members 
had ceased to exist. The Govemot was satisfied on his own 
assessment that Charan Singh had no longer any majority and 
his advice to dismiss the majority of ministers in the Council of 
Ministers could not be accepted, as he did not appear to 
represent the majority in the Assembly. 
In 1999 the Rashtriya Jan ta Dal (R.J.D.) government 
headed by Rabri Devi was dismissed by the President on 12 
February 1999 on the ground of the failure of the civil 
administration to maintain law and order situation in Bihar. 
The Assembly was also placed in a State of suspended 
animation. The decision was taken by the President on the 
basis of the report of the Governor S.S. Bhandri and the 
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recommendation of the Union cabinet in the wake of the 
macabre cruely exhibited by Ranbir Sena, slaying over a dozen 
dalits including women and children. But the proclamation was 
revoked since the government knew that it could not be passed 
in the Rajya Sabha where they were in a minority. Then Central 
government decided to revoke President's rule on March 8, 
1999. Next day on March 9, 1999 Mrs. Rabri Devi was again 
sworn in as Chief Minister of Bihar and it brought the end of 
the 24 days long drama following the imposition of President's 
rule. 
Non-State Held Functions of Governor: 
\ The non-state field, the provisions are to be found in part 
XI of the Constitution. Article 256 enjoins that the executive 
power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure 
compliance with the laws made by Parliament. Article 257 
provides that the executive power of every State shall be so 
exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the 
executive power of the Union and executive powers of the Union 
extends to the giving of such directions to a State as may 
appear to the Central government to be necessary for that 
purpose. The executive power of the Union also extends for the 
purpose as giving directions to the States for the construction 
and maintenance of means of communications declared to be of 
national or military importance and also for giving directions to 
States to take measures for the protection of railways within the 
State. Under Article 258, the Central government may entrust 
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the State government or its officers to exercise functions in 
relation to any matter falling within the executive powers of the 
Central government. 
The provisions in part XI of the Constitution clearly fetter 
the executive authority of the Governor. In regard to these 
matters the Governor cannot possibly act on the advice of his 
ministers which are contrary to the directions of the Central 
government. In regard to these non-state matters the authority 
of the Central government must be held to be parallel. If, 
therefore, the Council of Ministers of any State advises the 
Governor in a manner which impedes the enforcement of 
Central laws applicable to the State or which prevents the 
construction and maintenance of means of communications of 
national importance or of railways, the Governor must ignore 
such advice. This is an important exception to the doctrine of 
constitutional government in the States, according to which the 
Governor must function on thfe advice of his ministers, 
responsible to the State Legislature. No Council of Ministers in 
a State can demand the Governor to act contrary to the 
constitutional provisions mentioned above. On the contrary if 
the Council of Ministers does not carry out the directions of the 
Central government as provided in the above Articles, the 
Governor will have to carry out the directions of the Central 
government and act on his own by distributing the business of 
government in such a way as will enable such directions to be 
carried out. 
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The position of the Governor in relation to his functions 
outside the State sphere or, in other words, in the field of inter-
State and Centre-State relationship is beset with difficulties and 
complications. The controversies concerning the office of the 
Governor and his functions have arisen mainly in respect of 
States where the Governor had reported to the President under 
Article 356 of the Constitution that the government of the State 
could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and the President had taken over the government 
in the State concerned on such report and the Governor 
concerned continued to function under the authority of the 
President and without the aid and assistance of a responsible 
Council of Ministers. It should be noted that the President may 
take over the government of a State without a Governor's report 
if he is independently satisfied that such a course of action 
should be taken as contemplated by Article 356 of the 
Constitution. 
The one of the most important irritants in Centre-State 
relation has been Article 356. It has been used or misused too 
often by the Centre. The ruling party at the Centre, was not 
prepared to let the State governments of other parties complete 
their terms by misusing the powers vested with the Centre 
under this Article.si The change in the ruling party at the 
Centre in 1977 Lok Sabha elections dismissed nine State 
governments^^ soon after assuming power. Its successor. 
Congress (I), which won Lok Sabha elections in 1980 repeated 
that feat by dismissing the same number of State governments 
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run by other parties. The persistent abuse of powers under this 
Article has been severely criticized as infringing upon the 
federal nature of Indian polity. It shows that it has reduced the 
States to the position of sub-ordinate organizations rather than 
equal partners in a federation. 
Inspite of all, the Sarkaria Commission has favoured the 
retention of this Article,53 with the view that, if this Article is 
abolished, the Centre would not be able to intervene even when 
there is utter chaos and breakdown of the constitutional 
machinery in a State. However, the Commission has suggested 
some steps to ensure that this extra ordinary power is used by 
the Centre on rare occasions, when all available alternatives fail 
to prevent or rectify a breakdown of constitutional machinery in 
the State. It has been recommended that dissolution of the 
State Assembly should be endorsed by the Parliament. It has 
also been recommended that before taking action under Article 
356, a warning should be issued to the errant State, in specific 
terms, that it is not carrying on the government of the State in 
accordance with the Constitution. However, this may not be 
possible in a situation when not taking immediate action would 
lead to disastrous consequences,^^ and in a situation of political 
breakdown, the Governor should explore all possibilities of 
having a government enjoying majority support in the 
Assembly. 
The Emergency provision in part XVIII of the Constitution 
including Articles 352 to 360 also constitute a most important 
features in our Constitution by which the autonomy and 
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constitutional governments of the States are limited. On the 
declaration of Emergency the entire legislative field of the Union 
and the States becomes one and parliament has by reason of 
Article 250 of the Constitution the power to make laws for the 
whole or any part of the territory of India in respect of any 
matter enumerated in the State list. The executive power of the 
Union also extends to giving directions to any State government 
as to the manner in which its executive power is to exercised. 
The invocation of the emergency provisions depends upon the 
President's satisfaction that a grave emergency exists due to 
external aggression or internal disturbance whereby the 
security of India or any part thereof is threatened. In terms, the 
decision is Ifeft to the President on his subjective satisfaction. It 
would follow, therefore, that the President's decisioh can be 
challenged ptovided his subjective satisfaction is maldfide or 
based on extraneous considerations or where there are no 
materials justifying the satisfaction. A challenge on these 
grounds was left open by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Lakhan Pal Vs Union of Indians. On the principles which have 
been clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is difficult to 
concede that the President's satisfaction can never be 
challenged. It is true that the onus of proving that the 
President's satisfaction is improper would be very heavy on the 
person who may challenge the President's satisfaction. As the 
Supreme Court stated in the above case the executives is 
obviously in the best position to judge a situation which 
justifies the proclamation of emergency. Nevertheless cases may 
143 
lUe governor and Center State Inflations 
be conceived when the Central government may abuse its 
authority by proclaiming an emergency, suspending 
fundamental rights on such proclamation and appropriating all 
powers, executive and legislative thereupon without any 
emergency existing at all. Apart from the above provisions, 
there is also Article 355 of the Constitution by which the duty 
of the Union to protect every State against external aggression 
and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of 
every State is carried on in accordance with the Constitution is 
made a permanent feature. This is a permanent limitation on 
the constitutional government in the States by which a 
government in the State is always subject to the Central 
government's overriding power and duty to ensure protection to 
every State against external aggression and internal 
disturbance and the conduct of the State government in 
accordance with the Constitution. A part from the legal position 
as outlined above, it seems extremely desirable and necessary 
that for the proper exercise of their functions under Articles 356 
and 357 of the Constitution, the President and the Governors 
should be guided by a proper code of conduct which should be 
drawn up with the concurrence and agreement of the State 
Legislatures and Parliament and of the Central government and 
State governments. 
The functions of the Governor in the State field and the 
non state field to bring into relief the problems which have 
emerged since last two plus decades when the Governor has 
become the focus of controversy, particularly because he has to 
144 
iHe governor and Center State JjfQitions 
function in so many States without the aid of the Council of 
Ministers by exercising his powers either delegated by the 
President under Article 356 and 357 or when he exercise his 
powers without the aid of the Council of Minister, without the 
President having taken over the government of the State. These 
are problems which really become important to consider for the 
purpose of appreciating how best it would be possible to create 
a body of conventions for the guidance of the Governor's actions 
so that there may not be any conflict of a constitutional nature 
which may establish the smooth functions of the government of 
the State either under the President's rule or without the 
President's rule. 
Governor Act as Centre Agent: 
The role of Governor has come for lot of criticism in the 
recent times which has made this appointment a point of 
discussion among the citizens. The Governor is usually a 
distinguished statesman who discharges his pferfunctory duties 
with dignity and commands a respect from all strata of political 
parties. His ethical influence on the legislature paves the way 
for healthy and just environment where both the ruling as well 
as the opposition parties plays a citizen friendly role and work 
for what we call development process. In normal times the 
Governor normally abides by the decisions and 
recommendation of his Council of Ministers. His acts are to be 
inline with the constitutional provisions. In times of 
proclamation of emergency he has to tag along and execute the 
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orders of the President. He is merely a constitutional and 
emblematic head, possessing practically no powers in reality 
and performing always on the advice of his minister. The task 
he is called upon to play, cannot be any other than the role of a 
upright and impartial dignity, standing above the vortex of 
party politics and always accessible to the State government for 
consultation and guidance whenever leaders of that government 
are inclined to seek them. But he contributes the stabilizing 
factor in an atmosphere of political fluctuations, and supplies 
to the populace that ornamental symbol which represent their 
unity, appeals to their thoughts and to some extent even to 
their love ceremony. Till 1967, when a single party ruled at the 
Centre as well as in most of States, Governors role seldom 
stirred controversies, much less constitutional litigations. Since 
the 1970's especially after the birth of coalition politics the 
scenario has been changed drastically. 
In Hargovind Vs Raghukul Tilak^e it has been held that 
the office of the Governor of a State is not aft employment 
under the Government of India. It is an independent office and 
is not under the control or subordinate to the Government of 
India. But this has been nullified by the political actions of the 
Governor of State right from the days of attaining 
independence. The Supreme Court57 has adjudicated that a 
Governor is neither as agent of the Central government nor 
subservient to the Central government. He is the head of the 
particular State; his word carries weight, therefore, with the 
Central government and also with the State government. 
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Narsima Rao^s led Congress government dismissed the 
Bhratiya Janata Party (BJP) led governments of Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh on the pretext of 
failure of the Law and order. Instead of fighting a political and 
ideological battle, the Congress party took the weapon of Article 
356 to dismiss these BJP led government. The reports from 
the respective State Governors of these States submitted 
identical reports that also within 24 hours which seems 
unusual . The Governors acted as instrument of the Centre. In 
October 1997, Romesh Bhandari decision to sack Kalyan Singh 
without giving him an opportunity to demonstrate his majority 
on the floor of Vidhan Sabha in consonance with the directive 
principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the Bommai case 
was considered to the direct and blatant affront of the 
Constitution and a flagrant dereliction of the constitutional 
duty enjoined on him. The real problem lies in the fact that 
drama was staged in Uttar Pradesh but the remote control of 
directions was coming from New Delhi. The Apathetic attitude 
of the then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and his Council of 
Ministers was of a spectator. They failed to convene the cabinet 
to deliberate on the unconstitutional behaviour of the Governor, 
despite the letter from the President insinuating he recall of the 
Governor. The interim order passed by the Supreme Court on 
March 9, 2005 in the Jharkhand case once again raise 
important questions on the delicate balance of power that 
prevails between the three wings of government. The sordid 
Jharkhand episode brought to the fore extremely important role 
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that has to played by a Governor when election results do not 
throw up a dear winner. The Constitution requires Governors 
to be men of stature and strong moral character. Recently, 
2008, the political development in Meghalaya are a pointer to 
the malaise that has spread role in our constitutional system. 
In the last three years, it happed Nagaland, twice in Goa before 
being enacted in Bihar. If in Meghalaya the Governor exercised 
his discretion to invite a party to form government, in other 
instances, the Governors used their discretion to dismiss 
popular government. Arbitrary decisions of Governors have 
challenged before the Supreme Court. It delivered stinging 
judgment, setting them aside. But, almost all of them were of 
academic interest as the political wagon wheel, by the time the 
verdicts, came had rolled much beyond. The reluctance, or call 
it slow action on part of the Apex Court in Goa in 2005. Chief 
Ministerial aspirant Manohar Parrikar will surely agree has 
emboldened Governors to violate constitutionally approved 
norms, brazenly, at the slightest hint from the Centre. 
The former President of India A.P.J. Abdul Kalam's^^ 
observations at the All India Governor's Conference in 2005 on 
the Governor's role assume significance in the wake of the 
controversial role of the Governor's of Goa, Jharkhand and 
Bihar in recently. His advice to the Governors to preserve the 
light of 'dharma' by rising above day -to-day politics needs to be 
appreciated. The President Kalam, while addressing the 
Conference of Governor in June 2005, had also said, " while 
there are many checks and balances provided by the 
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Constitution, the office of the Governor has been bestowed with 
the independence to rise above the day-to-day politics and 
override compulsions emanating either from the Central system 
or the State system" . The events that happened at Bihar, Goa 
and Jharkhand were constitutional coups^o all staged by the 
desperate and the paranoid. When the Supreme Court in a rare 
one line order pronounced the Presidential proclamation that 
earlier dissolved the Bihar Assembly unconstitutional. It was a 
rejoinder to the conspiracy that thwarted the judgments of 
democracy. Hung verdicts stipulate multifaceted solutions, 
Indra Bhushan Singh, senior Advocate of the Allahabad High 
Court, hoped that the present situation in Jharkhand would set 
the bench mark for handling fractured mandates and good the 
country's politicians and constitutional experts towards a 
solution to this problem. "I hope these development will at least 
cause a creative beginning to efforts in this direction" he 
added.61 In the past^^ also Governors have behaved in this 
manner, more than fifteen years ago, it was Ram Lai who used 
his Governor's office to unseat the N.T. Rama Rao government 
in Andhra Pradesh to please Indira Gandhi. Channa Reddy 
used his office of Governor to create political uncertainty in a 
complete arbitrary manner when he was Governor of Himachal 
Pradesh. All these political coups have been triggered by old 
political hacks that have been compensated by the high 
command for their undistinguished loyalties. Governors are 
usually not too petulant; they have enormous capacity to take 
things lying down. It is only those who are left with a modicum 
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of self-respect get out in a huff in such situations. Mercifully, 
self-respect is not a major gubernatorial weakness. When Raj 
Bhavans become a mere dumping ground for disused political 
resource, it may be more profitable to turn them into biogas 
chambers. The distasteful Jharkhand episode brought to the 
forefront the exceptionally important role that has to be played 
by a Governor when election results do not throw up a clear 
winner. The Constitution requires Governors to be men of 
standing and tough honourable fibre. The wicked Ram Lai case 
was the first brazen manifestation of the defining of the 
Governors office. S.C. Jamir of Goa in 2005 gave Manohar 
Parrikar jus t two days time to prove his majority but Pratap 
Rane was given one month. In Jharkhand Syed Sibtey Razi 
invited Shibu Soren to form a government when he was not 
head of single largest party in 2005 and also gave him three 
weeks to demonstrate his majority. The appointment of pro-
term speaker was also contrary to constitutional convention. 
The Buta Singh, who prevented the Nitish Kumar led coalition 
from staking claim in Bihar in 2005 is unconstitutional. There 
is not a shadow of doubt that what happened in Jharkhand, 
Goa and Bihar were completely illegal and unconstitutional. 
Governors have continued to exercise their discretionary powers 
in as arbitrary and partisan manner. What has happened in 
Goa, Jharkhand and Bihar are continuation what happened 
earlier in Karnataka, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh 
and many more? All these development have certainly 
downgraded the dignity and prestige of this August Office. What 
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is least expected from a constitutional authority like the 
Governor is that he must act as per constitutional authority 
like the Governor is that he must act as per constitutional 
norms and upright the traditions of this prestigious office. From 
the above discussion it will be apparent that our Constitution 
demarcates the respective areas of function of the Governors in 
the States, the Central government, the State Legislatures, 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers at the Centre and in the 
States. If there is proper understanding and appreciation of the 
respective functions of each organ and office there could be no 
conflict. Conflicts arises only when there is either extra 
emphasis on the use of powers by one organ as against the 
other or a tendency to create rivalries on the basis of party 
interests and policies. 
We can say that in order to enable the Governor to 
successfully discharge his functions under the Constitution, as 
agreed code of conduct approved by the State governments. 
Central government, the Parliament and the State Legislature 
should be evolved. This code of conduct should first of all lay 
down norms and principles which should guide the exercise of 
the Governor's discretion and his powers which he is entitled to 
use and exercise on his personal judgment. It is also suggested 
that to enable the Governors to performs their functions 
properly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, 
it is essential that only right persons be appointed as 
Governors. A Governor must be an impartial person who by his 
ability, character and behaviour inspires respect. 
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THE GOVERNOR AND ARTICLE 356 
India is a country having federal system which in practice 
shows dominance of Union government over Sta tes government. 
To establish this si tuation Governor a representat ive of Centre 
places a key role. Constitutionally Article 356 h a s empowered 
the Governor to show its presence in the State function. 
G e n e s i s o f Art ic le 3 5 6 : 
The Constitution of India has given power to the President 
under Article 356 dismissed a democratically elected State 
government. It is an extreme and unusual power. It is indeed a power, 
which, if misused or abused, can destroy the constitutional 
equilibrium between the Centre and its constituents units. The 
historical and constitutional genesis of the provision for President's 
rule in the States as incorporated in the Constitution of India, which 
grants extremely extensive and unusual power to the Centre to meet 
an extraordinarily exceptional situation where breakdown of 
constitutional machinery occurs in a State, i This would provide a 
spectacle of the origin of the Article, changes effected in it, its 
development and final transformation into its present form. This is 
examined chronologically with reference to the Government of India 
Act of 1909, Act of 1919, Act of 1935 and the Draft Constitution of 
India as discussed by the founding fathers of the Constitution in the 
Constituent Assembly. It would also be noteworthy that this provision 
was introduced and incorporated as an insignificant provision which 
would never be called into operation and that "remains a dead letter or 
iss rarely used''.2 But gradually this has transformed itself into an 
established, integral and highly controversial provision of the 
Constitution that no established political party of the country which 
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has come to power at the Centre either as a majority party or as a 
partner of a coalition unequivocally or wholly opposed. 
Impositions of central rule in a province were an imperial power 
introduced by the British colonialists. That is, the seeds of the Article 
can very well be traced back to the pre-independence days, when the 
Government of India Act of 1909 or Minto Morley Reforms were 
introduced. Before the introduction of the Act, the native people had 
no role in administration and legislation. The affairs of the Provinces 
were carried on by the Governor-General through his Executive 
Councillors. However, the Act marked the beginning of a new phase in 
the constitutional history of India by a inaugurating a new era 
characterized by the growths of responsible governments by delegating 
some powers to the Indian Legislatures, Indian politicians and the 
Indian people^. As the projected legislative bodies under the reforms 
had no real powers, the Britishers did not care to devise ways and 
means to keep these legislatures under their control in the true sense 
of the term. The changes introduced by the Act were, however, one of 
degree and not of kind. Even Lord Moreley himself emphaticallj' 
repudiated that the measures were in no sense a step towards 
parliamentary government. There was disappointment, and frustration 
among Indian leaders who was initially hailed Moreley-Minto Reforms. 
In response to their agitations and demand for more changes, the 
Government of India Act of 1919 or Montague-Chelmsford Reforms 
were enacted. The Act introduced dyarchj^ in the provinces. Under this 
system, the provinces were mere administrative units having no 
independent status of their own. Though the ultimate responsibilitj' 
still rested with the British Parliament yet, this phase witnessed the 
introduction of a modicum of responsibility in the working of 
government which was made possible by the constitutional 
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arrangement of dyarachy. The Act aimed at the gradual development 
of self-governing institutions in India with a view to the progressive 
realization of responsible government. The reforms of 1919 fell far 
short of satisfying the Indians who had been struggling for self 
government. The Indian National Congress condemned it as 
"inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing." The failure of reforms 
was due to external circumstances as well as some inherent defects of 
the system of dyarachy. It was just an experiment carried out by the 
Britishers in Constitution making process. In theory also, dyarachy 
was unsound and India continued to be unilaterally governed. No 
occasion arose for the take over of the provincial governments. When 
India's struggle for independence was at its peak a Commission 
headed by John Simon, a leading constitutional lawyer of Britain and 
members of the British Parliament was appointed to look into the 
question of constitutional reforms for India and to make suitable 
recommendations. The Commission discussed at length several vital 
issues like the breakdown of law and order in Bombay, Madras, 
United Provinces and Punjab and the exercise of special powers vested 
in the Governors. The Commissions realized that Governors interfered 
a fair bit in provincial matters especially at the instance of political 
instability. The most important recommendation of the Commission 
was the special provision for a State of emergency. All political parties 
in India rejected its report outright, the Government of India Act of 
1935 was based on the recommendations of the Simon reporf^. The 
Act contained an emergency provision, the spirit of which 
subsequently found its way into the present Indian Constitution. This 
is the origin of the concept of Emergency provision in the States . 
It was ironic tha t similar provisions were not enacted in the case 
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of Ireland within the United Kingdom in the Government of 
Ireland Act, 1920. This special power appears to have been 
reserved for meeting the Indian situation in the spirit that "the 
King's government must go on". 
The Indian National Congress as a mark of protest passes 
several resolutions against the Simon Commission, White Paper 
and Joint Committee recommendations and demanded the 
setting up of a Constituent Assembly. However, the British 
government went ahead with the enactment of the Government 
of Indian Act of 19355. The Act aimed at completion of the 
process of devolution. It introduced certain new principles 
federal principles along with its coroUary of provincial autonomy 
and the principle of popular responsible government in the 
provinces subject to certain "safeguard" as they were "called in 
political parlance in India". The scheme of provincial autonomy 
as envisaged in the Act was accompanied by a constitutional 
delimitation of legislative and executive jurisdiction between the 
federation and the units. With the creation of autonomous 
provinces, two questions arose; first, how to enable the Centre to 
direct and control provincial policies and act in an emergency 
such as war or internal disturbance. The second, how to make 
provision for carrying on the administration if the machinery of 
ministerial government failed to function. In this context, the 
recommendations of the Statutory Commission manifested 
themselves in clause 45 and 93 of the Act.^ These provisions 
were highly significant since they became the forerunners to the 
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President's rule provisions in the Constitution of independent 
India. 
These provisions made it clear that the Britishers 
experimented with a federal system in India by the 1935 Act, 
they were not ready to forgo their control over the provinces 
under their jurisdiction. They were equally apprehensive of a 
possible 'collapse' of the new experimental system of 
parliamentary democracy either at the Centre or in the 
provinces. Hence they incorporated many provisions like section 
93 in the Act which would enable the Governors to resume and 
to take back the very few powers entrusted to the elected 
governments in the provinces as and when, in their opinion, the 
government of the province could not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act. As far as the British 
colonialists were concerned, it was incumbent on them to 
include a provision of this sort because the British Parliament 
was not prepared to trust the political parties in India. Many of 
them were opposed to the British rule and some of the parties 
like the Indian National Congress had declared openly that they 
would enter the legislatures and the government with a view to 
wrecking the system from within by using constitutional and 
extra-constitutional means. This kind of check envisaged by 
section 93 of the Act was applied in the provinces during 
freedom struggle. The motive of self preservation of the British 
Raj appears to be very dominant in these invocations. Also the 
socio-political climate was highly disturbed, which further 
accentuated the imperial instincts of oppressive dominance over 
160 
THe governor andJLrticCe 356 
the Indian representative institutions. These provisions were not 
introduced in the Indian (provincial Constitution) order, 1947. 
The Independence of India Act of 1947 virtually ended the 
British Rule in India and enabled the Constituent Assembly to 
frame and adopt a new Constitution and to supersede the Indian 
Independence Act without any further legislation from the 
British Parliament. 
Federal Spirit and Article 3 5 6 in Action: 
The Article 356 of the Indian Constitution has acquired 
quite some notoriety due to its alleged misuse. The essence of 
the Article is that upon the breach of a certain defined State of 
affairs, as ascertained and reported by the Governor of the State 
concerned (or otherwise), the President concludes that the 
'constitutional machinery' in the State has failed. Thereupon the 
President makes a 'proclamation of emergency', dismissing the 
State Legislature and Executive. During a State of Emergency, 
the President is vested with tremendous discretionary powers. 
Any legislation or constitutional provision that abrogates any of 
the basic principles of democratic freedom in anathema to most 
people and the more so to the people of the largest democracy in 
the world. Having just gained independence after a long and 
continuous struggle, the people of India would naturally have 
the greatest interest in preserving all the freedoms envisioned in 
a democratic society. If the members of the Drafting Committee 
of the Constitution included a provision that permits a 
government dismiss a duly elected representative body of the 
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people and suspend that freedoms in violation of even the 
crudest interpretation of a 'separation of powers', then common 
sense suggests that it is only to deal with the direct of 
circumstances and nothing less. But it seems that the remedial 
nature of the Article has been perverted to impose the 
domination of the Central government upon a state government 
that does not subscribe to its views. Central control over regional 
governments is essential for the integrity of nations that have 
federal system of government, and Article 356 was designed to 
preserve this integrity, but what remains to be seen is whether it 
is being use'd at thte tOSt of sacrificing the interest of democratic 
freedom. 
Fedteraiism in India is at once similar and distinct from 
other federation like that of America, distinct in that it is a group 
of independent StAtfes cbming together to form a federation by 
conceding a portion of their rights of governmeht, but a 
distributed entity that derived its power from a single source the 
Unioh. Sovereignty and this powfers of governance and 
distributed and shared by several entities and organs within the 
Indian constitutional system.7 Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar who 
chaired the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, 
stressed the importance of describing India as a 'Union of States' 
rather than a 'Federation of States'. Though the country and the 
people may be divided into different States for convenience of 
administration, the country is one in integral whole its people a 
single emporium derived from a single source. The similarity 
between the systems of government in the two countries 
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'however, is remarkable. Both governments exhibit a strong 
* Union control, which the individual States give up a significant 
portion of their autonomdus rights to the Central government in 
return for security and pursuit of common interests, in contrast, 
in a confederation the individual States retain most of their 
sovereignty and are only loosely bound together. This is in 
essence how one would describe Centre-States relations in India, 
excepting provisions for certain emerging situations in the 
Constitution of India, where the Union would exercise absolute 
control within thfe State.A close scrutiny and analysis of clause 
(1) of Article 356 suggests the following ingredients:-
i. A report from the Governor of the State; 
ii. "or otherwise" than the Governor's report; 
iii. The President must be satisfied; 
iv. Breakdown of constitutional machinery in a State .» 
A brief analysis of each ingredient is essential here: 
i. A report from ihie Governor: 
The Constitution of India in its Article 355 casts aii 
obligation upon the government at the Centre to ensure that the 
government of every State is carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. It has no agency in the State 
other than the Governor, to keep it informed of the happenings 
and to see whether the government is being carried on as per the 
directions of the Article. Here comes the role of the Governor in 
the declaration of Article 356 in a State. He is duty bound to see 
that the government of the State is being carried on in 
accordance with the constitutional provisions and when he 
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discovers that the State government is not functioning in 
accordance with the Constitution, it is his duty to report the 
matter to the President of India. Thus the functions of the 
Governor in terms of Article 356 comes in only when he sends a 
report to this effect to the President.^ Normally, the first and 
foremost requirement of any action under Article 356 is the said 
report of the Governor. This practice is democratic, and of 
significarice since it has transferred the responsibility back to 
the Governor from the President. 
The Indian Constitution, which envisages the 
Jjarliamentary system of government, makes it obligatory on the 
part of the Governor to exercise all his powers and functions in 
accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. The 
Constitution does not say that sending of the report by the 
Governor in this connection is a function to be exercised in his 
discretion. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Governor has to 
act on his own judgment in sending his report to the President 
on the breakdown of constitutional machinery of the State 
concerned. This position is justified by the Governor's Committee 
report, which says, "occasion may arise when the Governor may 
find that in order to be faithful to the Constitution and the law 
and his oath of office, he has to take a particular decision 
independently", lo 
Eminent constitutional authorities like D.D. Basu and 
H.M. Seervai seem to share this observation. "The reason is that" 
Basu justified, "as a result of such a report, if adverse, the State 
government itself would be suspended, so that the Governor's 
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Council of Ministers cannot be expected to sign their own death 
warrant."!! H.M. Seervai is of the view that Governor will be 
justified in making such a report to the President even contrary 
to the advice of his ministry as such a report might show that 
the ministry itself was responsible for the breakdown of 
constitutional machinery in the State 12, This position is further 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the following words: "Under 
Article 356, the Governor exercises real rather than formal 
powers, relating to the breakdown of the constitutional 
machinery in a State. When he makes a report in this regard, he 
has obviously to act in his discretion. The Chief Minister, who is 
to be affected by this report, cannot be expected to advice the 
Governor to recommend his own dismissal to the President."13 
All these observations indicate that the Governor can do it 
in his discretion. By the very nature of the function, it cEinnot be 
exercised on the advice of his ministry for it may very often 
happen that the report itself may be a condemnation of the 
Council of Ministers that the government runs by the Council of 
Ministers is no longer capable of being conducted in accordance 
with the Constitution. However, these discretionary powers do 
not affect the normal position that like the President of India, the 
Governor must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. 
However, the Article does not mention specifically whether the 
report should be "speaking one" or "non speaking one". It is 
obvious that such report should be a speaking one, furnishing 
facts clear and specific and not vague so as to satisfy the 
President whether or not a situation contemplated in the Article 
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has arisen. It should essentially contain the material facts and 
circumstances which are relevant to assess the situation and 
leading to a particular satisfaction. As the Sarkaria Commission 
rightly observe that, we should emphasis that such a report of 
the Governor should be a speaking document containing a 
precise and clear statement of all material facts and the ground 
on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the 
existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 
356.14 
It is now a well settled principle that no satisfaction can 
reasonably be formed by an authority on vague facts or report. 
In his report, the Governor should act truthfully with a high 
degree of constitutional responsibility in terms of oath arid 
inform the President that the government of the State cannot be 
carried on in accordance with the constitutiohal provisions. 
When challenged in the constitutional court, it gives an insight 
into the satisfaction reached by the President. The Governot 
therefore owes constitutional duty and responsibility in sending 
the report with necessary factual details, is if the report is non-
speaking one, it would amount to satisfaction of the Governor 
and not that of the President regarding the existence of a 
situation in a State. Therefore, the Governor should be very 
cautious in making the report. He is supposed to act fairly and 
honestly consistent with his oath. It is for this reason that Article 
356 places such implicit faith in his report. If, however, in a 
given case, his report is vitiated by legal malafides, it is bound to 
vitiate the President's action as well. Therefore, the underlying 
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assumption of the Constitution is that the incumbent of the 
office of the Governor must not only be imbued with qualities of 
perception, judgment, fact and initiative, but also be objective 
and fair in making his report on the point whether President's 
rule should or should not be imposed. ^ ^ 
Thus, this shows that the power of the Governor under 
Article 356 assumes great significance. Being a man on the spot, 
he possesses direct and first hand knowledge of the functioning 
of the government. After 1967, the party in power at the Centre 
found itself in such a situation that for retaining power in 
different States, it had to misuse the constitutional provision 
with regard to the office and functions of the Governor. Quite 
naturally, only pliant persons were preferred as Governors. The 
Sarkaria Commission rightly observes: "In all the evidence before 
us, a common threat is that much of the criticisms against the 
Governors could have been avoided if their selection had been 
made on correct principles to ensure appointment of right types 
of persons as Governors. Even the most critical of the witnesses 
agree that if proper persons are chosen, there will be little cause 
of complaints."17 
ii. Clauscy *or otherwise' in Article 356: 
Article 356 provides that the satisfaction of the 
President may derive either form the report of the Governor 'or 
otherwise'. The word *or otherwise' has given rise to an idea that 
the President can even form his satisfaction in all cases without 
the report of the Governor also. This is justified in view of the 
obligation of Centre under Article 355. In view of the ultimate 
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responsibility of the State, the framing fathers of the 
Constitution thought that it was proper not to restrict and 
confine the action of the Centre merely to Governor's report. 
Sometimes the Governor might not make a report. The President 
can act even without the Governor's report, if he is satisfied that 
such events call for the exercise of special responsibility placed 
upon the Centre to maintain the State under the Constitution, 
have occurred in a State. The provision of the clause, however, 
makes even the report of the Governor unessential. The 
satisfaction of the President can be arrived at otherwise. It 
suggests that the President may get information from other 
sources or agencies as well. It is an extra precaution. However, it 
seem that the report of the Governor is almost binding and *or 
otherwise' clause is subject to some specific contingencies 
making the Governor fail in his duty. 
The words "or otherwise" can be interpreted in two ways.^^ 
First, it may mean that even if the President does not receive a 
report from the Governor, he is competent enough to assess the 
situation himself. Secondly, it may also be interpreted to mean 
that even on receipt of a report from the Governor, the President 
is free to accept or reject the recommendations to promulgate the 
President's rule. In other words, the President may act 
'otherwise' than the report of the Governor, in either of the two 
ways. Thus theoretically, the word 'otherwise' shifts the whole 
burden of responsibility from the Governor's shoulders to those 
of the President and the Governor's role appears to pale into 
insignificance. It is politically and constitutionally significant to 
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note that as the provision was originally drafted at the time of 
the framing of the Constitution, the Article merely provided that 
the President would act on the report made by the Governor. The 
words 'or otherwise' were not there. Subsequently, Ambedkar 
moved an amendment according to which, under Article 278, as 
the Article was then numbered, the President could, if he felt 
that his intervention was necessary, act even when there was no 
report for this purpose made by the Governor. It might be 
salutary to reproduce the words of Ambedkar here: 
Now, it is felt in view of the fact that Article 277-A (now 
Article 355) imposes a duty and an obligation upon the Centre, it 
would not be proper to restrict and confine the actions of the 
President, whipl> wqv l^d undoubtedly be taken in the fulfillment 
of his duty, to thb report of the Governor of the province. It may 
be that thb GoVfettior does not make a report ... I think, as a 
necessary consfequencfe to the introduction of Article 277-A, we 
must give liberty to the t*resident to act even where there is no 
report by the Governor and when the President has got certain 
facts within his knowledge, on which he thinks he ought to act 
in the fulfillment of his duty. The width of the power is very wide. 
The satisfaction of the President must be based on relevant 
material, i^  
When this amendment was placed in the Constituent 
Assembly, there ensued a long and heated debate. H.V. Kamath 
and others took a serious objection since this would undermine 
the position of the Governor and also give the President wide 
powers. He described the action of the President even without 
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the report of the Governor as a constitutional crime. He 
condemned it in theste words: what the 'otherwise' is, God only 
knows... I want that the President should be empowered to act 
only in case the Governor or the ruler of the State informs him 
that a situation has arisen or that an emergency has arisen etc., 
but not otherwise. What is this otherwise? Do we mean to say 
that thfe Pt-esident, even grahting that he is to act upon the 
advice of his Council of Ministers, can intervene solely on the 
strength of his owrl judgment, perhaps buttressed or reinforced 
by the advicfe of the Council of Ministers at the Centre but 
without a re^lort from the State Governor or ruler. This is a foul 
transactlbn He wariifed that: We are laying ourselves upon the 
snare attd traps iti bur path whetein we shall be caught beyond 
and rescue.20 
Sttotlg views wete dlso exjiressed in favour of its inclusion. 
For instancfe, ThakUf Das Bhatgava observed that the clause 'or 
otherwise' dentited the affairs in which the Governor might not 
be doing his duties bt- might give a wrong report. If that premise 
is correct, he askfed, whatever manner the President may come 
to know, it is the duty of the Centre to interfere. Arming the 
President with such power was, according to B.H. Zaidi, 
necessary in the light of our historic past and in the light of 
fissiparous tendencies on the part of units to break away from 
the Centre. He, therefore insisted that instead of being critical 
and putting the most unwarranted suspicion at the door of our 
would be Presidents of the future, we should take the historical 
tendencies into consideration. Raj Bahadur was also in favour of 
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granting liberty of the President to interfere in the affairs of the 
State without a report from the Governor, if there was 
breakdown of constitutional machinery in the State. He was of 
the view that there was no reason for us to distrust our 
Presidents, who were to be elected by us and were empowered to 
act under Article 278. Such power according to him, was 
necessary to safeguard democracy and freedom.21 In the same 
way, Alladi Krishna Swami Iyer could not find any justification in 
taking exception to the use of the words 'or otherwise' in Article 
278. 
A question arose whether the court may recommend to the 
President the recourse to Article 356 under the 'otherwise' 
clause. The Patna High Court held that the High Courts are 
competent to give advice to the President for the declaration of 
President's rule by virtue of 'or otherwise' clause. The court in its 
observation in the Sdociyukt Nagrik Samiti case opined that the 
various irregularities committed in the employment programmes 
under Jawarhar Rozgar Yojna in Sahabganj district of Bihar, as 
point out by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, 
made it appear that it was appropriate for the President to 
invoke Article 356 of the Constitution and dismiss the State 
government on the ground of a breakdown of the constitutional 
machinery in the State. B.M. Lai Chief Justice and A.K. Singh 
Justice declared that recommendation of the Governor was not 
conclusive regarding the invocation of Article 356 and the High 
Court was also competent to report to the President on the 
situation in the State.22 
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In 1987, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had to deal with a 
similar situation, a writ petition containing serious allegations 
against the Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao, and alleging a 
breakdown of the constitutional machinery was filed. The court 
was csdled upon to decide whether Article 356 should be 
invoked. The full bench observed that, the question concerning 
the imposition of President's rule is a matter entirely within the 
jurisdiction of the President of India, who may act upon the 
advice tendered to him by the Union government. There are no 
grounds to think that the Union government is unaware of what 
has been happening in the State or that the Union government 
failed to take any action even though it is satisfied that 
conditions existing in the State justifies the imposition of 
President's rule. While we refuse to give any directions to the 
Union government in the terms prayed for by the petitioner, we 
have no doubt that the representation filed by the petitioner as 
well as the details set out in this judgment will receive 
consideration of the Union government and an appropriate 
decision will be taken23. This is exactly what the Patna High 
Court has done. It was acting in the course of public interest 
litigation petition. It is obVious that the judiciary should neither 
recommend nor report because such acts are neither expected 
from the courts nor within their jurisdiction. Further, the law 
courts can sit in judgment after the proclamation has been made 
and therefore, they should refrain from being instrumental 
thereto in any manner. "If a judgment contains a recital of 
certain facts which the Union government would be interested to 
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be acquainted with, copy of judgment may be forwarded to the 
government. There stops the role of courts."24 
So far the President has acted independently of the 
trovemor's report i.e. or 'otherwise' a clause on many occasions. 
These acts were not only highly controversial but also against 
the spirit of parliamentary democracy and federalism. For the 
first time, President's rule was imposed under this clause, 
without the report of the Governor in as many as nine States on 
April 1977, when the Janata Party, the first non-congress 
government, was in power at the Centre. Similarly, when 
Congress returned to power, President's rule was imposed by 
taking shelter under this clause on 13 February 1980 in nine 
States, fhis clause was invoked for the third time on 13 
Februaiy 1991, when Karunanidhi's Dravida Munnetta 
Kazhagaiii (D.M.K) government in Tamilnadu was thrown out by 
the minority government of Chandra Shekhar.25 
Thus, we have seen that this clause "or otherwise" not only 
carries with it some inherent dsmgers but also certain 
constitutional inconsistencies. It fails to take into account the 
realities of power politics and the consequent perils. An 
unsavoury aspect of invoking this clause is that it neglects and 
ignores outright the office of Governor. It is constitutionally 
abnormal and unethical that the President while arriving at the 
satisfaction as to the fact that the government in a State cannot 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution ignores or overlooks, even by implication; the 
Governor of the State concerned, who is the constitutional head 
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of the State and happens to be an agent of the President under 
the Constitution. Moreover, it is the Governor who would 
normally act as the President's agent during the President's rule 
to perform the functions which otherwise would have been 
performed by the State government. It would not be 
constitutionally fair that and jus t that the office of the Governor 
is bypassed while proclaiming the President's rule in the 
States.26 The constitutional relevance of the act lies in a situation 
where in the Centre is in conflict with the Governor due to the 
fact that the Governor sends a wrong report or fails to make a 
report at all despite the Centre's staunch conviction that an 
inevitable action under Article 356 is warranted. The Bhagavati, 
Justice conceded that the inclusion of the words 'or otherwise' in 
Article 356 gave the President a very drastic power which if 
misused and abused destroys the constitutional equilibrium 
between the Union and the States.27 
The possibility of abuse of power is there and toward off 
this possibility, our tonstitutional wisdom requires that the orbit 
of the operation of the clause be restricted. Its operation should 
be restricted to major breakdown of law and order or failure to 
maintain law and order and the State government shows no 
political will or administrative ability to cope with the situation. 
In this context, the Central government must place before the 
President full evidence and relevant papers revealing the 
circumstances which require action and he is in turn should 
place them before the Parliament when the matter is being 
deliberated on in the House and if necessary, before the courts. 
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It is only by this reasonable and transparent process that the 
objectivity of the Central government's decision could be 
established. In this regard, the important decision given by the 
Supreme Court is a welcome development. The Court said that,If 
the Union of India does not indicate or State that any other 
information or material was available to the President or Union 
Council of Ministers other than the report of the Governor much 
less disclose it, the court must hold that there was no other 
information before the President except the report of the 
Governor and that the words 'and other information received by 
me' were put in the proclamation mechanically. 
Hi. Satisfaction of the President: 
Article 356 also stipulates that the President has to satisfy 
himself as to the existence of the situation contemplated in the 
Article. How can he be satisfied? That satisfaction of the 
President derives either from the report of the Governor 'or 
otherwise' or both ways, if tke President's act is based on 'or 
otherwise' and not on the report of the Governor, the satisfaction 
is based on the disclosed facts in the Presidential proclamation. 
Whether he gets information from the Governor or otherwise, the 
President has to become satisfied that the situation 
contemplated by the Constitution has actually arisen. Therefore, 
he is not expected to act mechanically on the report of the 
Governor. He can call for further information, if necessary, from 
any other source. Thus, the existence of objective material 
showing that the government of the State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution is a condition 
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precedent. Once such material is shown to exist, the satisfaction 
of the President based on the material is not open to question, 
"However, if there is a no objective material before the President, 
or the material before hirii cannot reasonably suggest that the 
government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with 
the provisions of the Constitution, the proclamation issued to 
open to challenge".28 This shows that the power so vested in the 
President is of widest artiplitude. So the material before the 
President must be sufficient to indicate that unless a 
proclamation is issued, it is not possible to carry on the affairs of 
the State as per the provisions of the Constitution. It is not 
ordinary situation arising in the State but a situation which 
shows that the constitutional government has become an 
impossibility, which alone will entitle the President to issue the 
proclamation. It has to be further remembered that the Article 
requires that the President has to be satisfied that the situation 
in question has arisen. Hehce, the material in question has to be 
such as would induce a reasonable man to come to the 
conclusion in question. The expression used in the Article is "if 
the President is satisfied". The word 'satisfied' is understood in 
different context as: To furnish with sufficient proof or 
information, to set free from doubt or uncertainty; to convince; to 
answer sufficiently (an objection question); to fulfill or comply 
with (a request); to solve (a doubt, difficulty); to answer the 
requirement of (a State of thing hypothesis etc.) to accord with 
(condition). 
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In the State of Rajasthan V. Union of India, the Supreme 
Court observed: If the satisfaction is malafide or is based on 
wholly extraneous or irrelevant ground, the court would have 
jurisdiction to examine it because in that case there would be no 
satisfaction of the President in regard to the matter in which he 
is required to be satisfied.29 
In this context, it is to be noted that since the President 
acts on the aid and advice of the Central cabinet, the satisfaction 
of the former means the satisfaction of latter. In other words, the 
satisfaction mentioned in the clause is that of the Central 
government. Thus, the President under our Constitution, being 
who may be called a constitutional President, is obliged to act 
upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by 
the Prime Minister. Here one should particularly refer to Article 
53, 74 and 75 of our Constitution. Article 53 provides that the 
executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and 
shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers 
subordinates to him in accordance with this Constitution. The 
Article 74(1) reads, there shall be a Council of Ministers with the 
Prime Minister at the head to aid and advice the President who 
shall in the exercise of his function, act in accordance with such 
advice, provided that the President may require the Council of 
Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or 
otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the 
advice tendered after such reconsideration. Further, Article 75 
lays down that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively 
responsible to the Lok Sabha. There is no provision in our 
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Constitution which makes the President answerable to the 
Legislature. Hence, one may reasonably think that as the 
ministers are so answerablfe for thte policy and administration of 
the Union, it is implied that they are recognized as possessing 
the authority to finally decide the affairs of the government. 
Therefore, the real ruler is the Council of Ministers and more 
particularly the cabinet and not the President. Thus, our 
Constitution embodies generally the parliamentary or the cabinet 
system of government of the British model both for the Centre 
and the States. Under this system the President is the 
constitutional or formal head of the Centre and he exercises his 
powers and functions conferred on him by or under the 
Constitution, on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 
In this connection, the Supreme Court observed that, whenever 
the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the 
Governor of any power or function, the satisfaction required by 
the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President 
or the Governor in the constitutional sense in the cabinet system 
of government, that is satisfaction of his Council of Ministers on 
whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally 
exercises all his powers and functions, the decision of any 
minister or officer under rules of business made under any of 
the two Articles?? (3) and 166 (3) is the decision of the President 
or the Governor respectively. These Articles do not provide for 
any delegation. Therefore, the decision of the minister or any 
officer under the rules of business is the decision of the 
President or the Governor.^o 
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However, it is quite clear that the President cannot exercise 
his powers under the Constitution as he thinks fit. He has to 
have facts, circumstances which can lead a person of his status 
to form an intelligent opinion requiring exercise of his discretion 
of such a grave nature that the representatives of the people who 
are primarily entrusted with the duty of running the affairs of 
the State are removed with a stroke of the pen. His action must 
appear to be called fair and justifiable under the Constitution if 
challenged in a court of law. 31 
In this context, it is worthwhile to analyse the 
"constitutional activism" displayed by K.R. Narayanan in the 
case of Uttar Pradesh in 199732 and Bihar in 19^8.33 Here, the 
President was able to stall the undemocratic decision of the 
cabinet, but it cannot be regarded as constitutional activism in 
the true sense of the term. What made it possible for the 
President to stall this was the favourable political cliillate 
prevailiiig then. It is not Narayandn alone but two fol-fner 
Presidents also had expressed strong displeasure against the 
cabinet decisions to impose President's rule in the States. The 
first of its kinds was in 1977 during the Janata regime.34 
Assuming power after emergency, the Desai government decided 
to dismiss nine Congress ruled State governments on the ground 
that the State governments no longer represented the will of the 
people and accordingly, the cabinet decided to advice the then 
acting President B.D. Jatti to dissolve the nine Assemblies. He 
refused. He told his secretary (K.Bal Chandran); "I want time to 
consider the recommendation". After another cabinet meeting 
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Desai sent a strong letter to the President through cabinet 
secretary N.K. Mukherji. It reminded Jatti of his duties and 
responsibilities as the constitutional head of the State. Following 
this, Jatt i signed the order promulgating the Central rule in the 
nine States, bringing a twenty four hour-long constitutional 
crisis to an end with the cabinet having its own way. Now it is 
exactly the reverse, with the President having his own way. 
Similarly, it was reported (in the press) that President Shankar 
Dayal Sharma was reluctant to sign the proclamation under 
Article 356 with respect to the States of Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh in 1992, in the aftermath of 
the demolition of the Babari Masjid.^s He was right in expressing 
his disapproval. But it appears that he ultimately agreed to sign 
as he had no other option in the Constitution. What is to be 
derived from all these? In the latest cases, the President was able 
to correct the wrong decision of the cabinet because of the 
existence of the coalition government in which the Prime 
Minister's position was rather weak. The Prime Minister of a 
coalitioh system cannot be treated at par with a Prime Minister 
in a single party majority rule. Had they been the leader of the 
single majority party as in the case of 1977 or 1992, they would 
not have accepted the instruction of the President to reconsider 
the decision. Further, there was no unanimity among the 
coalition partners and a few of them strongly recorded their 
displeasure against taking such a decision. Besides, the smooth 
relationship between the Prime Ministers and their colleagues on 
the other, came to the help of K.R. Narayanan. Had that not 
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been the case, the respective cabinets would perhaps have stuck 
to their decision, leaving no option for the President but to sign 
the procl£imation.36 Above also many in the cabinet realized the 
untenability of their earlier stand and were conscious of the 
probability of its reversal by the Supreme Court. Whatever may 
be the fact, Narayanan's decision constitutes a landmark and 
could mark a decisive transformation of the much abused power 
of the Central government to end the rule of their political 
opponents in the States.^7 
iv. Failure of Constitution al Machinery: 
Failure of constitutional machinery was a cleaver political 
innovation of the British colonialists. It is an essential pre-
condition for the exercise of power under Article 356, which is to 
be declared by the President when he is satisfied that a situation 
has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be 
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Howevtet, the Constitution does not specifically State what 
amounts to and what does not amount to such a failure. The 
ambiguity about the constitutional crisis is creating obstacles to 
an objective political approach. But we should also recognize the 
almost impossibility in defining constitutional crisis. The 
impossibility lies in the difficulty in defining the problems of a 
society which is in the process of evolution. It is by exploiting 
(misusing) the loopholes (ambiguity) in the constitutional 
provision that the Centre is exaggerating the smallest crisis in 
States where the opposition reigns and simplifying even the 
gravest constitutional crises in States where its own party is in 
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power. Therefore, it has become a subject of perennial concern 
and is widely jdebated. 
To understand the meaning of the expression and to 
comprehend the intentions of the founding fathers, we should go 
through the debates in the Constituent Assembly. Needless to 
say, this phrase evoked strong criticism and argument in the 
Assembly. The 'plurosignative' nature of the phrase became very 
clear when several members of the Constituent Assembly came 
up with divergent interpretations.^s The extreme vagueness and 
uncertainty of the phrase was highlighted by the members of the 
Constituent Assembly itself. T.D. Bhargava described the 
question-what constitutes the failure of machinery as t he 
question of questions'. Several members also stressed the 
necessity to lay down precisely the situations contemplated in 
the phase. 
While speaking on this Article Ambedkar observed that, it 
would take me very long to go into a detailed examination of the 
whole thing and referring to each Article, say this is the principle 
which is established in it and say, if any government, any 
legislature of the province does not act in accordance with it, 
that would act as the failure of the machinery. The expression 
failure of the machinery, I find, has been used in the 
Government of India Act, 1935. Everybody must be quite 
familiar, therefore, with its de facto and de jure meaning. I do 
not think any further explanation is necessary.3^ Further, he 
also stated that we would "reply only to those amendments 
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which he though had any substance and that he could not go on 
discussing every amendment that was moved." 
The above statement of Ambedkar indicates that he himself 
was not fully convinced with his own answer. Significantly, he 
has never replied to the objections. It is true that this expression 
has been borrowed from the Act of 1935, but it would be difficult 
to agree with him that the phrase has the same meaning in the 
present Constitution which it had in the Act since Article 356 is 
not the exact copy of section 93 of the Act. Further, one can also 
find difficulty in agreeing with him that "everybody must be quite 
familiar with its de facto and de jute meaning" and it does not 
need any further explanation about the meaning of the phrase, 
Ambedkar intended to keep it "vague". In sum, the Constituent 
Assembly has pin-pointed four circumstances responsible for the 
breakdown of the constitutional msLchinery. Even though these 
are not incorporated in the Constitution they are relevant and 
deserved to be considered. They are: 
• When there is a breakdown of Constitution due to internal 
violence. 
• When there is a breakdown owing to majority party 
refusing to function at all. 
• When the breakdown occurs due to the ministry in the 
State refusing to follow the directions of the Centre. 
• The party alignment in the State is such that no stable 
government could be formed."^o 
However, the views of the framers do not explain fully the 
meaning of the expression "failure of constitutional machinery". 
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The expression and its implication have also been the subject of 
elaborate discussion in the report of Sarkaria Commission on 
Centre-State relations. The Commission report says that a 
failure of constitutional machinery may occur in a number of 
ways. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all such 
situations. Nevertheless, it discusses instances of what does and 
what does not constitute a constitutional failure under the 
following heads: 
• Political crisis 
• Internal subversion 
• Physical breakdown, and 
• Non-compliance and constitutional directions of the 
Union executive. 
A constitutional breakdown may be out come of a political 
crisis or deadlock. This may occur where, after a gfeneral 
elections, no party or coalition of parties or groups is able to 
secure an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, and, 
despite exploration of all possible alternatives by the Governor, a 
situation emerges in which there is complete and demonstrated 
inability to form a government commanding confidence of the 
Legislative Assembly, or a ministry resigns or is dismissed on 
loss of its majority support in the assembly and no alternative 
government commanding the confidence of the assembly can be 
formed or the party having a majority in the legislature refuses 
to form or continue the ministry and all possible alternatives 
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explored by the government to find a coalition ministry 
commanding a majority in the assembly have failed. 
Internal subversion may occur where the government of a 
State, although carried on by a ministry enjoying majority 
support in the assembly, has been deliberately showing for a 
period of time, disregard of the Constitution and the law or 
where a government deliberately creates a deadlock or pursues a 
policy bringing the system of responsible government to a 
standstill or where the government in the guise of acting within 
constitutional arms flouts purposefully principles and 
conventions of resfionsible government to pursue dictatorship. 
Physical breakdown occurs where a ministry although 
properly constituted, either refuses to discharge its 
responsibilities to deal with such a situation of internal 
disturbance, or is unable to deal with such a situation that 
paralyses the administration and endangers the security of the 
State or where natural calamity such as an earthquake, cyclone 
epidemic, flood etc.,of unprecedented magnitude and severity 
completely paralyses the administration and endangers the 
security of the State and the government is unwilling or unable 
to exercise its governmental power to relieve it. 
Where a direction issued by the Union in the exercise of its 
executive power under any provision of the Constitution such as 
Articles 256, and 257 and 339 (2), or, during the emergency 
under Article 353, is not complied with by the State government 
in spite of adequate warning the President may holds that a 
situation has arisen which is contemplated under Article 356.If 
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public disorder of any magnitude endangering the security of the 
State has taken place, it is the duty of the State to keep the 
Union informed and if the State fails to do so, such failure will 
amount to impeding the exercise of the executive power of the 
Union and justify the latter giving appropriate directions under 
Article 257(1). If such a direction given by the Union to the State 
under Article 257(1) is not complied with inspite of adequate 
warning, the President liiay hold that a situation has arisen, 
which is contemplated under Article 356.^1 
Thus the Commission's categorization is comprehensive 
and quite illuminating. The discussion shows clearly that the 
failure of constitutional machinery may occur in a number of 
ways, contributing factors being determined by the dynamics of 
political process and the level of political development in the 
States concerned. It is very clear that Article 356 itself is vague 
and gray in terms of the definition of the breakdown of the 
constitutional machinery in a State. It is silent and has not 
provided any remedy. This constitutional lacuna was being 
exploited by the parties in power at the Centre. Thus the power 
given under Article 356 is not the offshoot of a right, but a 
compliance with a duty. It is the performance of this duty which 
justifies the total invasion of the States field. This shows that 
action under Article 356 is to be taken not out of liking, but out 
of compulsion when the circumstances are so grave as it cannot 
be dispensed with. Therefore, the orbit of operation of the powers 
of the President in this connection must be determined in the 
light of the provision of Article 355 and for all practical purposes, 
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they have to be read together, when they are so read, it is amply 
clear that the power of the President under Article 356 of the 
Constitution implies that the Union government has the 
obligation to do whatever in its power to help the States in its 
endeavour to coilform to the Constitution. Only when the Union 
fails in its attempt or finds it impossible to do any thing, that it 
should think of the next step, namely action under Article 356. 
Parliamentary Control Mechanism of Article 3 5 6 : 
The proclamation of President's rule under Article 356 is a 
very serious matter as it not only disturbs the federal 
equilibrium but also adversely affects the rights of the people, 
their elected representatives and responsible ministries. Any 
abuse or misuse of this highly potential power will play havoc 
with our constitutional system. As such it is essential to have a 
machinery of control against the abuse of this power. A question 
arises, how the abuse of the power conferred under the Article 
can be warded off and a chfeck can be placed on the exercise of 
this power. 
The framers of the Constitution, in this context relied upon 
the Parliament as a primary safeguard against the abuse of 
power and provided in the Constitution that the Parliament 
should endorse the application of Article 356. This is conceived 
both as a check upon the power and as a vindication of the 
principles of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty over the 
executive. Parliament's power of endorsement is held to be more 
democratic and more flexible than the system in which the 
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judiciary is Supreme. Furthermore, the Parliamentary check 
makes the government accountable to the people. 
The control of the Parliament in this context is to be found 
in clause (3) of Article 356. It provides that every such 
proclamation shall be laid before each House of Parliament and 
shall, except where it is a proclamation revoking a previous 
proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months 
unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved 
by the resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The provision 
amounts in substance to a requirement that the two Houses of 
the Parliament shall be informed of the proclamation of 
emergency made by the executive and that unless the approval 
by resolutions of both Houses is obtained within two months the 
declaration of emergency shall lapse."^^Provision is also made in 
the clause for the contingency of the Lx)k Sabha having been 
dissolved at the time of the proclamation or the dissolution of the 
House taking place within a period of two months provided in 
the clause for the approval of both the Houses. The Constitution 
says that if any proclamation is issued at a time when the Lok 
Sabha has been dissolved or dissolution of the House of people 
takes place during the period of two months, the ratification 
shall be done by the Rajya Sabha. However, the duration so 
extended by the Council of State runs at the most till the 
expiration of thirty days from the date on which the Lok Sabha 
first sits after its re-constitution unless before the expiration of 
the said period a resolution approving the proclamation has also 
been passed by the House of the people."^^ Therefore, the role of 
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Parliament, in continuing emergency beyond two months is 
crucial. Without such approval of Parliament, the Presidential 
proclamation under this Article would cease to exist after two 
months. Thus, the power of proclsdming the emergency is vested 
solely in the executive, the crucial decision about it is to be 
taken by the Parliament by its approval or disapproval within 
two months. The President's decision is only temporary, destined 
to lapse unless Parliament wills otherwise. This position has 
been justified in the Bommai case. This is an important 
safeguard in the Constitution against an arbitrary exercise of 
Presidential powers. The scrutiny of the proclamation is, 
therefore, designed to test the validity or propriety of the 
proclamation of emergency. If the Parliament finds that the 
declaration is not proper or is not called for, it can refuse its 
approval. Parliament is also closely and intimately involved in 
the extension of Presidents rule in the State. Once approved by 
the Parliament, it shall remain in force for a period of six 
months. If the government desires to extend it further, the 
executive is bound to bring the matter again before the 
Parliament and get an extension for a further period of six 
months.'^'* xhe maximum period for which the President's rule in 
any State may continue is three years. However, as a result of 
the 44th amendment Act, continuation of such rule beyond the 
period of one year from the date of the issue of the proclamation 
is dependent on two factors :-
• A proclamation of emergency under Article 352 is in 
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operation at the time of passing such proclamation; 
and 
• The Election Commission certifies that the 
continuance in force of the proclamation is necessary 
on account of difficulties in holding election to the 
Assemblies of the State concerned. As a result of this 
amendment, ordinarily the duration of President's 
rule in any State will be only one year. Under 
exceptional circumstances, the period may be 
extended. Only in rare cases, both the conditions 
would be fulfilled. 
It was also because of these and thus conditions the 
48th, es^d, 64th, 67th, and 68th Amendment, Acts were passed to 
continue President's rule in Punjab beyond the period of one 
year to face the challenges opened up by the Akali agitation. The 
Sarkaria Commission also reconlmended that in clause (5) of 
Article 356, the word "and" occurring between sub clause (a) and 
(b) should be substituted by "or" so that if either condition is 
satisfied, the proclamation can continue in force beyond one 
year. The envisaged role of Parliament introduces a very 
important constitutional and safeguard against the abuse of 
power. The virtual suppression of the State government and 
State legislature, which results from a declaration under this 
Article, beyond the initial time limit can be operative only after 
the approval of both House of Parliament. Rajya Sabha being a 
representative of the State and the Lok sabha being also 
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comprised of member's drawn from all the States, the 
requirement of their approval for the continuance of the 
proclamation of emergency is likely to operate as a powerful 
check against the capricious authority of the President.'^s 
The efficacy of this Parlismientary safeguard to prevent the 
abuse and misuse of this "tremendous power" with imrtiense 
potential was discussed and debated by the founding fathers in 
the Constituent Assembly.'^^Ultimately, however, the framers in 
their collective wisdom were itnmensely satisfied with the 
Parliamentary "check" mechanism devised by them and As such 
did not provide for any alternative safeguard of direct nature. 
The safeguards associated with Article 356 seems to be 
fairly ineffective, a close perusal of the actual working of the 
Parliamentary control mechanism for the last fifty years has 
clearly showti that the Parliament is quite ineffective iti 
controlling the arbitrary exercise of this power. The provision has 
often becotne edentate in the hands of unscrupulous politicians. 
The constitutional fathers while providing for the mechanism of 
control could not have thought of such a contingency. If the 
Indian Parliament appears to have failed to act as a powerful 
restraint upon the arbitrary exercise of this power, then what are 
the reasons for it? It is mainly on account of two factors. These 
are as:-
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Constitutional Lacunae in Article 356: 
The constitutional provisions bring to light the fact that the 
provisions itself gives room for the executive to bypass the 
Parliamentary control. First of all, unlike some other democratic 
Countries of the world the prior approval of the Parliament or any 
of its Houses is not required for the issuance of a proclamation 
under Article 356 of the Constitution. The President is given the 
full liberty and authority to issue a proclamation even when the 
Parliament is in session. The constitutional provision in Article 
356 (3) is very clear in that respect. What the Constitution 
requires is that as a matter of course both Houses of Parlianient 
should approve it within two months. Ih the same way there is 
no obligation on the Union government under the Constitution to 
lay the proclamation on the table of the House on the very first 
day provided the Parliament is in sessidn.'*'^ Since the decision to 
invoke Article 356 in a State has got for reaching consequence 
and puts in abeyance the democratic rights of the people even if 
it is only for a short period, it is submitted that the Parliament 
should be appraised of it at the very earliest possible 
opportunity. Our governments have often been guilty of wilfully 
withholding this vital information from the Parliament with 
ulterior motives. Therefore, it should be made statutory that the 
report on the introduction of President's rule in a State should 
be tabled in Parliament on the very first day itself if the 
Parliament is in session, or on the first day of the next session, if 
it is not in session. 
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Another weakness is that the constitutional provisions 
conferring power of approval on Parliament do not confer power 
to invalidate a proclamation if the Parliament wills otherwise. 
The proclamation in any case, is valid for an initial period of two 
months as per the constitutional provisions and it is so 
irrespective of its approval or disapproval by the two Houses of 
Parliament. Its life for a period of two months cannot be cut 
short by the Parliament. The approval of Parliament merely gives 
the proclamation further lease of life for six months. 48 
The third reason why political control by Parliament can 
become ineffective is that disapproval of proclamation does not 
make it unconstitutional since its inception. Article 356 (3) 
makes it clear that / the only effect of either House failing or 
refusing to approve the proclamation is that it ceases to operate 
after two months. This clearly means that it has been operative 
up to that time. Consequently, every act done, order made and 
laws passed by the government till the time the proclamation is 
disapproval will be quite legal and proper. That is, it cannot 
question, what has been done in the interim between the time 
when President's rule is declared and when Parliament refuses 
to ratify the proclamation. They are, however, subject to review, 
repeal or modification by the government /Legislative Assembly 
or other competent authority. This is a lot more significant than 
it would appear. This constitutional provision has been used by 
the Union government on many occasions since the inception of 
the Constitution for some short-term purpose, politically 
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significant and vital for the ruling party at the Centre and its 
counterparts in the State and unfavourable to the oppositions^. 
Furthermore, Parliamentary control has also been 
overcome by way of reissuing of the proclamation. The Central 
government which becomes shy of facing the Parliament on the 
issue of President's rule revokes the proclamation within thfe 
stipulated time of two months and issues a fresh one in its place. 
This may happen when the proclamation issued is revoked 
within two months and during that period the Parliament may 
not be in session. Another strategy is to allow the proclamation 
to lapse under Article 356 (3) by not placing it on the table of 
Parliament and issue a fresh one. Besides this, in some case 
when the proclamation was about to expire after six months of 
Parliamentary approval, they were revoked and fresh 
proclamations Wbre issued. 
The strategy applied by the Centre to circumvent the 
constitutional prbvision testifies to the fact that the 
Parliamentary apjjroval can be conveniently avoided. In reissuing 
the proclamation the government has used this power in the 
same way as it has issued and reissued ordinances. This 
practice indicates the fact that this controlling mechanism as 
envisaged by the Constitution becomes either meaningless or 
redundant. 
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The limitation imposed by the working of the 
Parliamentary system: 
Closely allied with these constitutional loopholes are other 
factors inherent in the theory and practice of Parliamentary 
democracy which enable the Union executive to lighten or evien 
nullify Parliamentary safeguards as envisaged in the 
Constitution. The major fact is that in a Parliamentary system 
any government is normally drawn from the political party or 
parties which have secured a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha. 
Our electoral system also ensures that the leading party in the 
Lok Sabha gets a majority of seats even on a minority of popular 
votes. This majority of seats in the Lok Sabha comes to the help 
of the Central government in garnering enough support for the 
proclamation. Under such circumstances, it is "unrealistic to 
rely on the government controlled majority in the Legislature to 
exercise effective supervision over that same government in its 
use of emergency power".so 
The most important occasion when the Legislature can 
exercise its power of control over the executive is when it is 
placed for discussion and approval. Unfortunately, as the 
imposition of Article 356 is a political move, the discussion in the 
Houses also is, understandably, charged with political overtones, 
being on party lines. Since the ruling party being safe behind its 
majority in the House, the debate which generally continues for 
a day or two or only minutes ends with the expected 
endorsement of government's action. The legislators of the party 
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in power, even if they do not agree with the government, do not 
oppose it in Parliament because of the fear of the party Whip. It 
might, therefore, be argued that Parliamentary control over the 
executive has, for all practical purpose, come to mean control by 
political parties. Thus Parliament in general and Member of 
Parliaments (MPs) in particular are powerless in the party 
machine, and the government control of the Parliament is 
absolute^i. Further, the debate usually suffers from serious 
drawbacks regarding fairness, reasoning and objectivity. 
Conclusions on a particular proclamation are drawn well in 
advance on khown party lines, and to support such conclusions 
arguments arfe put forth. In other words, participants and people 
are well aware of what a particular member is going to speak. 
Infact, such party positions are made clear to the media even 
before the actual debates start in Parliament. 
The legislature is charged with final authority to decide the 
validity or othetwise of the proclamation under Article 356, thfe 
executive branch is supported in the Legislature by a solid and 
disciplined party majority. In such instances, it is hardly 
practicable to look to the legislature for an independent check. 
The absence of a strong opposition further aggravates the 
issues.52 The dominating position of the Congress party in both 
Houses of Parliament in the first five Lok Sabha made the 
opposition totally irrelevant in the Parliamentary process. Today 
the nature and strength of the opposition groups in the Indian 
Parliament is such that they cannot play on all occasions an 
effective role of controlling the executive in this regard. This is 
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particularly so because the opposition consists of diametrically 
opposite political trends. When highly important matters with far 
reaching implications are brought before Parliament, some 
parties seek to build pressure on the government to move 
rightward, some seek to exert the same on the government to 
move leftward. Thus the major reason for the indiscriminate, 
arbitrary use of Article 356 by the ruling party at the Centre in 
its favour has been the weak position of the parties in the 
opposition and their inability to mobilize cross sectional support 
so as to prevail upon the Central government to go slow in 
imposing President's rule. Another important reason why 
Parliament is much weaker and much less effective in exercising 
control is that the Parliament is being denied vital information 
about a particular President's rule. In the absence of the relevant 
information how can Parliament approve or disapprove of the 
action of the President? It is essential that the Parliament should 
be fully apprised of the reasons and circumstances which 
influenced the President's decisioh to impose President's rule in 
a State. 
The positive aspects of Parliamentary check: 
The various factors are at work in Indian polity to minimize 
effective Parliamentary control over the proclamation of 
emergency under Article 356. Nonetheless, the Parliament can 
still act as a brake on the wheels of the government. The 
Parliament's contribution in this regard may be discussed under 
three heads ,firstly, symbolic action consisting of individual 
members using various methods to express their disapproval, 
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secondly, anal5^ical assessment consisting of Parliament 
exposing the root cause for the successive imposition of 
President's rule and finally, institutionalization of mechanisms of 
control consisting of creation of procedures and institutional 
methods by which Parliament can control the governance of the 
State during President's rule.^^ 
With regard to the first method, ministers can be 
interrogated during question hours and information can be 
extracted through questions about the reasons for the 
proclamation of President's rule. A skilful and determined 
member can use Parliamentary questions to extract much 
information or to conduct a campaign in favour or against a 
particular proclamation,as did Somnath Chatterjee over the 
Tamilnadu debate in 1991, and the George Fernandes in the 
Uttar Pradesh debate in 1996. 
The second method of analytical assessment involves 
Parliament exposing the root cause for the successive imposition 
of President's rule. The debates in the Parliament also providte 
occasion and opportunities to consider what exactly is wrong 
with the political system designed by the Constitution. In this 
context, several suggestions have come forth. In the Andhra 
Pradesh debate in 1954, A.K. Gopalan's opinion on what 
constitutes a 'constitutional crisis' was a valuable analysis^^. 
Similarly, in the Tamilnadu debate in 1991, Jaswant Singh's 
argument that before taking the "most extreme step of invoking 
Article 356", the Centre should take recourse to Article 256 
which empowered it to issue directive to "errant or defaulting 
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government not acting in consonance with the interest of the 
security of State or on an issue relating to national security"55 
was also an argument which could be accepted. By describing 
the Centre action in Tamilnadu in 1991 as "nothing but a 
travesty of constitutional morality, a blatant abuse of power, and 
deliberate decimation of the fundamental principles of 
federalism", Somnath Chatterjee, in a way summed up the 
feeling of major opposition parties. He said: The history of 
Article 356 in this country is a history of political and 
constitutional aberrations, and it is replete with instances of 
gross misuse by successive Congress governments. What is 
astounding is the brazen -facedness and the effrontery of this 
misuse the marriage of convenience between the Congress and 
this motley conglomerate called the Janata Dal (S) is producing 
monsters.s^The continuing unabated story of the misuse of the 
provision was pictured by George Fernandes in the Uttar 
Pradesh debate in 1996 he observed that the position is that 
starting from 1959 and during the great leadership of the 
Congress, of Shastri, Indira Gandhi by machinations of Centre 
and not because of any bonafide reasons, Aricle 356 had been 
used for political reasons and not for any administrative reasons. 
This is the experience of Article 356. It has been used 
indiscriminately against political opponents in West Bengal. We 
have been victims in Kerala, we have been victims in Orissa. 
Then people have been victims in U.P., Haryana and what not. In 
the Bihar debate in 1999, L.K. Advani, the Home Minister, 
agreed to the opposition view that breakdown of the law and 
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order or mere incompetence could not be niade the basis for 
dismissing a democratically elected government.^7 
A perusal of the old record shows that the issue has been 
debated in the Parliament, but it was not been successful so far 
in withholding approval to a proclamation, which is illegitimate 
or at least of doubtful legitimacy. This may be the product of 
Parliamentary helplessness in the face of strong, impregnable 
majorities in the Centre. However, an analytical assessnient of 
this kihd helps a responsible government to understand the 
public opinion in this regard. 
The third, reason is the institutionalization of the 
mechanisms of control, a large number of suggestions have been 
made about how President's rule can be avoided, and if imposed, 
controlled effectively. Parliament's most effective contribution in 
this regard was the Constitution of Committees of Member of 
Parliaments (MPs) to monitor the working of the President's rulfe 
in the State. The ideas was first mooted in the I^injab debate 
and it was incorporated in the PEPSU Legislation ( delegation of 
powers) Act, 1953 when a Committee of Parliamentarians drawn 
from both the Houses and the State concerned was formed. 
Inevitability, the Constitution of the Committee was altered so as 
to include member of Parliaments, other than those from, the 
concerned State. During the Orissa proclamation, the mandatory 
inclusion of members from the State concerned was also 
dropped and a plea was made for a Committee of Parliament 
taken as a whole.^s 
flfllStf 
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The Committee now ffeflects the size and shape, the 
political complexion of the Parliament itself. It is composed of 
various parties, and helps to cool down party spirit by promoting 
a strong corporate sense. This helps consideration of questions 
on their merit rather than on party line. 
The general trend of most debates was to treat institutional 
innovations with suspicion. This was understandable since 
various otherwise seemingly neutral institutions of the 
Constitution had, over the years been subjected to manijjulative 
use. The Committee was a useful suggestion. Its utility and 
efficacy has been diluted by the presence of the majority party's 
MPs and the fact that the Committee has been given a 
consultative role only. Therfe is little that members can do. t h e 
affairs of the Parliament are stage managed by those who have 
comfortable majorities in the Parliament. Debates on President's 
rule are not punctuated by a consistent intense concern. They 
merely fade in and fade out without any appreciable impact on 
the concerned State. 
Judicial Interpretation of Article 356: 
The Constitution of India right from its inauguration did 
not explicitly provide for not did it exclude judicial review of 
President's power under Article 356.59 The 38^ constitutional 
amendment enacted in the year 1975 placed the question of 
'satisfaction' of the President in declaring emergency beyond 
judicial scrutiny. It added a new clause (clause 5) to Article 356 
which read: 
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Not withstanding anything in this Constitution, the 
satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause (1) shall be final 
and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court of law. 
Thus, the amendment wanted to make sure 
constitutionally that the issue of legality of the proclamation of 
emergency was a political question^o and non-justifiable and 
hence beyond the purview of judicial scrutiny. The 1975 finality 
clause was done away with in the year 1978 through the 44*^ 
amendment by the Jana ta government under the Prime 
Ministership of Morarji Desai. So, after the 44* amendment the 
original position continues as regards the jurisdiction of the 
Court to judicially review this extraordinary power granted to the 
President under Article 356 of the Constitution of India. In State 
of Rajasthan V. Union of India the Supreme Court held: 
President's satisfaction would he open to judicial review only in 
those exceptional cases where on facts admitted or disclosed, it is 
manifest that it is malafide or is based on wholly extraneous or 
irrelevant ground^ ^ 
In Sunderlal Patwa V. Union of India^^ the Jabalpur bench 
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court struck down the imposition 
of President's rule in Madhya Pradesh in 1992 on the ground of 
malafide and ordered to revival of dissolved Assembly and 
reinstatement of the dismissed ministry. The appeal by the 
Union of India against the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment 
had led to the Constitution of a nine member constitutional 
bench to dispose the case. This constitutional bench of the 
Supreme Court in a unanimous judgment upheld the imposition 
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of President's rule in the three Bhartiya Janata Party ruled 
States of Madhya Pradesh, Himaehal Pradesh and Rajasthan.^3 
The Court did not, however, hold that the findings of the Madhya 
Pradesh High Court was erroneous. The Court referred three 
previous instances of President's rule in Nagaland (1988), in 
Kamatka (1989) and Meghalaya (1991) where the action taken 
by the President was unconstitutional but nothing could be done 
to undo what had already taken place. Thus the position is 
that the court declared in unequivocal terms that the 
satisfaction of the President under Article 356 is open to judicial 
review if it is malafide. The view that exercise of power under 
Article 356 is open to judicial review was first laid down by the 
Supreme Court in 1977 followed by the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court in 1993 and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1994 and 
the Allahabad High Court in 1997. The judiciary in India has, 
thus, adopted the substantive review approach rather than total 
ouster approach or jurisdiction approach on this issue.^^ 
The power to issue President's rule in the States has been 
challenged several times and the question of justifiability arose 
for consideration on many occasions: in the Kerala High Court 
(1965), in Punjab High Court (1968), in the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court (1974), in the Orissa High Court (1974) in the 
Supreme Court of India (1977), in Karnataka High Court 
(1989), in Guwahati High Court (1988 and 1991), in Madhya 
Pradesh High Court (1993), in the Supreme Court (1994), in 
the Allahabad High Court of Uttar Pradesh (1997).Some of the 
important and significant cases is given below briefly: 
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K.K. Aboo Vs Union oflndia:^^ 
The first case on the issue of President's rule in State was 
decided by the tCerala High Court a member of the newly elected 
Assembly i.e. K.A. Aboo challenged the 1965 imposition of 
President's rule in the High Court. His main contentions were, 
first, that the Governor was not empowered to make 
recommendation for the imposition of President's rule when the 
State was already under the rule of the President. His second 
argument was that Assembly could only be dissolved after it was 
assembled. This could have given Assembly an opportunity to 
find a solution to the problem. Thirdly, he argued that Governors 
action was malafide. 
Justice M. Madavan Nair adopted the first and second 
approached as discussed above and refused to go into the 
question of validity of the Presidential proclamation. The learned 
judge did not think that the Govfemor acted malafide because of 
the constitutional crisis was not created due to continuation of 
President's rule but as a result of absence of clear mandate. The 
argument of availability of new Assembly also did not find favour 
with the Court and the Court observed that Article 356 does not 
prescribe any condition for the exercise of powers there under by 
the President, except his satisfaction.^6 
State ofRajasthan Vs Union oflndia:^^ 
In the Parliamentaiy elections of March 1977 the ruling 
Congress party suffered a massive defeat in nine States viz, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
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Haryana, Orissa, Punjab, Raj as than and West Bengal. After the 
elections the Janata Party came to power at the Centre. On 17* 
April 1977 the Union Home Minister wrote a letter to the Chief 
Ministers of nine States asking them to advise their Governors to 
dissolve the respective Assemblies and seek fresh mandate. 
Further, the Union Law Minister in a broadcast said that the 
governments in the nine Congress ruled States had forfeited 
confidence of the electorate and that they seek the dissolution of 
the State Legislature and obtains a fresh mandate. Six of these 
nine States viz. Rajastahan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, 
Himachal Pradesh and Orissa in their writ petition to the 
Supreme Court submitted that the Home Minister's letter and 
radio broadcast of the Law Minister constituted a clear threat of 
dissolution of the Assemblies and disclosed grounds which are 
prima facie outside the purview of Article 356 Of the 
Constitution. The Court rejected the objections and held that 
the defeat of the ruling party in a State at the Lok Sabha 
elections cannot by itself, without anything more, support the 
interference that government of the State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with provisions of the Constitution. But the present 
situation was wholly different. It was not a case where just an 
ordinary defeat had been suffered by the ruling party in a State 
at the elections to the Lok Sabha but there has been a total rout 
of its candidates which reflected a will of estrangement and 
resentment and antipathy in the hearts of people against the 
government which may lead to instability and even the 
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administration may be paralyzed. Therefore, this ground was 
held to be clearly a relevant one. 
The Court rejected the contention that judicial review of 
Presidential proclamation was totally barred. Bhagwati and 
Gupta, J .J . hfeld that: "merely because a question of political 
complexion, that by itself is no ground why the court should 
shrink from performing its duty under the Constitution if it 
raises an issue of constitutional determitiation " merely 
because a question has a political colour, the Court cannot fold 
its haiid in despair and declare " judicial hand off. Further thfey 
formulated the scope of judicial review as follows.But one thing 
is certain that if the satisfaction is malafide or is based oh wholly 
extraneous and irrelevant grounds, the Court would have 
jurisdiction to examine it. The Court was of the view that the 
case did not fall within this exception. The observations made by 
the Court are of immense significance now. The above 
observations of the Supreme Court are of great importanbe. This 
case is significance not because the Court s verdict was any 
different from the earlier line of cases. Infact, the Court 
dismissed the case unanimously, but what is significant is the 
assertion of all the judges that a Presidential proclamation could 
be challenged if the exercise of power was "malafide" or on 
"constitutionally or legally prohibited" ground or for "extraneous 
or collateral purposes."68 
In A.K. Roy V Union of India a Constitution bench of the 
Supreme Court observed that after the deletion of clause (5) by 
the 44* Constitutional Amendment, which was in existence 
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when the Rajasthan case was decided "any observations made in 
the Rajasthan case on the basis of the clause cannot any longer 
hold good". 
After the Rajasthan case the question of judicial review of 
Presidential proclamation under Articlte 356 arose for 
consideration in the Gauhati and Karnatka High Courts. 
President's rule was imposed in Nagaiand on 7^ August 1988 
when eight month old Congress ministry headed by Hokisha 
Sema was reduced to a minority due to defections. Thete was a 
difference of opinion between Chief justice Raghaur and Justice 
Hansaria. The former held that the Union of India cannot be 
compelled to tender any information to the Court because of 
Article 74 of the Constitution. On the other hand, Justice 
Hansaria held that as the material which formed part of "other 
information" was not before the Court and as the same did not 
form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers 
under Article 74(1), Union of India should be given an 
opportunity to disclose the information to the Court . Justice 
Hansaria ruled that should the Union of India fail to give the 
"other information" the Court would have no alternative but to 
decide the matter on the basis of the matter placed before it. 
Sunderlal Patwa Vs Union oflndia^^: 
After the demolition of the Babri Pasjid at Ayodhya, 
President's rule was imposed in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan. Imposition of President's rule 
in Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan was 
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challenged in the respective High Courts. The High Court of 
Madhya Pradesh departed from the earlier decisions and held 
that the Presidential proclamation is open to judicial review on 
the ground of illegality, irrationality, impropriety or malafide or 
in short, on the ground of abuse of power. The Court has 
clearly held in the instant case that there was no material to 
infer that the State government could not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution or that the 
constitutional machinery had failed. Therefore the Court ordered 
to restore the dismissed ministry as also the dissolve Assembly. 
The judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court is a "significant 
milestone in legal history" since it is the first case where the 
Court struck down a Presidential proclamation as 
unconstitutional, •^o 
S.J?. Bommai Vs Union of India: ^^ 
In the Supreme Court the Bommai case was heard by a nine 
members constitutional bench. The conclusions of the judgment 
are as follows: 
• The validity of proclamation issued by the President 
under Article 356 (1) is judicially reviewable to the 
extent of examining whether it was issued on the 
basis of any material at all or whether the material 
was relevant or whether the proclamation was issued 
in the malafide exercise of the power. When a prime 
facie case is made out in the challenge to the 
Proclamation, the burden is on the Union government 
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to prove that the relevant material did in fact exist. 
Such material may be either the report of the 
Governor or other than the report. 
• Article 72(2) is not a bar against the scrutiny of the 
material on the basis of which the President had 
arrived at his satisfaction. 
• When the President issues proclamation under 
Article 356 (1), he may exercise all or any of the 
powers under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. It is 
for him to decide which of the said powers he will 
exercise, and at what stage, taking into consideration 
the exigencies of the situation. 
• Since the provisions contained in clause (3) of Article 
356 are intended to be a check on the powers of the 
President under clause (1) thereof, it will not be 
permissible for the President to exercise powers 
under sub-clause (a) ,(b) and (c) of the latter clause, 
to take irreversible actions till at least both of the 
Houses of Parliament have approved of the 
proclamation. It is for this reason that the President 
will not be justified in dissolving the Legislative 
Assembly by using the powers of the Governor under 
Article 356 (1) (a) till at least both the Houses of 
Parliament approve of the proclamation. 
• If the proclamation is issued is held invalid then 
notwithstanding the fact that it is approved by both 
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Houses of Parliament, It will be open to the Court to 
restore the status quo ante to the issuance of the 
proclamation and hence to restore the Legislative 
Assembly and the ministry. 
• In appropriate cases, the Court will have power by an 
interim injunction, to restrain the holding of fresh 
elections to the Legislative Assembly pending the final 
disposal of the challenge to the validity of the 
proclamation to avoid the fait accompli and the 
remedy of judicial review being rendered fruitless. 
However, the Court will not interdict the issuance of 
the ptoclamsltion Or the exercise of any other power 
under the proclamation. 
• While restoring the status quo ante , it will be open 
for the Court to mduld the relief suitably and declare 
as valid actions taken by the President till that date. 
It will also be open for the Parliament and the 
Legislature of the State to validate the said actions of 
the President. 
• Secularism is a part of the basic structure of the 
Constitution. The acts of a State government which 
are calculated to subvert or sabotage secularism as 
enshrined in our Constitution, can lawfully be 
deemed to give rise to a situation in which the 
government of the State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
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Thus to conclude it may be said that the general 
principles and guidelines which have been laid down by the 
Supreme Court in this case will help to strengthen national 
unity and integrity, to sharply limit the constitutional power 
vested in the Central government to dismiss state 
governments and to prevent the arbitrary and whimsical 
use of power of the Governors in the name of exercising their 
discretionary powers conferred by the Constitution and 
conventions. The most remarkable contribution of the verdict 
is the giftirmation that secularism being one of the basic features 
of the Constitution, any State government pursuing unsecular 
policies would be acting contrary to the constitutional mandate 
rendering itself amenable to action under Article 356. No doubt, 
it sets an example and warning to the religion oriented political 
parties to go slow in intrdducing religious fundamentalist 
tendencies in politics for goihg gtound. It is, indeed a new 
precedent set by the Supfeitife Court which could checkmate the 
ugly fundamentalist tendenbifes in the country. The verdic t i s , 
thus, strong, sound, well founded, cogent and pays due regard to 
the principles of federalism and secularism as enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
In 1996 when elections were held to the Uttar 
Pradesh (U.P.) Legislative Assembly no party secured a 
majority to form the government. So President's rule was 
imposed in the State and this proclamation was subsequently 
approved by the Parliament. Against this imposition of 
President's rule five petitions were filed in the Allahabad High 
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Court. A two member bench delivered a split verdict on 11 
November 1996 necessitating the referring of the matter to a 
three member bench. The Court unanimously held that the 
impugned presidential proclamation dated 17^ October 1996 
reimposing. President's rule in U.P and subsequently approved 
by Parliament was unconstitutional, issued in colorable 
exercise of power and was based on wholly irrelevant and 
extraneous grounds and therefore, could not be allowed to 
stand. Consequently the proclamation was quashed72. 
However, to avoid any crisis as a result to the quashing of the 
aforesaid proclamation, the Court, by applying the doctrine of 
prospective overruling, directed that the judgment shall come 
into operatioti only after the prenounced date for the 
resumption of political process in the State. 
Even though the vterdict quashing the Presidential 
proclamation was unanimous, the three judges cited 
different reasons in their respective judgments. B. M. Lai, J. 
observed that the Governor of U.P. was constitutionally not 
bound to invite the single largest party to form a government, 
in case; it did not have the confidence of the House. But at the 
same time he was constitutionally bound and obliged to 
explore all possibilities'^s. 
B. Brajesh Kumar J. ruled that there is neither any 
convention, nor any constitutional provision under which the 
leader of largest single party, not in majority, must be called to 
form the government except where the Governor was satisfied 
that it would have the support of any other party in minority 
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and would enjoy the confidence of the House. He said that the 
period of President's rule could not be extended beyond one 
year except in the situation prevailing under Article 356 (5) of 
the Constitution and concluded that the re-imposition of 
President's rule on 19th October 1996 was not a fresh 
proclamation but rather an extension of a proclamation that 
was already a year old. The Supreme Court on December 20^^, 
1996 stayed the High Court ruling and directed the Union 
government and the Governor to take measures that would enable 
the continuity of political process in the State.The Allahabad 
High Court vetdict generated enormous political interest and 
constitutional debate in the country. The verdict had drawn 
attention to fcertain fundamental (Questions involving the 
nature and functioning of federal system in India and its 
constitutional basis, in view of the exercise of Article 356 and 
the power of the Governor and the union government to use it 
in what way. No doubt' thfe judgtnent would pave the way for 
more cordial ahd fruitful relatiottship between the Centre and 
the States. 
Recently, in 2005 when elections were held to the Bihar 
Legislative Assembly no party secured a majority to form 
the government. So, President's rule was imposed in the State 
and this proclamation was subsequently approved by the 
Parliament. 
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The positions of the parties were as given below: 
Parties 
Jan ta Dal (U) + 
Jan ta Dal (U) 
Bhartiya Jan ta Party 
(B.J.P.) 
Rashtriya Jan ta Dal 
(R.J.D.)+ 
Rashtriya Jan ta Dal R.J.D. 
Communist Party of India 
CPI, CPM 
Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) 
Congress 
Others 
Total seats (243) 
93 
54 
39 
77 
73 
4 
40 
10 
33 
The reason for imposition of President's rule was no party 
or coalition has the numbers to form government. This is despite 
JD (U) claiming enough support to form the government. The 
Governor defends dissolution says the State was witnessing, 
"horse trading of the worst kind". Therefore no stable 
government possible. Parties like Laloo's RJD support him while 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) takes the issue to the 
President. The Supreme Court seeks the appearance of Attorney-
General or any Law officer nominated by the Attorney General 
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for a petition filed by former legislators of Bihar challenging the 
decision to dissolve the State Assembly. The Supreme Court on 
Janusiry 2006, indicated that the Bihar Governor Buta Singh 
has mislead the Centre in recommending the dissolution of the 
Bihar Assembly in May 2005 and said the Union Council of 
Ministers should have verified his report before accepting it is 
gospel truth.7"* 
The Court, which in its October 7, 2005 interim order has 
said the dissolution was unconstitutional, and said that the 
Governor acted in "undue haste" in sending his report and his 
motive was to prevent the JD (U) from staking claim to form a 
government in Bihar after a fractured assembly polls verdicts j s 
Giving reason why the dissolution was unconstitutional, a five 
judge bench, in a 3:2 judgment said the Governor misled the 
Council of Ministers by sending a report curtaining 
"unascertained facts". The majority judgment was passed by 
Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and two other judges, Justice B.N. 
Agarwal and Ashok Bhan. The minority view was taken by 
Justice K.G. Balakrishnan and Justice Arijit Passayat. The 
bench said the Governor's report contained "fanciful 
assumptions", which could be destructive to democracy. Terming 
is action as "drastic and extreme", the bench said the Court 
cannot be a silent spectator to such subversion of the 
Constitution".76 
The Court said time has come to consider a national policy 
outlining common norms for appointment of Governors, which 
would be acceptable to all political parties. It held that the 
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Governor enjoyed complete immunity and is not answerable in 
exercise of constitutional power but Article 361 does not take 
away from the Court the power to deal with the validity of his 
action. The Governor had recommended the dissolution amid 
allegation that he prevented the NDA, which was on the verge of 
cobbling a majority with a breakaway group of Ram Vilas 
Paswan's LJP and few independents from forming the 
government. The bench said the provisions of the 10 schedule of 
the Constitution were not relevant at the time when the 
Governor had sent his report to the Centre. That was fully an 
unconstitutional act. The issue of defection has to be dealt in 
accordance with the law as no such power is give to the 
Governor. If such a power is given to a Governor, it would be 
horrendous. 
The Supreme Court reiterated the recommendation of the 
Sarkaria Commission regarding the appointment of the 
Governors according to which only an eminent person free from 
political affiliation should be appointed to the constitutional 
post. Thus, the cases given above it comes onto broad relief that 
inspite of constitutional stipulations and the Supreme Court 
judgment imposing many curbs against misuse of the power yet 
the same game of running with the hare and hunting with the 
hound is going on. 
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The office of the Governor is not only important for the 
federation but also for the success of the democratic system of 
the government in the country. After along debate in the 
Constituent Assembly it was decided to give much power to the 
Governor to maintain the unity of India. Since the creation of the 
office of the Governor in the Indian federal system the office has 
remained a controversial one. The institution of the Governor 
was misused to a great extent especially after 1971 to gain 
political mileage because of two reasons, firstly, then was one 
party dominance at the Centre and the secondly the lack of 
political power amd awareness on the part of the opposition. The 
President shall appoint the Governor of State by warrant under 
his hand and seal. He is removable by the same authority. But 
in actual practice he is appointed by the cabinet, which means 
by the party in power at the Centre. But two conventions have 
generally come to govern his nomination. One the Central 
government ordinarily consults the State concerned before 
announcing the name of Governor of the State. It is a sound 
practice though it has been flouted on several occasions. For 
instance the appointment of the West Bengal Governor Dharam 
Vira against the wishes of the Chief Minister. In Bihar the 
controversy arose when M.P. Sinha, the Chief Minister, protested 
against the appointment of Nityanand Kanurgo as the Governor. 
The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh protested when Ramesh 
Bhandri was appointed Governor in the State. Jayalalitha 
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strongly opposed the appointment of S.S. Barnla in 2004 as 
Governor of Tamil Nadu. 
Another convention is that the incumbent of this office 
comes from outside the State concerned. This again is a 
wholesome arrangement, because such an incumbent does not 
have his local political roots and affiliations and would thus be 
free from State level party politics. But this convention has also 
violated in some cases, for instance in the appointment of Vjjal 
Singh in Punjab, Karan Singh in Kashmir, H.C Mukherjee in 
West Bengal and Vesentdade Patil in Maharashtra. 
National Commission to Review the Working of the Indian 
Constitution under the Chairmanship of Justice N.M. 
Venkatachalaiha recommended that a Committee consisting of 
the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and Speaker of the Lok 
Sabha and the Chief Minister of the concerned State should 
select the Governor instead of confidential and informal 
consultation. It is better that the process of selection is 
transparent and unambiguous. It is advisable to consult the 
Chief Minister but his advice should not be binding upon the 
President while the appointment of the Governor and also the 
President should not act a tool in the hands of the Union 
government. But the President should see that the merit of the 
candidates should be principle criteria. The Governors should be 
honest, intelligent, more energetic knowledgeable, dynamic and 
independent persons and they should be in the position to 
defend, protect and safeguard the Constitution for which they 
take an oath. 
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The Governor of a State is the constitutional head of the 
State. The Constitution provides the Council of Ministers with a 
Chief Minister to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of 
his functions. As the head of the State the Governor has right to 
appoint Chief Minister. But the matter of appointment of the 
Chief Minister may appear to be simple under normal 
circumstances but assumes great significance at certain other 
times. Various political scenarios might be present themselves 
before the Governor and depending upon the situation, he has 
either to act strictly according to the provisions of the 
Constitution or use his discretion. When a single parly secures 
an absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly after the 
election the task of the Governor in the appointment of Chief 
Minister is simple. He has no alternative but to call the leader of 
the majority party to form the ministry. The task of the Governor 
somewhat complicated when no single party secures a majority 
in the State Assembly. Here, the Governor has to appoint the 
Chief Minister at his discretion, and the exercise of his discretion 
cannot be called in question in writ proceedings. The criterion 
that influences the decision of the Governor in such situation is 
that the person so chosen should, in his opinion, be in a position 
to mobilize majority support in the Assembly. 
In Haryana after the 1982 election the Congress could 
muster the support of 42 Members of Legislative Assemblies 
(MLAs) in the House of 90. Devi Lai, leader of the combined 
opposition, with the strength of 45 MLAs staked his claim to 
form the government. Haryana Governor G.D Tapase invited him 
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to the Raj Bhawan to prove his claim in two days. Bhajan Lai, 
leader of Congress party, claimed that he should be given the 
first chance to prove his majority as the Congress was the single 
largest party in the House. Surprisingly, Governor Tapase 
administered the oath of office to Bajan Lai as the Chief Minister 
without even waiting for Devi Lai. The Governor also gave one 
month time to Bhajan Lai to prove his majority. 
Priority of single largest party, over post-election alliance is 
a straight forward convention supported by Sarkaria 
Commission but it has often been disregarded. In Uttar Pradesh 
(U.P.) in 1996, after the election, no political party could get clear 
majority in the 425 members Assembly. Bharatiya Jan ta Party 
(BJP) emerged as the single largest party with 176 seats. Romesh 
Bhandari the Governor of U.P, refused to invite Kalyan Singh, 
the leader of BJP to form the government. The Governor wanted 
full satisfaction to the effect that a stable government could be 
formed in the State. It was only in March 1997, the Governor 
invited Mayawati leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party and the BJP 
combine, to form the government. Such incidences did shake the 
people's faith in democratic institution. 
In 2005 the Jharkhand episode brought to the forefront the 
exceptionally important role that has to be played by a Governor 
when election results do not throw-up a clear winner. The 
Jharkhand, Governor Syed Sibtey Razi invited Shibu Soren to 
form a government when he was not the head of single largest 
party and gave him three weeks to demonstrate his majority. The 
Sarkaria Commission has recommended that in States, where 
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there is no clear majority with any single party, the Governor 
should invited leader of the alliance of parties that was formisd 
before the election. Thereafter, chance should be given to single 
largest party staking claim to form the government with thb 
support of other parties and independents. Next in order should 
be the leader of the post-election alliance of parties claiming 
support of other parties joining the government and some 
supporting it from outside without joining the government 
should be given the chance. The Governor Committee (1971) has 
recommended that even the leader of the party in a minority may 
be invited to form the government provided the Governor is 
satisfied that such a leader would be able to command the 
support of other parties in the Assembly for its policies. 
The unlimited discretionary powers of Governor vested in 
him need to the curtailed because these had made him to 
indulge into exercises not squaring up the norms of the 
Parliamentary system, without any remedy against such 
exercises. This point of pin-pointing his discretionary powers 
was raised in the Constituent Assembly and then though 
Dr.Ambedkar had agreed with the suggestion yet had expressed 
his inability to do so because, at that point of formulation of the 
Constitution, he did not know as to which powers should be 
vested in his discretion and which not. But looking at the 
reasonableness of demand he had assured the House that at an 
appropriate time this point could be raised and he would look 
into it. Since the members forgot to raise the point at an 
appropriate stage, the much desired limitations on his 
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discretionary power could not be imposed, and the provision as 
it was then conceived went on the statute-book. Since the 
unlimited discretionary powers have proved a bane of the Indian 
Constitution manifesting in complete subversion of federal 
parliamentary ethos, it is called forth that his discretionary 
powers should be stated in specific terms. 
According to the scheme of the Constitution the Governor 
discretionary powers should extent to recommending the 
President for taking action under Article 356 £ind also reserving 
the Bills, passed by State Legislature for his disposal. Other 
powers to be exercised by him, of the nature of political pohcies, 
should be exercised on the aid and advice of his Council of 
Ministers and the prerogatives in his best judgment according to 
the established norms of the Parliamentary system. In the light 
of the above Article 163 should be amended. 
As the head of the State, the Governor is also the ex- officio 
Chancellor of the State Universities and in his capacity he 
should be free to exercise his own judgment and shall not be 
bound to accept the advice of the Council of Ministers. In this 
way the educational institution of such a high level can be saved 
from dirty politics. 
The Governor like President of India has also power to 
grant pardon, reprieves, respites, and remissions of punishment 
or suspended remit or commute the sentence of any person 
convicted under any law. But this power should be exercised 
with full care and when the matter is sub-judice the Governor 
should desist from taking action under Article 161 of the 
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Constitution to avoid a conflict between the executive and 
judiciary. The one of the directive that the power of pardon 
should not be consideration of religion, caste or political 
expediency. The Governor as a component part of the State 
Legislature has power to summon the Assembly. The directive of 
the Governor in the respect of summoning of the Assembly 
should not be ignored especially when a doubt arises about the 
strength of the Legislators backing the ministry. An alternative 
method which can be used to solve this problem is that if a 
majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly express 
their desire in writing with view to calling the Assembly, the 
Chief Minister should not be shy of it. In order to avoid recurring 
confusion is should be made obligatory through a constitutional 
amendments whenever, there is only doubt about the strength of 
the ministry, the Chief Minister must agree to the summoning of 
the Assembly by the Governor. In this way the crisis may be 
avoided. If the Chief Minister refuses that he has lost support of 
the majority the Governor will be entirely justified in dismissing 
such a ministry. In Kamataka Devraj Urs government was 
dismissed in 1977 on the suspicion by the Governor, that he had 
ceased to command a majority support as a result of defection in 
spite of the fact that the Assembly was under summons and was 
going to meet within three days, was it not the duty of the 
Governor to put his doubt to test in the appropriate forum? 
What it competent on the part of the Governor, acting from the 
position of a constitutional head to take such a drastic action as 
dismissed without an adverse verdict given by the Assembly? If 
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the Governor's conduct in the whole exercise is examined from 
the norms of the Parliamentary system it is difficult to appreciate 
the fact that throughout he had been playing politics and in the 
Constitution was violated in most blatant manner. 
The Governor in his capacity as the head of the State has 
right to Address the Joint session of the State Legislature. In the 
normal circumstances the Governor has to read the Address 
prepared by the Council of Ministers in which a detailed 
description of policies and programme of the government is 
given. Since independence this right became the subject of the 
controversy. The West Bengal Governor Dharma Vira in 1969 
refused to read some portions which were derogatory to his 
position and the Governor of Punjab D.C. Pavate had underwent 
a similar experience in 1969. His address contained an 
objectionable paragraph concerning the toppling of previous 
government of Gumam Singh in Punjab in 1968. Dr. D.C. Pavate 
read the full Address including those portions which designated 
his past actions. The question if the address is an expression of 
the views of the government and not of the Governor, the former 
should not transgress its authority and condemn the Governor 
and the Central government. To avoid such controversies, the 
text of Address should be prepared with full care and it should 
be the moral duty of the ministry not to include anything which 
is against the Governor past actions. 
Normally, in the discharge of the functions under Article 
200, the Governor must abide by the advice of his Council of 
Ministers. Article 200 does not invest in the Governor, expressly 
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or by necessary implication witJi a general discretion in the 
performance of his functions there under, including reservation 
of Bills for the consideration of the President. However, in rare 
and exceptionally cases, he may act in exercise of his discretion, 
where he is of the opinion that the provisions of the Bill are 
patently unconstitutional, such as , where the subject-matter of 
the Bill is ex-facie beyond the Legislative competence of the State 
Legislature, or where its provisions manifestly derogate from the 
scheme and framework of the Constitution so as to endanger 
the sovereignty, unity and integrity of the nation, or clearly 
violate Fundamental Rights or transgress other constitutional 
limitations and provisions. In this connection it is to be noted 
that the Governor of Kerala B.Rama Krishna Rao, reserved the 
Kerala Education Bill, 1957 for consideration of President when 
he himself satisfied that the Bill would fall contrary to provisions 
of the constitutional law. The Governor of Madhya Pradesh also 
reserved the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Bill, 1960 for 
consideration of the President because the system of nomination 
as referred under Article 106 of the Bill was a negation to the 
concept of Panchayat Raj under the Directive Principle of State 
Policy. In dealing with a State Bill presented to the Governor 
under Article 200, he should not act contrary to the advice of his 
Council of Ministers only because, personally he does not like 
the policy embodied in the Bill. 
An indept and careful analysis of the application of Article 
356 brings to light that the provision had not been used 
rationally for the purpose for which it was incorporated. The 
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wishes of the patriarch of the Constitution during the debates in 
the Constituent Assembly have also not been understood 
property while invoking the Article. It has been used as an 
instrument of political management in favour of the ruling party 
at the Centre. The strange thing is that Article 356 has been 
used just as a daily diet, despite the fact that this is meant 
mainly for emergency. Since the inauguration of the Constitution 
in 1950, President's rule was proclaimed more than hundred 
times. It may be stated that on most of the time, there was no 
justification for invoking Article 356. 
In order to prevent the misuse of power, the Constitution 
has incorporated certain safeguarding mechanism. The greatest 
safeguard against any unjustifiable imposition is the President of 
India himself. It is true that no such express power is conferred 
on the President. However the President is duty bound to ask the 
cabinet to reconsider its suggestion if he disagrees with it, and 
ask for information or refuse to sign the proclamation. If he is 
insufficiently informed. Of Course, it is open to the cabinet to 
reject the advice and sent back the proposal, in which case, the 
President is constitutionally bound to give his assent. Further, 
we should not forget that the President is also, in fact, part and 
parcel of the executive system and also the party system. In this 
context, it would not be realistic to except that his decisions will 
always be fool proof. 
The framer of the Constitution has respond immense faith 
in the Parliamentary control mechanism devised by them to 
prevent the abuse of the Article 356. The control mechanism 
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through the political process was envisaged keeping in view the 
salient features of democracy. However, in practice, 
Parliamentary check over the abuse of power is minimal and 
ineffective. So far no Presidential proclamation has been voted 
down by thfe t*arliament. However, if the ruling party has no clear 
majority in both the Houses of Parliament, the picture would be 
different. It was because of the lack of majority in the Rajya 
Sabha that Union government was forced to revoke the 
proclamation relating to President's rule in Bihar in 1999. The 
Parliamentary Control mechanism of Article 356 is effective, if 
the members of the Parliament irrespective of their party 
affiliation should be allowed to vote freely according to their 
conscience. The Parliamentary control mechanism as provided 
by the Constitution is also affected by the inadequacy of time. 
We need indepth discussions on this issue. Unfortunately a new 
trend has developed in our Parliament, by which the time 
available fot- discussion on issue becomes very limited. With the 
increasing frequency of imposition of President's rule it is 
suggested that the time limit for discussion should be increased. 
The judiciary, which was initially reluctant to interfere in 
and to review the exercise of power under Article 356, asserted 
its power to do so in 1977 in the Rajasthan case. Thereafter the 
impression was that the 1977 judgment would remain a mere 
symbolic assertion of judicial power. But this was shattered in 
1993 when the Madhya Pradesh High Court invalidated the 
proclamation of the President dismissing Sunderlal Patwa 
ministry under Article 356. The Bommai case, the Supreme 
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Court went further and more emphatically asserted the power of 
the judicial review. It examined whether the power under Articlfe 
356 was exercised malafide or on extraneous considerations and 
consbquently, the Court struck down the dismissal of ministries 
and the dissolution of Assemblies in Kamataka, Meghalaya and 
Nagaland. In the light of the above judgment, there is a 
possibility that in future, the unwarranted usfe of Article 356 
might be struck down by the Court. In the Bommai case, the 
majority vitew was emphatic and was an open renunciation of the 
"juditial hand ofP approach. It is heartening to note that striking 
down of these proclamations has clearly shown that imjiosition 
of President's rule under Article 356 is justifiable. This indeed is 
the judicial ^ s w e r to the politically maldfide abuse of the 
Article. However, the majority decision is not clear or 
unequivocal to be considered as binding law uhder view is again 
unanimously reiterated by a constitutional bench of the 
Supreme Court. Despite the cohstitutional safeguard, all the 
political parties which come to power at Cfentre intervened in 
petty State matters on the slightest pretext. Thus, the provision 
which was included as a life saving device by the framers of the 
Constitution has become poison for our political process. The 
important question, therefore arise for consideration whether the 
Article should be deleted. In case the answer is negative, should 
it be retained as it is or amended. In any event, we feel that the 
stage has not yet arrived in Indian constitutional development, 
where we can recommend the deletion of Article 356. What is 
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required is its proper use and that has to be ensured by 
appropriate amiendments to the Article 356. 
It is stibmitted that the powerful weapon of President's rule 
should not be discarded from the constitutional armoury. This 
will be an unpardonable mistake, keeping in view the 
innumerable threats and dangers faced by the Republic today. 
Despite its misuse on certain occasions, Article 356 will continue 
to be more a necessity rather than a liability and can be 
positively used to ensure that the State government is carried on 
in accordance With the provisions of the Constitution, given the 
fact that dtit- Parliamentary democracy has entered the coalition 
age and that at present the regional parties are emerging 
stronger, t h e motivating factor for Presidential takeover of a 
State administration under Article 356 should never be petty 
party gains; rdther it must be the objective satisfaction that the 
constitutional machinery has failed. Therefore, this power should 
be wieldfed only in extreme cases with the Union government 
having on other option to restore the spirit of the Constitution. 
For this we must develop a constitutional culture imbibing 
federal spirit. 
The Congress, the Janata, Party, the United Front and the 
Bharatiya Jan ta Party governments that have come to power in 
the Centre retained Article 356. The Left parties, in principle, 
oppose the retention of the Article. But they have supported the 
imposition of President's rule on some occasions. The point is 
that most political parties make use of the provision when it 
suits them; otherwise, they want it to be deleted. On a closer 
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examination, it appears that neither deletion nor dilution is the 
answer to the vexed question of the misuse and abuse of the 
Article. The Article 356 is not an isolated or severable provision 
of the Constitution; it verily constitutes the crux of the entire 
Centre-State relationship. Remove it, and there goes along with it 
the rubric federal design which has been erected with a great 
sense of responsibility by the founding fathers of the 
Constitution. The only way is to incorporate effective safeguards 
apart from the existing constitutional checks keeping in view the 
federal nature of our society. 
The Administrative Reforms Commission Report (1969), 
Rajmannar Committee Report (1969) and the Sarkaria 
Commission Report (1988) while recommending suitable 
changes in the Centre-State relations also looked into the 
problems of misuse of the Article. The Administrative Reforms 
Commission (1969) recommended setting up of a machinery at 
the Centre to advise the President on possible intervention in thfe 
affairs of the State. This "high status and standing body" the 
Commission observed should advise the President as to "when, 
where and how" the CentrsJ government may intervene in the 
law and order matter in the State. Its functions should be purely 
of advisory nature and a report should be placed before the 
Parliament. The Commission called for some restraint in the 
exercise of the Presidential power under Article 356. 
The Rajmannar Committee on the other hand 
recommended the deletion of Article 356 and 357. In case the 
Union government wanted to retain the present provision, the 
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Commission suggested that sufficient safeguards should be 
provided in the Constitution itself to secure the interest of the 
States against the arbitrary use of Article 356. 
The Sarkaria Commission recommendations (1988) on 
Centre-State relations and in particular, with reference to the 
use of Article 356 would be valuable. The Commission is 
emphatic in recommending that Article 356 should be used very 
sparingly in extreme cases as a measure of last resort, when all 
available alternatives fail to prevent or rectify a constitutional 
breakdown in a State. "All attempts should be made to resolve 
the crisis at the State level" before taking recourse to the 
provisions of Article 356. The Commission also suggested that a 
warning should be issued to the errant State, in specific terms 
that its is not carrying on the government of the State in 
accordance with the Constitution and the explanation given by 
the State should be taken into account before taking action 
under Article 356. 
In a situation of political breakdown, the Commission 
observed that the Governor should explore all possibilities of 
having a government with a majority support in the Legislature. 
If it is not possible to install such a government and if fresh 
elections can be held without available delay, he should ask the 
outgoing ministry to continue as a caretaker government, if the 
ministry was defeated in a major policy issue, unconnected with 
any allegations of maladministration or corruption, and is 
agreeable to continue. The Governor then should dissolve the 
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Legislature leaving the resolution of the constitutional crisis to 
the electorate. 
The Commission has also recommended the course of 
action to be taken consequent on the proclamation of President's 
rule. Every proclamation should be placed before each House of 
Parliament at the earliest. But since the constitutional provision 
in clause (3) of the Article 356 lies down that this should be done 
before the expiry of two months period, it comes to the rescue of 
the Central government and this recommendation is practically 
rendered ineffective. 
The State Legislative Assembly should not be dissolved 
either by the Governor or by the President before the 
proclamation has been laid before the Parliament and it has an 
opportunity to consider it. The Commission recommended that 
Article 356 should be suitably amended to ensure this. 
Another significant recommendation of the Commission is 
that "the safeguards corresponding in principle, to clauses (7) 
and (8) of Article 352 should be incorporated in Article 356" to 
enable the Parliament to review the continuance in force of the 
proclamation periodically. 
The heart of the remedy suggested by the Commission is 
that the material facts and grounds on which Article 356 (1) is 
involved should be made an integral part of the proclamation. 
This would make the remedy of judicial review "a little more 
meaningful". The Commission suggested that this should be 
provided, through an appropriate amendment, notwithstanding 
anything in clause (2) of Article 74 of the Constitution. This will 
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enable the aggrieved party to approach the Supreme Court and 
High Courts to determine whether the proclamiation is well 
founded. And because of the logic of the decision will be written 
into the proclamation, the Supreme Court will be able to 
pronounce on the constitutional validity of t|ie proclamation 
without invading the constitutional domain of thfe executive. 
'the Commission has also recommended that the report of 
the Governor on the basis of which the President acts under 
Artifclfe 356 normally should be "a speaking docliment" and 
should contain a precise and clear statement of all material facts 
and ground on the basis of which the President has satisfied 
himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation 
contemplated in Article 356. Further, the Governor's report 
should be given wide publicity in all media and in full. 
No, doubt the Sarkaria Commission has gone beyond the 
framers of the Constitution and their predecessors in suggesting 
certain recoilimendations with regard to the use of Article 356. 
Of course, these suggesting are not radical. They are appendages 
to the existing constitutional provisions to suit the political 
system which has undergone much transformation since 1967. 
They cover the past and make useful observations and 
suggestions with regard to the clear and specific malpractices. 
However, they hesitate to venture into the future and they take 
shelter in the original constitutional provisions and in the 
wisdom and ingenuity of the founding fathers of the 
Constitution. In the place of concrete suggestion to remedy the 
weakness, the Commission restricted its observation to giving 
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advice on how to use the Article, on what occasion to use i t , how 
to treat ministries backed with majority by , how to understand 
the breakdown of constitutional machinery etc. Role of 
conventions in the democratic framework is another area on 
which the Sarkaria Commission was not eloquent. Many of the 
issued linked with the imposition of Article 356 genuinely need 
the support of conventions. The Commission's suggestions are 
good and valuable. But no one would follow them without 
concrete legal sanctions. No doubt, the attempt of Sarkaria 
Commission however small and limited was a good step and 
served as a corrective or rethinking element in the political 
process. 
The Inter-State Council constituted a Standing Committee 
to look into the matter relating to Centre-State relations 
including abuse of Article 356. The Committee recommended the 
issue of warning or show cause notice with seven days time to 
reply to it and the proclamation be issued only after considering 
the reply of the concerned State government. The Committee 
went a little further that the Sarkaria Commission by stating 
that the proclamation should contain the text of the notice as 
well as the reply of the State government thereto. The 
proclamation is not in the nature of a court judgment to contain 
all these ingredients. The Committee suggested that the period of 
two months for obtaining the approval of Parliament might be 
reduce to one month. The period of two months is a fairly short 
period and there is no reason to reduce it to one month. The 
Committee further recommended that the proclamation be 
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approved by a two-third majority in Parliament. In these days of 
coalition government, where no party has even a majority, the 
condition that the proclamation be approved by a two-third 
majority would completely nullify the objective and effectiveness 
of Article 356. The basic problem is that no political party has a 
definite stand on the utility of Article 356. It is precisely for this 
reason that despite several meetings, the Standing Committee of 
the Inter-State Council could not reach a consensus of Article 
356. 
We can say that the presence of a healthy and strong 
opposition, vigilant public opinion and above all the existence of 
a free press go a long way in ensuring that Article 356 is used as 
was intended by the founding fathers of the Constitution. It was 
the combined forced of these three institutions which enabled to 
correct the wrong decisions of the Centre and the same resulted 
in Kalyan Singh in Uttar Pardesh in 1998, and Rabri Devi in 
Bihar, in 1999. But unfortunately the Indian Parliamentary 
system lacks a strong opposition, vigilant public opinion and an 
independent press. These agencies should be the moving spirit 
behind any Parliamentary system. But very often, these 
institutions cater to their vested interests only and look at 
problems from factional angle. 
However, as things stand today the only effective safeguard 
against the misuse of the Article 356 appears to be the judiciary. 
As and when the power is unilaterally used against a State 
government the courts apart from considering the case should 
also be able to come out with a verdict within a short period of 
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time. It is suggested that the power to issue writs in this regard 
will enable the Supreme Court and the High Courts to deliver 
timely verdicts. This will help to put the constitutional process 
back on the rails without further damage. 
Thus the office of the Governor is provided by Constitution 
in order to preserve the Constitution. His main function is to 
retain the ministry and to sefe that the administfeltion of the 
State is going on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and when the ministry is out he has to Carry on the 
administration of the State on behalf of the President of India. He 
has to send periodical reports to the President about the political 
and administrative affairs of the State.We may conclude that the 
Governor has two important roles to play, it is his responsibility 
to see that the federal balance and political stability are not 
sought to be destroyed or undermined. In his tole as the head of 
the State government, he has discretionary powers. He is not 
merely a figure-head or a nominal head, or a passive spectator 
but the exact range of his power would upon the political 
situation that exist in the State. If there is great deal of political 
harmony in the State, the burden of the government is greatly 
reduced. If there is great deal of political disharmony in the State 
and political stability is being undermined, the role of the 
Governor naturally becomes much larger. 
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Appendix-I 
Extracts from Constituent Assembly Debates, Official 
Report, Reprinted by Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 
Third Reprint, 1999. 
1. Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Consti tuent Assembly Debates, 
Vol. VII, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1999, p. 43, 
"though India was to be a federation, the federation was 
not the result of an agreement by the States to join in a 
federation, and that the federation not being the result of 
an agreement, no State has the right to secede from it. The 
federation is a Union because it is indestructible. 
Though the country and the people may be divided into 
different States for convenience of administration, the 
country is one integral whole, its people a single people 
living under a single imperium derived from a single 
source. The Americans had to wage a civil war to 
establish that the States have no right of secession and 
that their federation was indestructible. The Drafting 
Committee thought that it was better to make it clear at 
the outset rather than to leave it to speculation or to 
disputes." 
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2. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates, 
Vol. VIII, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1999, pp. 455-56, "It 
probably would be desirable to have people from 
outside-eminent people, sometimes people who have not 
taken too great a part in politics. Politicians would 
probably like a more active domain for their activities 
but there may be an eminent educationist or persons 
eminent in other walks of life, who would naturally, 
while cooperating fully with the government and 
carrying out the policy of the government, at any rate 
helping in every way so that policy might be carried out, 
he would nevertheless represent before the public some 
one slightly above party and thereby, in fact, help that 
government more than if he was considered as part of 
the party machine. ... it is obviously desirable that 
eminent leaders of minorities - I use the word for the 
sake of simplicity: in future I hope we will not use the 
words 'majority' and 'minority'- eminent leaders of 
groups should have a chance. I think they will have a 
far better chance in the process of nomination than in 
election." 
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3. A.K. Ayyar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Ibid., pp. 
431-32, "In thp n o r m ^ wprlqng pf thp PonstitL^tion, I 
have no doubt that the convention will grow up of the 
Government of India consulting the Provincial Cabinet, 
in the election of the Governor. If the choice is left to thfe 
President and his Cdbihfet, thfe President may, in 
conceivable circumstances, with dufe regard to the 
conditions of the Provihce, choosfe a persbn bf 
lindoubtfed polity and position iti jjublifc life who at the 
samfe time has not been itiixed Up in Provincial patty 
struggle ot factions. Such a person is likely to act as a 
friend ahd mediator of the Cabinet and help in the 
smooth Working of the cd.bintet governtnent in the early 
stagfes. t b e Central fact tb be remembered is that the 
Govetnot- is to be constitutional head, a sagacious 
councellor and adviser to the Ministry, one whb can 
throw oil over troubled water. If that is the position to 
be occupied by the Governor, the Governor chosen by 
the Government of India, presumably with the consent 
of the Provincial government, is likely to discharge his 
functions better than one who is elected on a party 
ticket by the Province as a whole based upon the 
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universal suffrage or by Legislature on some principle of 
election." 
4. Dr. b.R. Ambedkal-, CotiStitueht Assembler Debates, 
Ibid., pp. 468-469, "It has been said in the course of 
debate that the argument against felection is that there 
would be rivalry between the Prime Minister and the 
Governor, both deriving their mandate from the people 
at large. Speaking for myself, that was not the argument 
which influenced me because I do not accept that even 
under election there would be any kind of rivalry 
between the Prime Minister and the Governor, for the 
simple reason that the Prime Minister would be elected 
on the basis of policy, while the Governor could not be 
electfed on the basis of policy, because he could have no 
policy, not having any power. So far as I could visualize, 
the election of the Governor would be on the basis of 
personality; is he the right sort of person by his s tatus , 
by his character, by his education, by his position in the 
public to fill in a post of Governor? In the case of Prime 
Minister the position would be: is his programme 
suitable, is his programme right? There could not, 
therefore, be any conflict even if we adopt the principle 
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of elfection." "I want to warn the House that the real 
issue before the House is really not nomination or: 
electibh because as 1 said this functionary is going to be 
a purfely, ornamental functionary, how he comes into 
being, whether by nomination or by sotiie bther 
machinery, is a purely psychological qlib^tibn - What 
wotild appeal most to the people a person nominated or 
a pJerson in whose nomination the Legislature hds in 
some way participated. Beyond that, it seems to ttie it 
has no consequence. Therefore, the thing that I want to 
tell the House is this: that the real issue before the 
House is not nomination or election, but what powers 
you propose to give to your Governor. If the Governor is 
purely a constitutional Governor with no power more 
than what we contemplate expressly to give him in the 
Act and has no power to interfere with the internal 
administration of the Provincial Ministry, 1 personally do 
not see any very fundamental objection to the principle 
of nomination." 
5. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, 
VIII, p. 546, "The Governor under the Constitution has 
no functions which he can discharge by himself; no 
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fuilfctions at all. While he has no functions, he has 
certElin duties to perform, and I think the House will do 
well to bear in mind this distinction A distinction has 
beeri made between the functions of the Governor and 
the duties which the Governor has to perform. My 
submission is that altkough the Qovfei-rtor hds no 
functions still, even the cohstitutional Govfernor, that he 
is, has certain duties to {jerform. His, diitites, dccdrding 
tb the, rilfty be classified in two parts, bnte is, that tlfe 
has to retain the Ministry in offifce. Because, the 
Mihistry is to hold office during his pleasure, he has to 
see Whether and when he should exercise his pleasure 
agaihst the Ministry, t h e second duty which the 
Governot has, and itiust have, is to advise the Ministry, 
to watn the Ministry, tb suggest to the Ministry an 
alternative and to ask fof reconsideratioh. I do not think 
that anybody in this House will question the fact that 
the Governor should have this duty cast upon him; 
otherwise, he would be an absolutely unnecessary 
functionary: no good at all. He is the representative not 
of a party; he is tie representative of the people as a 
whole of the State. It is in the name of the people that 
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he carries on the administration He must see that the 
administration is carried on a level which mdy bfe 
regarded as good, efficient, honest adrriinistrktion. 
Therefore> having regard to these two duties which the 
Governor has narhely, to see that the administration is 
kept pure, without corruption, impartial, and that thfe 
proposals enunciated by the Ministry are not contrary to 
the wishes of the people, and therefore to advise them, 
warti them and ask them to reconsider . 1 ask the 
I^ouse, how is the Governor in a position to carry out 
his dlities Unless he has before him certain ihformatioh. 
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Appendix-II 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SARKARIA COMMISSION REPORT 
Power and Funct ions of t h e Governor under t h e Consti tut ion 
1. 5.19.01 Normally in the discharge of the functions under 
Article 200, the Governor must abide by the advice of his Council of 
Ministers. Article 200 does not invest the Governor, expressly or by 
necessary implication, with a general discretion in the performance of 
his functions there under, including reservation of Bill for the 
consideration of the President. However, in rare and exceptional 
cases, he may act in the exercise of his discretion, where he is of 
opinion that the provisions of the Bill are patently un-constitutional, 
such as where the subject-matter of the Bill is ex-facie beyond the 
legislative competence of the State Legislature, or where its provisions 
manifestly derogate from the scheme and framework of the 
Constitution so as to endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of 
the nation, or clearly violate Fundamental Rights or transgress other 
constitutional limitations and provisions. 
(paras 5.6.06 and 5.6.13(i)) 
2. 5.19.02 In dealing with a State Bill presented to him under 
Article 200, the Governor should not act contrary to the advice of his 
Council of Ministers merely because, personally, he does not like the 
policy embodied in the Bill. 
(paras 5.6.09 and 5.6.13(ii)) 
3 . 5.19.03 Needless reservation of Bills for President's 
consideration should be avoided. Bill should be reserved only if 
required for specific purposes, such as: 
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a) to secure immunity from the operation or Articles 14 and 19 
vide the First Proviso to Article 31A(1) and the proviso to Article 
31C. 
b) to save a Bill on a concurrent List subject from being 
invalidated on the ground of repugnancy to the provisions of law 
made by Parliament or an existing law vide Article 254(2); 
c) to ensure validity and effect for a State Legislation imposing tax 
on water or electricity stored, generated, consumed, distributed 
or sold by an authority established under a Union law vide Article 
288 (2) 
d) a bill imposing restrictions on trade or commerce, in respect of 
which previous sanction of the President had not been obtained, 
vide Article 304 (b) read with Article 255. 
(para 5.14.05). 
4. 5.19.04 Normally, when a Bill passed by the State 
Legislature is presented to the Governor with the advice of the 
Council of Ministers that it be reserved for the consideration of the 
President, then the Governor should do so forthwith. If, in exceptional 
circumstances, as indicated in para 5.19.01 above, the Governor 
thinks it necessary to act and adopt, in the exercise of his discretion, 
any other course open to him under Article 200, he should do so 
within a period not exceeding one month from the date on which the 
Bill is presented to him. (para 5.16.04) 
5. 5.19.05 a) Every reference of a State Bill from the State 
should be self-contained, setting out precisely the material 
facts, points for consideration and the ground on which the 
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reference has been made. The relevant provisions of the 
Constitution should also be indicated. 
b) If the reference is made under Article 254 (2), the 
provisions of the Bill which are considered repugnant to or 
inconsistent with the specific provisions of a Union Law or an 
existing Law, should be clearly identified. 
(para 5.15.01(1) (ii)) 
6. 5.19.06 State governments often consult the Government of 
India at the drafting stage of a Bill. Generally, high-level officers of 
the State government hold discussions on the provisions of the draft 
Bill with their counterparts at the Union. This is a healthy practice 
and should continue. (para 5.15.02). 
7. 5.19.07 a) As a matter of salutary convention, a Bill 
reserved for consideration of the President should be disposed 
of by the President within a period of 4 months from the date 
on which it is received by the Union government. 
b) If, however, it is considered necessary to seek clarification 
from the State government or to return the Bill for 
consideration by the State Legislature under the Proviso to 
Article 201, this should be done within two months of the date 
on which the original reference was received by the Union 
government. 
c) Any communication for seeking clarification should be self-
contained. Seeking clarification piecemeal should be avoided. 
d) On receipt of the clarification or the reconsidered Bill from 
the State under the proviso to Article 201, the matter should be 
disposed of by the President within 4 months of the date of 
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receipt of the clarification or the back reference on the 
reconsidered Bill, as the case may be, from the State 
government. 
e) It is not necessary to incorporate these or any other time-
limits in the Constitution. 
(paras 5.16.03 and 5.7.09). 
8. 5.19.08 a) As a matter of convention, the President should 
not withhold assent only on the consideration of policy 
differences on matters relating, in pith and substance, to the 
State List, except on grounds of patent unconstitutionality 
such as those indicated in the recommendation in paragraph 
5.19.01 above. 
(para 5.10.06). 
b) President's assent should not ordinarily be withheld on the 
ground that the Union is contemplating a comprehensive law in 
future on the same subject. 
(para 5.7.08). 
9. 5.19.09 If a State Bill reserved for the consideration of the 
President under the First Proviso to Article 31A (1) or the Proviso to 
Article 31C clearly tends to subvert the constitutional system of the 
State, by reason of its unduly excessive and indiscriminate abridging 
effect of Fundamental Rights or otherwise, then, consistently with its 
duty under Article 355 to ensure that the government of every State 
is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, 
the Union government may advise the President to withhold assent to 
the Bill. 
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[para 5.8.06 and 5.8.07). 
10. 5.19.10 In cases where the Union government considers 
that some amendments to a State Bill are essential before it becomes 
law, the President may return the Bill through the Governor in terms 
of the Proviso to Article 201 for reconsideration, with an appropriate 
message, indicating the suggested amendments. The practice of 
obtaining the so-called conditional assent should not be followed 
when a constitutional remedy is available. 
(para 5.11.02). 
11. 5.19.11 To the extent feasible, the reasons for withholding 
assent should be communicated to the State government. 
(para 5.17.01). 
12. 5.19.12 State governments should eschew the wrong 
practice of mechanical and repeated re-promulgation of an Ordinance 
without caring to get it replaced by an Act of the legislature. 
(para 5.18.12) 
13. 5.19.13 In due regard to the requirement of clause (2) of 
Article 213, whenever the provisions of an Ordinance have to be 
continued beyond the period for which it can remain in force, the 
State government should ensure, by scheduling suitably, the 
legislative business of the State Legislature, enactment of a law 
containing those provisions in the next ensuing session. The 
occasions should be extremely rare when a State government fmds 
that it is compelled to re-promulgate an Ordinance because the State 
Legislature has too much legislative business in the current session 
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or the time at the disposal of the Legislature in that session is short. 
In any case, the question of re-promulgating an Ordinance for a 
second time should never arise. 
(para 5.18.14). 
14. 5.19.14 A decision to promulgate or re-promulgate an 
Ordinance should be taken only on the basis of stated facts 
necessitating immediate action, and that too, by the State Council of 
Ministers, collectively. (para 5.18.15). 
15. 5.19.15 Suitable conventions should be evolved in the 
matter of dealing with an Ordinance which is to be re-promulgated by 
the Governor and which is received by the President for instructions 
under the Proviso to Article 213(1). (para 5.18.16) 
16. 5.19.16 The President may not withhold instructions in 
respect of the first re-promulgation of an Ordinance, the provisions of 
which are otherwise in order, but could not be got enacted in an Act 
because the legislature did not have time to consider its provisions in 
that session. While conveying the instructions, the Union government 
should make it clear to the State government that another 
repromulgation of the same ordinance may not be approved by the 
President, and if it is considered necessary to continue the provisions 
of the Ordinance for a further period, the State government should 
take steps well in time to have the necessary Bill containing those 
provisions passed by the State Legislature, and if necessary, to obtain 
the assent of the President of the Bill so passed. (para 5.18.17). 
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17. 5.19.17 The recommendations in paras 5.19.01 to 5.19.11 
will apply mutatis mutandis to the seeking of instructions from the 
President for the promulgation of a State Ordinance. However, 
keeping in view the urgent nature of an Ordinance, a proposed 
Ordinance referred by the Governor to the President for instructions 
under the proviso to Article 213 (1) should be disposed by the 
President urgently and in any case within a fortnight. 
(para 5.18.23) 
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Appendix-III 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION TO 
REVIEW THE WORKING OP THE CONSTITUTION ON UNION-
STATE RELATIONS 
Office of Governor 
8.14.1 The Commission had issued a consultation paper 
with a questionnaire on the office of the Governor for eliciting 
public opinion. The issues raised and the suggestions made in 
the consultation paper related to amending Articles 155, 156, 
200 and 201 with a view to entrusting the selection of Governors 
to a Committee, making the five-year term a fixed tenure, 
providing for removal only by impeachment and limiting his 
powers in the matter of giving assent to Bills and reserving them 
for the consideration of the President. 
8.14.2 After carefully considering the public responses and 
after full deliberations, the Commission does not agree to dilute 
the powers of the President in the matter of selection and 
appointment of Governors. However, the Commission feels that 
the Governor of a State should be appointed by the President, 
after consultation with the Chief Minister of that State. Normally 
the five year term should be adhered to and removal or transfer 
of the Governor should be by following a similar procedure as for 
appointment i.e. after consultation with the Chief Minister of the 
concerned State. 
8.14.3 The Commission recommends that in the matter of 
selection of a Governor, the following matters mentioned in para 
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4.16.01 of Volume I of the Sarkaria Commission Report should 
be kept in mind: 
• He should be eminent in some walk of life. 
• He should be a person from outside the State. 
• He should be a detached figure and not too 
intimately connected with the local politics of the 
State. 
• He should be a person who has not taken too great a 
part in politics generally, and particularly in the 
recent past. 
In selecting a Governor in accordance with the above criteria, 
the persons belonging to the minority groups should continue to 
be given a chance as hitherto. 
8.14.4 There should be a time-limit - say a period of six 
months - within which the Governor should take a decision 
whether to grant assent or to reserve a Bill for consideration of 
the President. If the Bill is reserved for consideration of the 
President, there should be a time-limit, say of three months, 
within which the President should take a decision whether to 
accord his assent or to direct the Governor to return it to the 
State Legislature or to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court 
regarding the constitutionality of the Act under Article 143. 
8.14.5 In Jamalpur Gram Panchayat Vs Malwinder Singh-
AIR 1985 SC 1394, the Supreme Court held that if the assent of 
the President were sought to the law for a specific purpose, the 
efficacy of the assent would be limited to that purpose and 
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cannot be extended beyond it. The court held that if the assent 
is sought and given, in general terms so as to be effective for all 
purposes, different considerations might arise. In the case 
before the Supreme Court case the assent was given by the 
President for giving protection to the legislation under Article 31 
(as it then stood) and Article 31A and the court held that such 
assent would not operate for the purposes of Article 254(2) of the 
Constitution. However, the court upheld the law passed by the 
State Legislature on the ground that it fell under entry 18 of the 
State List and not entry 41 of the Concurrent List. 
8.14.6 It is felt desirable that a suitable amendment should 
be made in the Constitution so that the assent given by the 
President should avail for all purposes of relevant Articles of the 
Constitution. It would be inappropriate to drag the assent of 
President into such arguments. From the time the Bill is 
introduced till the assent of President is given, the whole 
procedure and proceedings are legislative in character. It is a 
collective action of the President, the House of the People, and 
the Council of States. It is not permissible to enquire as to how 
the mind of each member of the House and the President worked 
during the entire proceedings beginning with the introduction of 
the Bill and concluding with the according of assent by the 
President.The procedures are "certainly internal matters which 
are beyond the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into." The 
court is entitled to go into the questions as to whether the 
enactment is either ultra virus or unconstitutional. The assent 
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of the President is not justiciable. See AIR 1983 SC 1019 at 
1048 para 88 - M/s Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs State of 
Bihar and others. Even if noting sent to the President by the 
concerned ministry does not reflect all the articles in the 
Constitution, which referred to the effect of the assent of the 
President i.e. Articles 31 A, 31C, 254, it cannot be presumed 
that the President was not aware of or did not bear in mind, the 
relevant Articles dealing with the effect of the assent of the 
President. However, it is desirable that when a Bill is sent for the 
President's assent, it would be appropriate to draw the attention 
of the President to all the Articles of the Constitution, which 
refer to the need for the assent of the President to avoid any 
doubts in court proceedings. 
8.14.7 A suitable Article should be inserted in the 
Constitution to the effect that an assent given by the President to 
an Act shall not be permitted to be argued as to whether it was 
given for one purpose or another.When the President gives his 
assent to the Bill, it shall be deemed to have been given for all 
purposes of the Constitution. 
8.14.8 It is recommended that the following proviso may be 
added as second proviso to Article 111 of the Constitution: 
"Provided jurther that when the President declares 
that he assents to the Bill, the assent shall be 
deemed to be a general assent for all purposes of the 
Constitution." 
Suitable amendment may also be made in Article 200. 
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Failure of Constitutional Machinery 
8.15.1 The Constitution of a countiy-or, for that matter, any 
enactment containing important and far-reaching provisions-is 
expected to provide for situations where circumstances arise, in 
which those provisions cannot be worked in strict conformity 
with the constitutional or statutory text, as applicable in normal 
circumstances. In India, the specific topic of failure of 
constitutional machinery in the States is dealt with, in three 
Articles of the Constitution - Articles 355 to 357 and 365 - of 
which. Article 356 is the one most talked about and subject of 
controversy allegedly on grounds of having been frequently 
misused and abused. 
8.15.2 It is important that Article 356 is read with the other 
relevant Articles viz. Articles 256, 257, 355 and 365. Insofar as 
Article 355 also inter alia speaks of the duty of the Union to 
protect the State against external aggression and internal 
disturbance and to ensure that the government of the State is 
carried on in accordance with the Constitution, it is obvious 
that Article 356 is not the only one to take care of a situation of 
failure of constitutional machinery. The Union can also act 
under Article 355 i.e. without imposing President's rule. Article 
355 can stand on its own. Also, Union government can issue 
certain directions under Articles 256 and 257. While Article 
356 authorises the President to issue a proclamation imposing 
President's rule over a State if he is satisfied that a situation 
has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be 
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carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution, Article 365 says that where a State fails to comply 
with Union directions (under Articles 256, 257 and others) "it 
shall be lawful for the President to hold that a situation has 
arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried 
on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution". The 
scheme of the Constitution seems to clearly suggest that before 
rushing to issue a proclamation under Article 356, all other 
possible avenues should be explored and as Dr. Ambedkar said, 
Article 356 should be used only as a matter of last resort. It 
should first be ensured that the Union had done all that it could 
in discharge of its duty under Article 355, that it had issued the 
necessary directions under Articles 256-257 and that the State 
had failed to comply with or give effect to the directions. 
Use-misuse of Article 356: 
8.16 Since the coming into force of the Constitution on 26 
January 1950, Article 356 and analogous provisions have been 
invoked 111 times. According to a Lok Sabha Secretariat study, 
on 13 occasions the analogous provision namely section 51 of 
the government of Union Territories Act 1963 was applied to 
Union Territories of which only Pondicherry had a Legislative 
Assembly until the occasion when it was last applied. In the 
remaining 98 instances the Article was applied 10 times 
technically due to the mechanics of the Constitution in 
circumstances like reorganisation of the States, delay in 
completion of the process of elections, for revision of 
262 
J.ppendv(rIII 
proclamation and there being no party with clear majority at the 
end of an election. In the remaining 88 instances a close 
scrutiny of records would show that in as many as 54 cases 
there were apparent circumstances to warrant invocation of 
Article 356. These were instances of large scale defections 
leading to reduction of the ruling party into minority, withdrawal 
of support of coalition partners, voluntary resignation by the 
government in view of widespread agitations, large scale 
militancy, judicial disqualification of some members of the ruling 
party causing loss of majority in the House and there being no 
alternate party capable of forming a government. About 13 
cases of possible misuse are such in which defections and 
dissensions could have been alleged to be result of political 
manoeuvre or cases in which floor tests could have finally proved 
loss of support but were not resorted to. In 18 cases common 
perception is that of clear misuse. These involved the dismissal 
of 9 State governments in April 1977 and an equal number in 
February 1980. This analysis shows that number of cases of 
imposition of President's rule out of 111, which could be 
considered as a misuse for dealing with political problems or 
considerations irrelevant for the purposes in that Article such as 
mal-administration in the State are a little over 20. Clearly in 
many cases including those arising out of States Reorganisation 
it would appear that the President's rule was inevitable. 
However, in view of the fact that Article 356 represents a giant 
instrument of constitutional control of one tier of the 
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constitutional structure over the other raises strong 
misapprehensions. 
Sarkaria Commission: 
8.17 Chapter 6 of the Sarkaria Commission Report deals 
with emergency provisions, namely, Articles 352 - 360.The 
Sarkaria Commission has made 12 recommendations; 11 of 
which are related to Article 356 while 1 is related to Article 355 
of the Constitution. Sarkaria Commission also made specific 
recommendations for amendment of the Constitution with a view 
to protecting the States from what could be perceived as a 
politically-driven interference in self-governance of States. The 
underlined theme of the recommendations is to promote a 
constitutional structure and culture that promotes co-operative 
and sustained growth of federal institutions set down by the 
Constitution. 
Should Article 356 be Deleted? 
8.18 The Commission had issued a consultation paper 
along with a questionnaire with a view to elicit the views and 
responses of the public. Large majority of the responses were 
against deletion of Article 356 but favoured its being suitably 
amended to prevent misuse. There are three patent reasons 
which require the retention of the Article: 
(i) Article 356 and related provisions were regarded as a 
bulwark of the Constitution, an ultimate assurance of 
maintaining or restoring representative government in 
States responsible to the people. 
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(ii) In a fairly large number of cases the invocation of Article 
356 has been found to have been not only 
warranted but inevitable. 
(iii) If this Article is deleted, Article 365 would lose relevance 
and use of Article 355 in the absence of 356 might bring a 
drastic change in Union-State relations which may be 
worse from the point of view of both the States and the 
Union. 
The Commission is, therefore, not in favour of deletion of 
Article 356. 
Need for Conventions: 
8.19.1 In considering the issues raised regarding 
Article 356 the Commission found that a great part of the 
remedy to prevent its misuse lies in the domain of creating 
safeguards and constitutional conventions governing its use. The 
ultimate protection against the misuse of Article 356 lies in the 
character of the political process itself. The Commission is, 
therefore, for generating a constitutional culture that relies on 
conventions and treats them with same respect as a 
constitutional provision. 
8.19.2 Article 356 has been lodged in the Constitution 
as a bulwark, a giant protection and a remedy of the last resort. 
The invocation of Article 356 is a constitutional device, the 
operation of which is vested in the executive domain. In 
invocation, it is therefore essential to preserve its stature in the 
constitutional scheme. If the exercise of this power is perceived 
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to yield to political expediency, it will greatly damage the majesty 
of the executive power and the federal balance. The 
Commission, therefore, recommends, in the spirit of the framers 
of the Constitution, that Article 356 must be used sparingly and 
only as a remedy of the last resort and after exhausting action 
under other Articles like 256, 257 and 355. 
8.19.3 It has been widely represented that the process 
of invocation of Article 356 must follow the principles of natural 
justice and fair consideration. This aspect also weighed heavily 
during discussions in the Constituent Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee had hoped that warning 
would be given to the errant States and they would be given an 
opportunity to explain their position. One other issue regarding 
the issue of such a warning is whether it should be made public 
or given wide publicity. The Commission have considered this 
aspect very carefully and have come to the conclusion that 
taking this matter to the public domain at this stage may 
apparently allow for transparency but is likely to generate a 
great deal of heat in the political domain providing the anti-social 
forces a free play for social disharmony and violence. It may also 
encourage from the very outset a process of litigation that may 
apply continuous brakes in exercise of the executive 
responsibility. 
8.19.4 The Commission feels that in a large number of cases 
where Article 356 has been used, the situation could be handled 
under that Article 355 has hardly been used. 
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8.19.5 In case of political breakdown, the Commission 
recommends that before issuing a proclam.ation under Article 
356 the concerned State should be given an opportunity to 
explain its position and redress the situation, unless the 
situation is such, that following the above course would not be 
in the interest of security of State, or defence of the country, or 
for other reasons necessitating urgent action. 
Situation of Political breakdown: 
8.20.1 One of the principal criticisms against the imposition 
of the President's rule has been the unseemly hurry of Governors 
to recommend it - particularly in a politically conflicting context 
- without exploring all possibilities of having an alternative 
government enjoying confidence of the House. Even while 
making such an exploration the Governors placed excessive 
reliance on their subjective satisfaction to ascertain majority 
support for one or the other political party by resorting to 
headcounts of supporters presented before them by the political 
parties. 
8.20.2 The issue of determining the majority support of a 
political party in the House has been dealt with in the 
Rajamannar Committee Report, Sarkaria Commission and the 
Bommai judgment. The Commission notes that the political 
events in a divisive context in several States have repeatedly 
shown tremendous speed and mobility of shifting political 
loyalties. In such a situation the task that a Governor may 
impose upon himself to determine the majority support of one or 
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the other party is indeed an onerous one. The assessment of the 
Governor, no matter how carefully and objectively determined, 
can lose validity in no time in the climate of quick shifting sands 
of political loyalty. It is, therefore, not a matter of subjective 
determination of the Governor or the President. The 
constitutional requirement is that a government should enjoy the 
confidence of the House and its open and objective 
determination is possible only on the floor of the House. There 
may conceivably be exceptional circumstances and situations 
which are not conducive to hold the floor test. The Commission 
is not, therefore, in favour of a static binding rule but would rely 
on a political and constitutional process in a constitutional 
forum for a valid determination of majority support for a 
particular party in the House. The procedure suggested forms a 
part of the Bommai judgement and thus holds ground judicially. 
8.20.3 The Commission recommends that the question 
whether the Ministry in a State has lost the confidence of the 
Legislative Assembly or not, should be decided only on the floor 
of the Assembly and nowhere else. If necessary, the Union 
government should take the required steps, to enable the 
Legislative Assembly to meet and freely transact its business. 
The Governor should not be allowed to dismiss the Ministry, so 
long as it enjoys the confidence of the House. It is only where a 
Chief Minister refuses to resign, after his Ministry is defeated on 
a motion of no-confidence, that the Governor can dismiss the 
State government. In a situation of political breakdown, the 
268 
Appetufbi-III 
Governor should explore all possibilities of having a government 
enjoying majority support in the Assembly. If it is not possible 
for such a government to be installed and if fresh elections can 
be held without avoidable delay, he should ask the outgoing 
Ministry, (if there is one), to continue as a caretaker government, 
provided the Ministry was defeated solely on a issue, 
unconnected with any allegations of maladministration or 
corruption and is agreeable to continue. The Governor should 
then dissolve the Legislative Assembly, leaving the resolution of 
the constitutional crisis to the electorate. 
8.20.4 The problem would stand largely resolved if the 
recommendations made in para 4.20.7 in Chapter 4 in regard to 
the election of the leader of the House (Chief Minister) and the 
removal of the government only by a constructive vote of no-
confidence are accepted and implemented. 
8.20.5 Clause (1) of Article 356 contains the expression 'or 
otherwise'. Clearly, the satisfaction of the President, as regards 
the existence of the situation contemplated under Article 356, 
flows from two streams. It is immaterial that in most cases 
where Article 356 had been invoked in the past it was on the 
basis of the report of the Governor. Given the circumstances of 
global nexus in activities of terrorism, insurgency, lawlessness, 
the material flowing from the source "otherwise" than the report 
of the Governor is equally germane to the scheme of invoking 
this provision. If, to meet with the desirable objective of 
transparency, as suggested by the Sarkaria Commission, the 
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Governor's Report is projected in the public domain by making it 
a speaking document and given wide publicity, it would raise 
serious problems in the discharge of the executive responsibility. 
For purposes of publicity it would be difficult to differentiate 
between the Report of the Governor and the materials received 
"otherwise". The Commission recommends that normally 
President's Rule in a State should be proclaimed on the basis of 
Governor's Report under Article 356(l).The Governor's report 
should be a "speaking document", containing a precise and clear 
statement of all material facts and grounds, on the basis of 
which the President may satisfy himself, as to the existence or 
otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356. 
Constitutional Amendments 
8.21.1 Article 356 has been amended 10 times principally by 
way of amendment of clause 356(4) and by 
substitution/omission of proviso to Article 356(5). These were 
basically procedural changes. Article 356, as amended by 
Constitution (44*^ Amendment) provides that a resolution with 
respect to the continuance in force of a proclamation for any 
period beyond one year from the date of issue of such 
proclamation shall not be passed by either House of Parliament 
unless two conditions are satisfied, viz: 
(i) that a proclamation of Emergency is in operation in the 
whole of India or as the case may be, in the whole or 
any part of the State; and 
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(ii) that the Election Commission certifies that the 
continuance in force of the proclamation during the 
extended period is necessary on account of difficulties 
in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly 
of the State concerned. 
8.21.2 The fulfillment of these two conditions together is a 
requirement precedent to the continuation of the proclamation. 
It could give rise to occasions for amendment of the Constitution 
from time to time merely for the purpose of this clause as 
happened in case of Punjab. Circumstances may arise where 
even without the proclamation of Emergency under Article 352, 
it may be difficult to hold general elections to the State 
Assembly. In such a situation continuation of President's rulfe 
may become necessary. It may, therefore, be more practicable to 
delink the tWo conditions allowing for operation of each condition 
in its own specific circumstances for continuation of the 
President's rule. This would allow for flexibility and save the 
Constitution from the need to amend it from time to time. 
8.21.3 The Commission recommends that in clause (5) of 
Article 356 of the Constitution, in sub-clause (a) the word "and" 
occurring at the end should be substituted by "or" so that even 
without the State being under a proclamation of Emergency, 
President's rule may be continued if elections cannot be held. 
8.21.4 Whenever a proclamation under Article 356 has been 
issued and approved by the Parliament it may become necessary 
to review the continuance in force of the proclamation and to 
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restore the democratic processes earlier than the expiry of the 
stipulated period. The Commission are of the view that this 
could be secured by incorporating safeguards corresponding, in 
principal, to clauses (7) and (8) of Article 352. The Commission, 
therefore, recommends that clauses (6) & (7) under Article 356 
may be added on the following lines: 
"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing 
clauses, the President shall revoke a proclamation 
issued under clause (1) or a proclamation varying 
such proclamation if the House of the People passes a 
resolution disapproving, or, as the case may be, 
disapproving the continuance in force of, such 
proclamation. 
(7) Where a notice in writing signed by not less than one-
tenth of the total number of members of the House of 
the People has been given, of their intention to move a 
resolution for disapproving, or, as the case may be, for 
disapproving the continuance in force of, a 
proclamation issued under clause (1) or a 
proclamation varying such proclamation: 
(a) to the Speaker, if the House is in session; or 
(b) to the President, if the House is not in session, 
a special sitting of the House shall be held within fourteen 
days from the date on which such notice is received by the 
Speaker, or, as the case may be, by the President, for the 
purpose of considering such resolution." 
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Dissolution of Assembly: 
8.22.1 When it is decided to issue a proclamation under 
Article 356(1), a matter for consideration that arises is whether 
the Legislative Assembly should also be dissolved or not. Article 
356 does not explicitly provide for dissolution of the Assembly. 
One opinion is that if till expiry of two months from the 
Presidential proclamation and on the approval received from 
both Houses of Parliament the Legislative Assembly is not 
dissolved, it would give rise to operational disharmony. Since 
the executive power of the Union or State is co-extensive with 
their legislative powers respectively, bicameral operations of the 
legislative and executive powers, both of the State Legislature 
and Parliament in List II of VII Schedule, is an anathema to the 
democratic principle and the constitutional scheme. However, 
the majority opinion in the Bommai judgment holds that the 
rationale of clause (3) that every proclamation issued under 
Article 356 shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and 
shall cease to operate at the expiry of two months unless before 
the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions 
passed by both Houses of Parliament, is to provide a salutary 
check on the executive power entrenching parliamentary 
supremacy over the executive. 
8.22.2 The Commission having considered these two 
opinions in the background of repeated criticism of arbitrary use 
of Article 356 by the executive, is of the view that the check 
provided under clause 3 of Article 356 would be ineffective by an 
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irreversible decision before Parliament has had an opportunity to 
consider it. The power of dissolution has been inferred by 
reading sub-clause (a) of clause 1 of Article 356 along with 
Article 174 which empowers the Governor to dissolve Legislative 
Assembly. Having regard to the overall constitutional scheme it 
would be necessary to secure the exercise of consideration of the 
proclamation by the Parliament before the Assembly is dissolved. 
8.22.3 The Commission, therefore, recommends that Article 
356 should be amended to ensure that the State Legislative 
Assembly should not be dissolved either by the Governor or the 
President before the proclamation issued under Article 356(1) 
has been laid before Parliament and it has had an opportunity to 
consider it. 
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